habitable premises, right to

Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.

In May 1958, Joy M. Cooper leased a portion of the ground floor of a commercial building at 207 Union Street, Hackensack, New Jersey, from the predecessor in title to Reste Realty Corp. After about a year of occupancy, the parties executed a new five-year lease in April 1959 covering the entire ground floor except the furnace room for use as commercial offices in connection with a jewelry firm's sales training and meetings. A driveway ran along the north side of the building. During the first year of occupancy, rainwater ran off the driveway into the leased offices whenever it rained. Arthur A. Donigian, an officer and resident manager of the corporate owner who also maintained an office in the building, was notified of the flooding and took steps to remove the water. Before signing the second lease, Donigian promised to remedy the problem by resurfacing the driveway, and the work was performed. Donigian died on March 30, 1961. Thereafter, when flooding occurred, the lessor ignored Cooper's complaints, and she and her employees removed the water themselves. On multiple occasions, including after heavy rainstorms that left up to two inches of water, sales meetings with as many as fifty attendees had to be relocated or adjourned, sometimes requiring rental of other quarters. On December 20, 1961, five inches of water flooded the premises during a meeting of sales representatives from four states, forcing the meeting to be moved to a nearby inn. Cooper consulted an attorney that evening and, after notifying the lessor, vacated the premises on December 30, 1961. Reste Realty Corp. acquired the building and the lease assignment on January 19, 1962. On November 9, 1964, it sued Cooper to recover rent for the unexpired term through March 31, 1964. The trial court entered judgment for Cooper on her constructive eviction defense. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification.

In November 1969 the City Bureau of Buildings declared the single-family residence rented on a month-to-month basis for $100 per month by appellants Donald and Edna Lindsey and other tenants from appellee Normet unfit for habitation because of substandard conditions including rusted gutters, broken windows, broken plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation. The tenants requested repairs which the landlord refused except for one minor item. After paying the November rent they withheld the December rent. On December 15 the landlord's attorney sent a letter threatening court action unless the accrued rent was paid immediately. On January 7, 1970, before any state eviction proceedings had begun, the tenants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.160, was unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its continued enforcement. A three-judge district court was convened. It issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the tenants to pay rent into an escrow account during the proceeding. The parties entered a lengthy stipulation of facts, submitted exhibits and depositions, and the district court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Oregon statute established a summary procedure for resolving disputes over possession of real property. Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date. A tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on the tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue if the plaintiff ultimately prevails. The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true. A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. The district court upheld the validity of the statutes under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tenants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

In October 1974, plaintiff Hilder began occupying an apartment at defendants Stuart and Patricia St. Peter's 10-12 Church Street apartment building in Rutland with her three children and newborn grandson. She orally agreed to pay defendant Stuart St. Peter $140 a month and a $50 damage deposit, which she paid prior to moving in. Plaintiff has paid all rent due under her tenancy. Because the previous tenants had left behind garbage and items of personal belongings, defendant offered to refund plaintiff’s damage deposit if she would clean the apartment herself prior to taking possession. Plaintiff did clean the apartment, but never received her deposit back. Upon moving into the apartment, plaintiff discovered a broken kitchen window, which she repaired at her own expense after defendant failed to do so. Although defendant promised to provide a front door key, he never did, leading plaintiff to purchase and install a padlock at her own expense. After moving in, plaintiff discovered that the bathroom toilet was clogged with paper and feces and would flush only by dumping pails of water into it. The bathroom light and wall outlet were inoperable, so plaintiff attached a fixture to the wall and connected it to an extension cord plugged into an adjoining room. Water leaked from the water pipes of the upstairs apartment down the ceilings and walls of both her kitchen and back bedroom. As a result, a large section of plaster fell from the back bedroom ceiling onto her bed and her grandson’s crib. Plaintiff moved her and her grandson’s bedroom furniture into the living room and ceased using the back bedroom. During the summer months an odor of raw sewage permeated plaintiff’s apartment. Rutland City workers unearthed a broken sewage pipe in the basement of defendants’ building, with raw sewage littering the floor, but defendant failed to clean it up. Plaintiff also discovered that the electric service for her furnace was attached to her breaker box, although defendant had agreed to furnish heat. Between October 1974 and December 1976, plaintiff rented apartment number 1 for $140.00 monthly for 18 months, and apartment number 50 for $125.00 monthly for 7 months. The Rutland Superior Court ordered defendants to pay plaintiff damages in the amount of $4,945.00, which represented reimbursement of all rent paid and additional compensatory damages for the rental of a residential apartment over a fourteen-month period. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on the issue of the amount of damages, and plaintiff filed a cross-motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of punitive damages; the court denied both motions. On appeal, defendants raise three issues.