general personal jurisdiction

Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.

In 1974, Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., agreed with Bendix Autolite Corporation to deliver and install a boiler system at a Bendix facility in Fostoria, Ohio. Bendix is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio, while Midwesco is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Bendix became dissatisfied with the work, claiming that the boiler system had been installed improperly and that it was insufficient to produce the quantity of steam specified in the contract. This diversity action was filed against Midwesco in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 1980. When Midwesco asserted the Ohio statute of limitations as a defense, Bendix responded that the statutory period had not elapsed because under Ohio law the running of the time is suspended, or tolled, for claims against entities that are not within the State and have not designated an agent for service of process. Midwesco replied that this tolling provision violated both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the action, finding that the Ohio tolling statute constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Ohio statute constituted discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause because it required a foreign corporation to choose between exposing itself to personal jurisdiction in state courts by complying with the tolling statute, or, by refusing to comply, to remain liable in perpetuity for all lawsuits containing state causes of action filed against it in the State. Bendix appealed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Ohio tolling statute in 1987.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol), a Colombian corporation with its principal place of business in Bogota, owned a helicopter that crashed in Peru on January 26, 1976, killing four United States citizens. Respondents are the survivors and representatives of the four decedents. At the time of the crash, the decedents were employed by Consorcio, the alter ego of a joint venture named Williams-Sedco-Horn (WSH) headquartered in Houston, Texas. Consorcio had been formed to enable the venturers to contract with Petro Peru for construction of the pipeline. In 1974, Consorcio/WSH needed helicopter services for the project. Helicol's chief executive officer, Francisco Restrepo, flew to Houston and conferred with representatives of the three joint venturers on prices, availability, working conditions, fuel, supplies, and housing. The parties reached an agreement under which Helicol would begin performance before the formal contract was signed in Peru on November 11, 1974. The contract provided that payments would be made to Helicol's account with the Bank of America in New York City and that controversies would be submitted to Peruvian courts. Between 1970 and 1977, Helicol purchased helicopters, spare parts, and accessories for more than four million dollars from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth, accounting for approximately eighty percent of its fleet. During the same period, Helicol sent prospective pilots to Fort Worth for training and to ferry aircraft to South America. It also sent management and maintenance personnel to Bell's facilities for plant familiarization and technical consultation. Helicol received over five million dollars in payments from Consorcio/WSH drawn on the First City National Bank of Houston into its New York City and Panama City bank accounts. Helicol maintained no place of business in Texas, was never licensed to do business there, had no agent for service of process in the state, performed no helicopter operations in Texas, and owned no real or personal property there. Respondents filed wrongful-death actions against Helicol, Consorcio/WSH, and Bell Helicopter in the District Court of Harris County, Texas. After Helicol's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was denied, a consolidated jury trial resulted in a verdict of $1,141,200 against Helicol. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court of Texas ultimately upheld jurisdiction on rehearing.