general jurisdiction

Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.

In October 1953 Francisco Romero, a Spanish subject, signed on as a crew member of the S.S. Guadalupe, a vessel of Spanish registry owned by the Spanish corporation Compania Trasatlantica. Romero continued to serve on the Guadalupe after the initial voyage, so that under Spanish law the original contract of hire remained in force. The ship sailed from Bilbao, touched other Spanish ports, proceeded to New York and Hoboken, made a brief trip to Vera Cruz and Havana, and returned to Hoboken. On May 12, 1954, while the vessel lay in Hoboken, Romero was struck by a cable on deck and seriously injured. Romero filed suit on the law side of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against four corporate defendants. He asserted Jones Act and general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and maritime tort against Compania Trasatlantica and its New York husbanding agent Garcia & Diaz, Inc. He asserted maritime-tort claims against stevedore International Terminal Operating Co. and carpenter Quin Lumber Co., both of which were performing work aboard the Guadalupe under oral contracts with Garcia & Diaz. Jurisdiction was invoked under the Jones Act and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. After a pre-trial hearing the district court dismissed the entire complaint. It held that the Jones Act supplied no right of action against the foreign shipowner, that § 1331 did not confer jurisdiction over general maritime claims, that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer, and that complete diversity was lacking under Strawbridge v. Curtiss. The court also declined to exercise discretionary admiralty jurisdiction after examining Spanish law, which provided Romero a lifetime pension of 35 to 55 percent of his wages plus maintenance and cure enforceable through the Spanish consul. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicts among the circuits concerning the construction of § 1331 and the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen to the facts presented.

The petitioner, a resident of North Carolina, sued respondent, a South Carolina corporation, for damages for injuries allegedly caused by the respondent's negligence. He was employed as a lineman in the construction crew of a construction contractor. Respondent Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., a South Carolina corporation in the business of selling electric power, had contracted with R. H. Bouligny, Inc. for $334,300 to build approximately 24 miles of new power lines, reconvert about 88 miles of existing lines to higher capacities, and construct two new substations and a breaker station. The petitioner was injured while connecting power lines to one of the new substations. Byrd first recovered full benefits under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law from his direct employer Bouligny. He then filed a negligence action against Blue Ridge in the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. At trial Blue Ridge asserted an affirmative defense that Byrd qualified as its statutory employee because the contracted work was part of its trade, business, or occupation. Blue Ridge's manager testified on direct examination that three of its substations had been built by its own construction and maintenance crews. His answers on cross-examination created uncertainty that prompted the trial judge to note he appeared to have changed his testimony. Blue Ridge also introduced evidence that it financed the project with a federal loan, purchased the materials, and maintained an engineering service contract with an independent firm for design and supervision. Its charter under the South Carolina Rural Electric Cooperative Act authorized it to construct generating plants, buildings, and equipment necessary for its operations. After all evidence was presented the district judge struck the affirmative defense, ruling that Blue Ridge could not be a statutory employer because its crews performed work only for its own use rather than for others. The judge then denied Blue Ridge's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the negligence claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Byrd in the amount of $126,786.80. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, resolved uncertainties in the manager's testimony in Blue Ridge's favor, and directed entry of judgment for Blue Ridge without remanding for further proceedings. Byrd petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The case had previously been dismissed on the ground that Blue Ridge enjoyed tort immunity as a nonprofit corporation, but the Court of Appeals had reversed that dismissal and remanded for trial. On the present appeal the Court of Appeals did not reach other grounds raised by Blue Ridge because its resolution of the statutory employer issue disposed of the case.