Also known as:hearsay objections · hearsay rule objection
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An evidentiary challenge asserting that a proffered out-of-court statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and is therefore inadmissible unless it satisfies an exception or exclusion. The objection forces the proponent to establish that the statement is not hearsay or that a rule removes the bar. The rule of completeness permits related statements to be introduced at the same time over a hearsay objection.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Federal Rules
How its tested
Common Examples
4
Completeness Rule Invocation
Urban Maritime introduced part of an incident report blaming the charterer for improper container securing. Premier Marine sought to introduce the remaining pages and a follow-up email showing the vessel crew altered the stow plan. The court permitted the additional material at the same time because fairness required the jury to consider the full context even though the added statements would otherwise trigger a hearsay objection.
Waiver of Hearsay Objection
During plea negotiations the government and Mezzanatto agreed that statements made by Mezzanatto could be used at trial for impeachment. When the government later offered those statements, Mezzanatto raised a hearsay objection. The Court held the agreement enforceable and overruled the objection because parties may validly waive hearsay objections by stipulation.
United States v. Mezzanatto513 U.S. 196 (1995)
On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force agents arrested Gordon Shuster after discovering a methamphetamine laboratory at his residence in Rainbow, California. Shuster agreed to cooperate with the agents. He placed a call to respondent Gordon Mezzanatto's pager a few hours later. When Mezzanatto returned the call, Shuster told him that a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for $13,000. Shuster arranged to meet Mezzanatto later that day.
At the meeting, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his friend. Mezzanatto produced a brown paper package containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine from his car. He also presented a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue and asked the officer if he wanted to take a hit. The officer gave a prearranged arrest signal after leaving the car to retrieve the money. Mezzanatto was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor to discuss cooperating with the Government. At the beginning of the meeting, the prosecutor stated that Mezzanatto would have to agree that any statements made could be used to impeach contradictory testimony at trial if the case proceeded that far. Mezzanatto conferred with counsel and agreed to proceed under those terms. He then admitted knowing the package contained methamphetamine while claiming he had dealt only in ounce quantities and had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week.
The Government confronted Mezzanatto with surveillance evidence showing his car on Shuster's property the day before the arrest. It terminated the meeting for failure to provide completely truthful information. Mezzanatto was later tried on the charge. He took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he thought Shuster used the laboratory to manufacture plastic explosives for the CIA and that he did not know the package contained methamphetamine.
Over defense objection, the prosecutor cross-examined Mezzanatto about inconsistent statements from the October 17 meeting. The prosecutor called an attending agent to recount those statements. The jury found Mezzanatto guilty. The District Court sentenced him to 170 months in prison. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed over Chief Judge Wallace's dissent in 998 F. 2d 1452 (1993). The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056 (1993).
Non-Hearsay Purpose Admission
Rainey offered testimony recounting an out-of-court statement made by the defense expert six months after the crash. The defense raised a hearsay objection. The Court overruled the objection because the statement was offered only to show what the expert had said, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, so it fell outside the hearsay definition.
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey499 U.S. 153 (1988)
The litigation arose from the July 13, 1982 crash of a Navy T-34C Turbo-Mentor aircraft at Middleton Field, Alabama, during touch-and-go exercises. Lieutenant Commander Barbara Ann Rainey, a flight instructor, and her student Ensign Donald Bruce Knowlton were killed when the plane banked sharply right after a premature left turn, lost altitude, and crashed.
The surviving spouses of the pilots filed a product liability action against Beech Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer, and Beech Aerospace Services, Inc., which serviced the plane, alleging that a defect in the fuel control system caused an engine rollback and loss of power. Because the aircraft was destroyed and there were no survivors, the cause of the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. The defense presented an investigative JAG Report prepared by Lieutenant Commander William Morgan pursuant to Navy authority.
The report contained sections on findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, including statements that the engine was operating at reduced power at impact and that the most probable cause was the pilots' failure to maintain proper interval, while noting the possibility of rollback. Five or six months after the accident, plaintiff John Rainey, the deceased pilot's husband and a Navy flight instructor, sent a letter to Morgan outlining his own investigation and concluding that the most probable cause was a loss of useful power due to a pneumatic sensing or fuel flow malfunction.
At trial, the defense called Rainey as an adverse witness and questioned him about portions of the letter concerning his wife's attempt to cancel the flight and a hard right turn by the aircrew. On cross-examination, the court sustained an objection to a question asking whether Rainey had stated in the letter that rollback was the most probable primary cause. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, and on rehearing en banc the court divided evenly on one issue while unanimously holding that the district court erred in restricting cross-examination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Transcript Authentication Ruling
The government offered a transcript of recorded conversations involving Anderson. The defense raised a hearsay objection and argued that only the actual participant could authenticate the transcript. The court deferred ruling on the objection until the recording agent testified that the transcript accurately reflected the tape, after which the hearsay objection was resolved by voice identification.
United States v. Anderson452 F.3d 66, 76 (1st Cir. 2006)
On July 31, 2003, Eric Besore contacted DEA task force officer Steven Thibodeau to arrange a controlled purchase of drugs from an individual nicknamed Hoot. Besore had previously agreed to assist Thibodeau with drug investigations in exchange for help dismissing a criminal speeding charge. Thibodeau and other agents gave Besore $1,000, equipped him with an electronic transmitting device resembling a pager, searched him and his vehicle, and sent a surveillance team including Thibodeau and Barry Kelly to monitor the transaction in Westbrook, Maine.
Besore drove to a parking lot at King and Brown Streets. Kelly parked nearby to record transmissions from the device while Thibodeau maintained contact by cell phone. After a uniformed officer stopped a nearby vehicle, Besore moved his car up the street. Thibodeau later observed Besore in the driver's seat of his car with a black male later identified as Dwayne J. Anderson in the passenger seat. Kelly saw Anderson exit Besore's car and enter a green Subaru parked behind it. Besore then drove away and met Thibodeau, handing him a plastic bag containing a substance that field-tested positive for cocaine base.
Thibodeau placed the substance in evidence envelope 159263, locked it in the DEA safe, and mailed it to the DEA laboratory in New York. Chemist Brian O'Rourke later confirmed the substance was cocaine base weighing 6.1 grams. On October 23, 2003, a grand jury indicted Anderson for knowingly and intentionally distributing five or more grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). A two-day jury trial began on April 7, 2004, in the District of Maine.
At trial the government introduced a copy of the recording from Besore's transmitting device along with a transcript prepared by the prosecutor. Kelly authenticated the transcript by comparing it to the tape. The court gave limiting instructions that the tape was the evidence and any discrepancies must be resolved in favor of the tape. Besore did not appear despite a government subpoena. The defense requested a missing witness instruction, which the court denied. The court also excluded evidence of Besore's prior felony conviction for tampering with a witness during cross-examination of Thibodeau and admitted the drugs over a chain-of-custody objection.
The jury convicted Anderson after nearly two hours of deliberation. The PSR calculated a base offense level of 26 based on 6.1 grams of crack cocaine. It classified Anderson as a career offender, though the government later conceded he lacked the required predicate offenses and should be placed in criminal history category III. At sentencing on April 27, 2005, the district court found the substance was crack cocaine, set the Guidelines range at 78 to 97 months, and imposed a sentence of 78 months' imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. Anderson timely appealed both conviction and sentence.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a hearsay objection succeed against nonverbal conduct?
The objection succeeds when the conduct is intended as an assertion and is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In the refinery explosion case the thumbs-up gesture after reading the gauge was treated as assertive conduct because its timing and direction indicated an intended communication about safe pressure levels. Without evidence of intent the conduct would fall outside the hearsay definition.
Supporting sources
Does Rule 106 permit introduction of otherwise hearsay material?
Yes. When one party introduces part of a statement the adverse party may require introduction of related parts or statements at the same time even if those additional statements would otherwise be hearsay. The fairness principle overrides the hearsay objection to prevent a misleading impression from a truncated presentation.
Supporting sources
When is a party-opponent statement exempt from a hearsay objection?
A statement is exempt when offered against an opposing party and satisfies one of the conditions in Rule 801(d)(2). Direct statements by the party in an individual capacity, authorized statements, adopted statements, and coconspirator statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy all qualify. Each category removes the statement from the hearsay definition entirely.
Supporting sources
What must a proponent show to overcome a hearsay objection under the medical-treatment exception?
The proponent must show the statement was made for and was reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements describing symptoms and their cause made to a treating physician during a clinical visit satisfy the exception even if the declarant is available to testify.
Supporting sources
are enforceable. See Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Okla. , 220 U. S. 481, 488-489 (1911); see also United States v. Bonnett , 877 F. 2d 1450,…
EvidenceHearsay and circumstances of its admissibility · Definition of hearsayUBEIntermediate