Also known as: governmental immunities · government immunity · sovereign immunity · state immunity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common-law doctrine shielding governmental entities from tort liability or private damages actions unless the entity consents to suit or Congress validly abrogates the protection. The doctrine traces to English common law and bars suits against states and their subdivisions in both federal and state courts on federal claims when Congress acts under Article I powers.
Gabriella Gomez, a nurse at a state hospital, sues the State of Louisiana in state court for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The state moves to dismiss. The court grants the motion because the state has not consented to private damages actions on federal claims enacted under Article I powers.
Gustavo Gutierrez, a resident of State A, sues State B in State A's courts for breach of a services contract and seeks money damages. State B moves to dismiss on immunity grounds. The court dismisses the action because one state's courts may not entertain private damages suits against another nonconsenting state.
George Garcia, a resident of the state, files a federal-court action against his own state seeking damages for an alleged violation of a federal statute. The state moves to dismiss. The court dismisses the suit because the Eleventh Amendment bars a state's own citizens from pursuing private damages actions in federal court absent consent or valid abrogation.
Gretchen Graham, a casino operator, sues a state in federal court under a federal statute enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause seeking damages for alleged regulatory violations. The state moves to dismiss. The court grants the motion because Article I powers do not authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court.
Gabriel Gonzalez, an employee of a state-created transit authority, sues the authority in federal court for unpaid minimum wages and overtime under federal law. The authority moves to dismiss on immunity grounds. The court denies the motion because Congress validly subjected states and their instrumentalities to suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The history of public transportation in San Antonio began with private operators. In 1959 the City of San Antonio purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with the publicly owned San Antonio Transit System. In 1978 the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. SAMTA became the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Between 1978 and 1980 its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers. San Antonio began receiving federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants from December 1970 through February 1980. This total included $12.5 million in operating grants during SAMTA's first two fiscal years. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 without applying to local mass-transit employees. Congress amended the statute in 1961 to extend minimum-wage coverage to private mass-transit carriers with annual gross revenue of at least $1 million. In 1966 Congress withdrew exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. The 1974 amendments provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees while extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government employees. Following the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved it of overtime obligations under the FLSA. On September 17, 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not constitutionally immune from the FLSA. On November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory relief. On the same day appellant Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court for overtime pay under the FLSA. On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that local public mass-transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. After the Supreme Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co. in 1982, the District Court's judgment was vacated and remanded. On remand the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA in 1983. The Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, restored the cases for reargument after initial argument, and requested briefing on whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery should be reconsidered.
Guadalupe Gallegos, a vendor, sues a state hospital authority in federal court for damages arising from an alleged breach of a procurement contract. The authority moves to dismiss. The court grants the motion because the Eleventh Amendment bars private damages actions against nonconsenting states and their instrumentalities absent valid abrogation.
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
Many jurisdictions distinguish governmental functions, for which immunity applies, from proprietary functions, for which municipalities may be liable. Courts developed this distinction to limit the reach of common-law immunity while still protecting core governmental activities.
The Federal Tort Claims Act waives federal sovereign immunity for many tort claims but retains immunity for discretionary functions and certain other categories. Plaintiffs must satisfy the Act's procedural requirements to proceed.
…to the old notion that the King can do no wrong. Until now, this concept had survived in this country only in the form of sovereign immunity. That doctrine forecloses suit against the Government itself and against Government officials, but only when the suit against the latter actually seeks relief against the sovereign. Larson…
…simple structure would suffice. For example, Congress could enact a statute along the following lines: (a) a waiver of sovereign immunity
…between local government officials, such as the CLEO's who brought this action, and state entities that are entitled to sovereign immunity
…must rest on SAMTA's status as a governmental entity rather than on the "local" nature of its operations. The prerequisites for governmental immunity
…as to the individual and corporate respondents. I would go further, however, and also hold that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity
No. Article I powers such as the Commerce Clause or Indian Commerce Clause do not authorize Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Valid abrogation requires reliance on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yes. States retain sovereign immunity from private damages actions on federal claims in their own courts when Congress acts under Article I. Consent by the state is required before such suits may proceed.
Yes. The Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar extends to suits brought by a state's own citizens against that state in federal court absent consent or valid abrogation.