Also known as: heads of departments · head of department
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An executive branch official who leads a department and may be vested by Congress with authority to appoint inferior officers under the Appointments Clause.
President Helena Hoffman creates a new maritime agency and designates Heidi Henderson as its head. Congress enacts a statute authorizing the head to appoint a special compliance officer with limited duties investigating one bribery scheme. Heidi appoints the officer without Senate confirmation. The appointment is valid because Heidi qualifies as a head of department under the vesting provision.
Hope Howard, head of the State Department, refuses to deliver a commission to an appointed official. The official sues for mandamus. The court examines whether the head's duty is ministerial and non-discretionary. Because the head of department performs a duty fixed by law, mandamus may issue to compel performance.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
View caseHannah Hale, head of a cabinet department, terminates an employee for alleged misconduct. The employee sues claiming the action violated federal law. The court considers whether the head's official acts receive absolute immunity. Because the head exercises core executive functions, the suit is barred.
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
View caseHakeem Harris chairs a five-member independent agency. Congress vests the commission with power to appoint inferior officers. The agency board, acting collectively, appoints an administrative law judge. The appointment is valid because the multi-member commission qualifies as the head of a department.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The agency was tasked with implementing and enforcing a large body of federal consumer financial protection statutes, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Truth in Lending Act, along with a new prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in the consumer-finance sector. The CFPB is led by a single Director appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a five-year term, during which the President may remove the Director only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The agency receives its funding directly from the Federal Reserve rather than through the annual appropriations process. In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law LLC, a California-based law firm that provides debt-related legal services to clients. The demand sought information and documents related to the firm’s business practices to determine whether Seila Law had engaged in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt relief services. Seila Law asked the CFPB to set aside the demand on the ground that the agency’s single-Director structure with for-cause removal protection violated the separation of powers. When the CFPB declined, Seila Law refused to comply, and the CFPB filed a petition in federal district court to enforce the demand. The district court rejected Seila Law’s constitutional challenge and ordered the firm to comply with the demand. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Seila Law’s arguments were foreclosed by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States and Morrison v. Olson. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure and, if necessary, the severability of the Director’s removal protection from the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act.
View caseHilda Hernandez, head of the Post Office Department, removes a subordinate postmaster without cause. The postmaster challenges the removal as requiring Senate consent. The court upholds the removal because the head of department possesses unrestricted authority to remove inferior officers.
Frank S. Myers was appointed postmaster at Portland, Oregon, of the first class on July 10, 1917, for a term of four years fixed by statute. On January 3, 1921, President Wilson directed his removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers protested to the department that his removal was illegal and refused to surrender his office. He was, however, ousted and a successor appointed with the consent of the Senate. He brought suit in the Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against him. The case comes here on appeal. By act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, it was provided that postmasters of the first, second and third classes should be appointed and might be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term of the office was fixed at four years.
View caseHyperion Systems faces investigation by an independent counsel appointed by a judicial panel. The company argues only the Attorney General, as head of department, may appoint such officers. The court rejects the challenge because the counsel is an inferior officer whose appointment Congress may vest in the courts of law.
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View caseA head of department is the leader of a freestanding executive component, including cabinet secretaries and multi-member commissions of independent agencies. Congress may vest such officials with power to appoint inferior officers. The term does not extend to every agency subdivision.
Supporting sources
Yes. The Supreme Court has held that an entire commission or board, rather than its chair alone, qualifies as the head of a department. This allows the commission to appoint inferior officers when Congress so provides.
No. The term covers any freestanding component of the executive branch, including independent agencies such as the SEC. The key requirement is that the entity be subordinate to no other component within the executive branch.
…principles such writ may be directed and the applicant must be without any other specific legal remedy. The high station of the head of a department makes inquiry delicate but the court's province is solely to decide the rights of individuals, not to inquire into executive discretion. If the matter pertains to a paper upon record or to…