Also known as:heat of passion · heat-of-passion defense · heat-of-passion · sudden heat of passion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine mitigating an intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter when the defendant killed in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation. The provocation must be of a kind that would cause an ordinary person to experience a sudden and intense passion sufficient to overwhelm self-control. The defendant must have actually been provoked and must not have cooled off before acting.
See Our Sources· 3 primary sources
Cases
Common Law
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Battery on Relative Revives Passion
Hunter Hughes learned at a company party that his coworker had removed his name from patent filings. The coworker then punched Hughes's brother in the face. Hughes grabbed a laptop stand and struck the coworker moments later when she reached into her bag. The battery on his brother supplied adequate provocation that kept Hughes in the grip of passion without time to cool.
Discovery of Adultery After Delay
Hakeem Harris discovered his spouse with another person after work. He completed duties at a second location, drove home, received text messages, and then located the other person hours later at a bar. The passage of time allowed a reasonable cooling-off period so the killing remained murder rather than voluntary manslaughter.
Immediate Response to Battery
Hilda Hernandez attended a late meeting where her supervisor grabbed her collar and slapped her. She immediately struck back with a concealed poker she had brought for protection. The sudden battery met the standard for adequate provocation and left no interval for cooling.
Harris v. United States375 A.2d 505, 508 (D.C. 1977)
Appellants Harris and Hart were jointly tried and convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. The government's evidence rested principally on the testimony of an eyewitness to the homicide who stated that he was inside the Federal City Liquor Store at 943 Ninth Street, N.W., at approximately 2:30 on the afternoon of January 21, 1975, when appellants and two other men, one of whom became the murder victim, entered the store.
They appeared to the witness to be somewhat intoxicated. An argument ensued between Hart and the victim regarding a gun, and Hart pulled an ice pick out of his coat pocket and held it in his hands towards the victim's face. Hart then told the victim you are going to get my gun or else I am gonna kill you.
According to the eyewitness, Harris then stated let's kill the victim. When the manager of the liquor store insisted they take the argument outside, Hart, the victim, and an unidentified third man left the premises, crossed the street and turned into a nearby alley. Harris followed shortly thereafter but he did not enter the alley until after the unidentified third man exited the alley and proceeded down Ninth Street.
The witness then left the liquor store and walked down the street to get a direct view of the alley. A scuffle had started between the three men. Harris grabbed the victim from the back. The man was wrestled to the ground by both defendants and Harris struck him on top of the head. Hart then proceeded to stab the victim repeatedly with the ice pick.
A second government witness was outside the liquor store during the time in which the homicide was committed. He testified that as Hart crossed the street he was holding the victim behind his neck. He also recalled that as Harris walked past him he said he stole his pistol and he is going to kill him. On January 22, 1975, the day after the homicide, the witness was shown an array of 10 photographs and he positively identified appellant Hart as the man who had been holding the victim behind the neck. Before his grand jury testimony on February 21, 1975, the witness was shown the exact same array of photographs with the exception that appellant Hart's photograph had been removed and replaced by a picture of Harris, and on that occasion the witness made a positive identification of Harris.
Harris challenged his conviction on the ground that the court at a pretrial suppression hearing erroneously denied his motion to suppress identification evidence, and both appellants challenged the denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal.
Burden on Heat of Passion
Hyun Han killed during an argument after sudden adequate provocation and sought to prove he acted in the heat of passion to reduce the charge. The jurisdiction placed the burden on him to establish the mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. The allocation of that burden did not violate due process because it did not require him to disprove an element of the crime.
Patterson v. New York432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson.
Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder.
At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Inference of Intent from Weapon
Harriet Hamilton used a deadly instrument on a vital area during a confrontation after adequate provocation. The factfinder could infer intent to kill from that use. The inference supported malice aforethought unless heat of passion mitigation applied on the facts.
Sandstrom v. Montana442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)
David Sandstrom, an 18-year-old, confessed on November 22, 1976, to the slaying of Annie Jessen. Based on the confession and corroborating evidence, he was charged on December 2 with deliberate homicide under Montana law for purposely or knowingly causing her death.
At trial, Sandstrom's attorney told the jury that although his client admitted killing Jessen, he did not do so purposely or knowingly and was therefore guilty only of a lesser crime. The defense relied on testimony from two court-appointed mental health experts describing Sandstrom's mental state, attributing the killing to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption.
The prosecution requested, and over defense objection the trial judge delivered, the instruction that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. The jury found Sandstrom guilty of deliberate homicide, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison.
Sandstrom appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana, which upheld the conviction. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the instruction.
Henry Harrison claimed heat of passion after a sudden attack with adequate provocation. The jurisdiction treated the absence of provocation as a sentencing factor rather than an element of murder. The allocation did not shift the burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania477 U.S. 79 (1986)
The Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in 1982. The statute applies to persons convicted of enumerated felonies including third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping.
Under the Act a sentencing judge must impose a minimum term of five years' imprisonment upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during commission of the offense. The judge considers trial evidence plus any additional evidence offered by the parties at the sentencing hearing. The Act does not increase the statutory maximum penalty for the underlying felony.
Petitioner McMillan was convicted by jury of aggravated assault after shooting his victim in the right buttock during an argument over a debt. Petitioner Peterson was convicted after a bench trial of voluntary manslaughter after shooting and killing her husband. Petitioner Dennison was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated assault after shooting and seriously wounding an acquaintance. Petitioner Smalls was convicted after a bench trial of robbery after holding up a seafood store at gunpoint. In each case the Commonwealth provided notice before sentencing that it would seek application of the Act.
The four sentencing judges each held the Act unconstitutional and imposed sentences below the five-year minimum. The Commonwealth appealed all four cases to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which consolidated them and upheld the statute. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional challenges.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What four requirements must be met for provocation to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter?
The provocation must be of a kind that would cause an ordinary person to experience sudden and intense passion. The defendant must actually have been provoked. An objectively reasonable person would not have had time to cool off. The defendant in fact did not cool off before the killing.
Supporting sources
Does discovery of a spouse in the act of adultery qualify as adequate provocation?
Yes. Catching one's spouse in the act of adultery is a classic category of adequate provocation at common law. The discovery must occur suddenly and the killing must follow before a reasonable cooling-off period.
Supporting sources
Can mere words alone constitute adequate provocation?
No. Mere words, trivial battery, and past wrongs are legally inadequate to support the heat of passion defense. Only serious battery, threats of deadly force, or catching a spouse in adultery typically qualify.
Supporting sources
How does a cooling-off period affect the defense?
If a reasonable person would have cooled off between the provocation and the killing, the defense fails even if the defendant remained subjectively inflamed. The facts must show both that an ordinary person would still be under the influence of passion and that the defendant in fact had not cooled.
Supporting sources
Does a serious battery on a close relative qualify as adequate provocation?
Yes. A serious battery inflicted on the defendant or a close relative is recognized as adequate provocation. The relationship strengthens the claim that the defendant was actually inflamed by the attack.
Supporting sources
provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. In that case, a Maine jury had been instructed that if the State established that the homicide was both…
passion
irresistible; (4) not guilty, if, after a careful consideration of all the evidence, there remained in their minds a…
sudden
passion
, like lust, rage, or jealousy, may spawn an…
Criminal Law & ProcedureHomicide · Intended killingsUBEIntermediate