housing code

In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.

Roland Camara, lessee of the ground floor of an apartment building in San Francisco, faced criminal charges under the city's Housing Code for refusing to allow municipal inspectors to enter his residence without a search warrant. On November 6, 1963, an inspector from the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered the building to conduct a routine annual inspection for possible code violations. The building manager told the inspector that Camara was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence, which the occupancy permit did not authorize. The inspector confronted Camara and demanded entry to inspect the premises, but Camara refused because the inspector lacked a warrant. The inspector returned on November 8 without a warrant, and Camara again denied access. A citation was then mailed ordering Camara to appear at the district attorney's office. When he failed to appear, two inspectors returned on November 22 and informed him that Section 503 of the Housing Code required him to permit entry at reasonable times upon presentation of proper credentials. Camara still refused without a warrant. A complaint was filed charging him with violating Section 507 by refusing to permit a lawful inspection. He was arrested on December 2 and released on bail. Camara's demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied in the municipal court. He then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in California Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance authorizing the warrantless inspection was unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the writ. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. Camara had properly raised and obtained consideration of the federal constitutional questions in the state courts. The inspection program operated under Section 86(3) of the San Francisco Municipal Code, which required apartment house operators to pay an annual license fee that partly defrayed the cost of periodic inspections. The Bureau of Housing Inspection conducted these inspections at least once a year and as often thereafter as deemed necessary. The permit of occupancy for the building was not issued until the license was obtained.

In the summer of 1990, respondent Oxford House opened a group home in the City of Edmonds, Washington, for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction. The group home, called Oxford House-Edmonds, is located in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences. Upon learning that Oxford House had leased and was operating a home in Edmonds, the City issued criminal citations to the owner and a resident of the house. The citations charged violation of the zoning code rule that defines who may live in single-family dwelling units. The occupants of such units must compose a "family," and family, under the City's defining rule, "means an individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage." Oxford House-Edmonds houses more than five unrelated persons, and therefore does not conform to the code. Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing Act. The parties have stipulated, for purposes of this litigation, that the residents of Oxford House-Edmonds "are recovering alcoholics and drug addicts and are handicapped persons within the meaning" of the Act. Oxford House asked Edmonds to make a "reasonable accommodation" by allowing it to remain in the single-family dwelling it had leased. Edmonds declined to permit Oxford House to stay in a single-family residential zone, but passed an ordinance listing group homes as permitted uses in multifamily and general commercial zones. Edmonds sued Oxford House in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City with failure to make a "reasonable accommodation" permitting maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. The United States filed a separate action on the same FHA "reasonable accommodation" ground, and the two cases were consolidated. Edmonds suspended its criminal enforcement actions pending resolution of the federal litigation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that the defining provision is exempt from the FHA under § 3607(b)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the absolute exemption inapplicable, and remanded the cases for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an Eleventh Circuit decision declaring exempt a similar family definition provision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

Southall Realty Co. brought an action for possession against its tenant, Mrs. Brown, for nonpayment of rent. At trial the parties stipulated that the rent was in arrears in the amount of $230.00. Mrs. Brown contended that no rent was due under the lease because it was an illegal contract. The trial court held to the contrary and awarded the landlord possession for nonpayment of rent. Mrs. Brown had moved from the premises and did not wish to be returned to possession. Nevertheless, she pursued an appeal asserting that the judgment of the trial court would render facts res judicata in any subsequent suit for rent. In a prior case, Bess v. David, this court had held that a judgment in a possessory action foreclosed questions of tenancy in a later suit for rent. The evidence at trial showed that prior to the signing of the lease agreement, the landlord was on notice that Housing Code violations existed on the premises. An inspector for the District of Columbia Housing Division testified that an obstructed commode, a broken railing, and insufficient ceiling height in the basement existed at least some months prior to the lease agreement and had not been abated at the time of trial. The inspector also stated that the basement violations prohibited the use of the entire basement as a dwelling place. The landlord admitted telling the tenant after the lease had been signed that the back room of the basement was habitable despite the Housing Code violations. The owner of the premises testified that he had submitted a sworn statement to the Housing Division on December 8, 1964, to the effect that the basement was unoccupied at that time and would continue to be kept vacant until the violations were corrected.