Harper Hill learned that her uncle had executed a will leaving her a valuable parcel of land. Hudson Partners, seeking the parcel for development, used fraudulent documents to convince the uncle to revoke the will and substitute a new one naming the firm as sole beneficiary. After the uncle's death, Harper Hill sued Hudson Partners for the loss of the interest she would otherwise have received. The court held the parcel heritable and imposed liability on the firm for the value of the inheritance.
Inheritance Regardless of Ancestor Count
Hana Huang and her cousin each shared one grandparent with the decedent but differed in the total number of common ancestors in that generation. Upon the decedent's intestate death, the probate court applied the rule that an heir inherits without regard to how many common ancestors in the same generation the heir shares with the decedent. Both Hana Huang and the cousin received equal shares of the heritable estate.
Paternity Requirement for Nonmarital Child
Hazel Hoffman gave birth to a child out of wedlock and the father died intestate without formally acknowledging paternity during his lifetime. The state statute required establishment of paternity before death as a condition for the child to inherit. The court upheld the statute because it substantially advanced the governmental interest in orderly disposition of heritable property and reduced fraud in inheritance claims.
Estate Closing and Distribution
Heidi Henderson, as personal representative, filed a closing statement asserting that she had paid all claims, expenses, and taxes and had distributed the remaining assets to the persons entitled. The statement noted that certain contingent claims remained undischarged but that the distributees had agreed to accept distribution subject to possible liability. Because the assets were heritable and properly transferred, the court accepted the closing statement and terminated the administration.
Nonmarital Child Inheritance Claim
Hannah Hughes, a nonmarital child, sought to inherit from her father's intestate estate. The state statute barred the claim because paternity had never been established during the father's lifetime. The court sustained the bar, noting that the requirement served the important interest of reducing uncertainty in the passage of heritable property.
Trimble v. Gordon430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977)
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child.
Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
Landmark Restriction on Development
Hana Hashimoto owned a historic terminal building whose development rights were severely restricted by city landmark law. She argued that the restrictions destroyed the heritable value of the property by preventing any economically viable use. The court rejected the claim, holding that the regulations did not constitute a taking of the heritable interest because they left the owner with reasonable beneficial use.
Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v. New York City438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest.
The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month.
Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction.
Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals.
Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Does heritable status depend on the number of common ancestors shared with the decedent?
No. Under the Uniform Probate Code, an heir inherits without regard to how many common ancestors in the same generation the heir shares with the decedent.
Supporting sources
Can a state require paternity to be established during the father's lifetime before a nonmarital child may inherit?
Yes. Such a requirement is substantially related to the important governmental interest in the orderly and efficient disposition of heritable property at death by reducing fraud and uncertainty in inheritance claims.
Supporting sources
What must a personal representative show to close an estate by filing a closing statement?
The representative must show that all presented claims, administration expenses, and death taxes have been paid or settled and that the assets of the estate have been distributed to the persons entitled to receive heritable property.
Supporting sources
Is a person who uses fraud to prevent another from receiving an inheritance subject to liability?
Yes. One who by fraud, duress, or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving a heritable interest that the person would otherwise have received is subject to liability for the loss.
Supporting sources
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
…only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In…
ContractsFormation of contracts · Mutual assent (including offer and acceptance, and unilateral, bilateral, and implied-in-fact contracts)UBEIntermediate