Also known as: heat of passion doctrine · heat of passion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common-law doctrine that reduces an intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter when the defendant kills in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation before a reasonable cooling-off period has elapsed. The provocation must be of a kind that would arouse sudden intense passion in an ordinary person, the defendant must actually have been provoked, and the defendant must not have cooled off.
Hugo Hart entered a testing room and found his spouse engaged in sexual relations with a coworker. Enraged, Hugo seized a nearby wrench and struck the coworker fatally before any time passed for reflection. The killing occurred while Hugo remained under the influence of sudden passion triggered by the discovery.
Heidi Henderson watched as her coworker punched Heidi's brother during an argument over patent rights. Heidi immediately grabbed a laptop stand and struck the coworker fatally moments later while still visibly agitated. The sequence left no interval for an ordinary person to regain composure.
Hazel Hoffman attended a prearranged discussion at her firm and was grabbed by the collar and slapped by the managing partner. Hazel drew a concealed poker and struck fatally at once without any pause. The rapid sequence showed the killing occurred before any cooling could occur.
Harriet Hamilton entered a secluded room and saw her spouse with another person. Harriet seized a torque wrench and delivered fatal strikes immediately while still gripped by the discovery. No meaningful time elapsed between the sight and the act.
Hannah Hale endured public berating and a slap from her manager after hours. Hannah grabbed a box cutter and stabbed fatally right after the physical contact while still inflamed. The events unfolded without opportunity for an ordinary person to cool.
Hannah Hughes saw her coworker punch Hannah's sibling during a workplace dispute. Hannah struck the coworker fatally with a nearby object before any cooling interval. The facts showed the passion remained unextinguished at the moment of the blow.
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court. The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing. Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance. The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder. Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision. After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.
The provocation must be adequate to arouse sudden intense passion in an ordinary person. The defendant must actually have been provoked. No reasonable cooling-off period may have elapsed, and the defendant must not in fact have cooled. These requirements appear in the common-law definitions of voluntary manslaughter.
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…might invoke today: that Cobham's statements were self-inculpatory, 2 How. St. Tr., at 19, that they were not made in the heat of passion, id. , at 14, and that they were not "extracted from [him] upon any hopes or promise of Pardon," id. , at 29. It is not plausible that the Framers' only objection to the trial was that…
…defendant of proving, in rebutting the statutory presumption, that he acted with a lesser degree of culpability, such as in the heat of passion, to win a reduction in the offense from murder to manslaughter (and thus a reduction of the maximum punishment of 20 years). The State had posited in Mullaney that requiring a defendant…
…if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did the killing without malice or deliberation, but upon a sudden heat of passion caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the
…such as those committed with coolness of mind, and second degree used for murders committed on impulse, in frenzy or the heat of passion. We conclude that the Government's case in chief, though ample to permit a finding of intentional murder, did not present evidence of premeditation and deliberation sufficient to warrant…
Yes. Discovery of a spouse in the act of adultery has long been recognized as classic adequate provocation that reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter when the other elements are met. The MC question testing this scenario confirms the reduction applies when the defendant acts immediately while still in the grip of passion.
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No. Mere words, trivial battery, and provocation based on wrongs that occurred long in the past are legally inadequate. The essay questions emphasize that only recognized categories such as serious battery or spousal adultery suffice, and verbal taunts standing alone do not meet the standard.
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If a reasonable person would have cooled or the defendant in fact cooled before the killing, the doctrine does not apply and the offense remains murder. Essay and MC questions illustrate that time spent completing other tasks or discussing options after provocation defeats the claim even if later events rekindle anger.
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When malice aforethought is an element of murder, the prosecution must prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt. A state may not shift to the defendant the burden of proving heat of passion. The primary authority on this constitutional limit appears in the cited Supreme Court decision.
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