Also known as: harbor · harbors · harbored · harbour · harbouring
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
The act of providing lodging, shelter, or refuge to a fugitive or other person sought by law enforcement authorities.
The maintenance or keeping of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal on one's premises or under one's control.
The act of providing lodging, shelter, or refuge to a fugitive or other person sought by law enforcement authorities.
Officers arrested Hector Hernandez inside his home on an outstanding warrant. They noticed movement in an upstairs closet and heard whispers suggesting another person was present. Believing the area harbored an individual who might pose a danger, the officers conducted a limited sweep of spaces where a person could hide and located an armed associate.
Hope Howard, a defense attorney, told reporters that her client was being unfairly targeted and that she would continue to harbor him at her office during the investigation. The disciplinary board charged her with violating the trial publicity rule, but the court found the rule's safe-harbor language unconstitutionally vague as applied to her largely political statements.
The maintenance or keeping of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal on one's premises or under one's control.
Hunter Hughes kept a lion on his rural property even though he did not have physical possession of the animal at all times. When the lion escaped and injured a neighbor's child, the court held Hughes subject to the same strict liability that would apply to an actual possessor.
Henry Harrison harbored a large domestic dog that had never shown dangerous tendencies. After the dog bit a delivery person because Harrison failed to secure the gate, the court imposed liability only upon a showing that Harrison was negligent in preventing the harm.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Hassan Hakim allowed a crew member to stay aboard his vessel after learning the man was evading authorities. When the vessel sank, the estate of a deceased passenger sued under a maritime wrongful-death theory, alleging that Hakim's act of harboring contributed to the unsafe conditions.
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer. Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations. Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View case2 common questions
The Model Penal Code requires that the actor knowingly harbor or conceal the fugitive with the purpose of hindering apprehension. The act of providing shelter alone is insufficient without the culpable mental state directed at evading law enforcement.
Officers may conduct a protective sweep beyond the arrestee's immediate control when they have a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others.
Harbor Shipping stored chemicals on its dock while also harboring several guard dogs that had no known vicious propensities. After a spill occurred, a neighboring railroad sued, claiming the dogs' presence increased the risk of harm during cleanup operations.
American Cyanamid Company, a chemical manufacturer, loaded 20,000 gallons of liquid acrylonitrile into a leased railroad tank car at its plant in Louisiana on January 2, 1979. The following day, a Missouri Pacific Railroad train picked up the car for transport to a Cyanamid plant in New Jersey. The car arrived at the Blue Island railroad yard operated by Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, a switching line in the Chicago metropolitan area, on the morning of January 9, 1979. Several hours after arrival, employees noticed fluid gushing from the bottom outlet of the car due to a broken lid. After two hours, the leak was stopped, but approximately 5,000 gallons of acrylonitrile had spilled. Local authorities evacuated nearby homes for a few hours. The Illinois Department of Environmental Protection ordered decontamination measures that cost the switching line $981,022.75. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad filed a two-count complaint against American Cyanamid in federal district court. One count alleged negligence in maintaining the tank car. The other count alleged strict liability for engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity by shipping the chemical through a metropolitan area. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the strict liability count for $981,022.75. The court later dismissed the negligence count with prejudice to permit an appeal. The case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit after an initial appeal was dismissed for lack of finality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The district judge then dismissed the negligence claim to create a final judgment. The switching line cross-appealed the dismissal of the negligence count.
View case2 common questions
No. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 514, one who harbors a wild or abnormally dangerous domestic animal is subject to the same strict liability as a possessor even if the harborer lacks physical possession of the animal.
Yes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 imposes liability for harm caused by a domestic animal that the harborer does not know or have reason to know is abnormally dangerous only if the harborer intentionally causes the harm or is negligent in failing to prevent it.
…determination to the contrary, a corporate executive could reasonably interpret the disclosure requirements as establishing safe harbors. In California, for example, the disclosure statute defines "material" damage to a motor vehicle as damage requiring repairs costing in excess of 3 percent of the suggested retail price or…