Also known as: human traffickings · trafficked human · trafficking humans · trafficking in persons · TIP
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal offense involving the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of exploitation such as forced labor or commercial sexual exploitation.
Police receive an anonymous tip that Hana Huang and Hugo Hart are transporting victims across state lines for forced labor. The tip accurately predicts the pair's arrival time and vehicle at a specific rest stop. Officers conduct a Terry stop based on the tip's indicia of reliability and discover evidence of human trafficking.
An informant with a history of providing accurate information tells officers that Holly Hayes is harboring trafficking victims at a specific address. Officers obtain a search warrant under the totality of circumstances even though the informant's basis of knowledge is partially unverified. The search yields evidence leading to human trafficking charges.
A parent faces termination of parental rights after authorities remove her child during a human-trafficking investigation. The court denies appointed counsel because the proceeding is civil. The parent loses custody without representation despite the serious allegations.
In late spring of 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, adjudicated William Everett Lassiter, born in 1975 to petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter, a neglected child after evidence that she had not provided proper medical care, and transferred custody to the respondent Durham County Department of Social Services. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and began serving a sentence of 25 to 40 years. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights, alleging she had not had contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left the child in foster care for more than two years without substantial progress. Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and notice of the August 31, 1978 hearing. Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with challenging the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination hearing to him. At the hearing, the court discussed whether she should have more time to find counsel but concluded she had ample opportunity and proceeded without appointing counsel or inquiring about indigency. A social worker testified about the child's medical issues in 1975, lack of contact since then, and that the grandmother was not able to care for the child. Ms. Lassiter cross-examined the witness, testified herself, and her mother also testified. The court found that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the Department since December 1975, had not expressed concern for the child's welfare, and had willfully failed to maintain responsibility, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseAn individual receives public assistance while under investigation for human trafficking. Officials terminate benefits without a pre-termination hearing. The recipient challenges the action as violating due process protections for continued receipt of aid.
Residents of New York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program brought this action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the state and city officials who administered those programs. At the time the suits were filed, New York had no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. The suits prompted the State Commissioner of Social Services to amend the Department of Social Services regulations. The amendment required local officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient's aid to follow either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of § 351.26. The City of New York elected to follow subdivision (b). It promulgated Procedure No. 68-18. Under that procedure a caseworker who doubts a recipient's continued eligibility first discusses the doubts with the recipient. The caseworker then recommends termination to a unit supervisor. If the supervisor concurs, the recipient receives a letter stating the reasons for the proposed termination and notifying the recipient that within seven days he may request review by a higher official and may submit a written statement. The reviewing official decides whether to discontinue aid. Aid stops immediately upon affirmation, and the recipient is notified in writing of the reasons. The city's procedure contains no provision for the recipient's personal appearance before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The letter sent to the recipient states that he may request a post-termination fair hearing before an independent state hearing officer. At the hearing the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a record made. If the recipient prevails, all funds erroneously withheld are paid. A recipient whose aid is not restored after the fair hearing may obtain judicial review under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process. The court rejected the argument that the combination of the post-termination fair hearing and the informal pre-termination review was constitutionally adequate. Only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.
View caseA city enforces a sound amplification ban against a suspected human trafficking operation using loudspeakers to coordinate activities. The operator claims the ordinance violates free speech. The court upholds the restriction as narrowly tailored to public safety interests.
Kovacs was found guilty in the Trenton police court of violating section 4 of Ordinance No. 430 of the City of Trenton, New Jersey, which made it unlawful to operate sound trucks or similar devices emitting loud and raucous noises on public streets. A city patrolman testified at trial that he heard a sound truck broadcasting music on a public street near the municipal building. As he approached the truck, the music stopped and he heard a man's voice broadcasting from the truck. Kovacs admitted that he operated the mechanism for the music and spoke into the amplifier, and the broadcasting concerned a labor dispute then in progress in Trenton. Kovacs's conviction was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 64, 50 A.2d 451. The judgment was affirmed without a majority opinion by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in an equally divided court, with the dissents reported at 135 N.J.L. 584, 52 A.2d 806. The United States Supreme Court took jurisdiction to review the constitutional challenges. Kovacs challenged the ordinance on its face and as applied on the ground that it violated rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assemblage, and freedom to communicate information and opinions under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also challenged the ordinance as violative of the Due Process Clause on the ground that it was so obscure, vague, and indefinite as to be impossible of reasonably accurate interpretation.
View caseA statute bans a medical procedure often sought by victims of human trafficking. The law lacks an exception for maternal health. Challengers argue the restriction imposes an undue burden on women escaping exploitation.
In 1999 the Nebraska Legislature enacted a statute that prohibits any partial birth abortion. The statute defines partial birth abortion as an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery. The statute provides an exception only when the procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. Violation of the statute is a Class III felony carrying a prison term of up to twenty years, a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars, and automatic revocation of the physician's license to practice medicine in Nebraska. Dr. Leroy Carhart is a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting. He brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the Nebraska statute violates the Federal Constitution and an injunction forbidding its enforcement. After a trial on the merits during which both sides presented several expert witnesses, the District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The evidence at trial addressed several abortion procedures used after the first trimester. The most common second-trimester method is dilation and evacuation, or D&E, in which the cervix is dilated and instruments are used to remove fetal tissue, often requiring dismemberment. A variation known as intact D&E or D&X involves removing the fetus intact, usually after collapsing the skull, and is used after approximately sixteen weeks of gestation. Dr. Carhart testified that he attempts to use the intact D&E procedure in the 10 to 20 cases a year that present to Dr. Carhart because it reduces the risk of injury from sharp bone fragments, minimizes instrument passes, and lowers the chance of leaving retained tissue. The District Court found that the banned procedure is sometimes safer than other methods for women undergoing abortions between twelve and twenty weeks of gestation. It credited testimony that the intact D&E procedure reduces operating time, blood loss, risk of infection, complications from bony fragments, and instrument-inflicted damage to the uterus and cervix. The court also noted that a select panel of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists had concluded the procedure may be the best or most appropriate in particular circumstances. The Court of Appeals accepted these findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
View caseAuthorities in Cambodia applied existing human trafficking statutes to arrest surrogates on the theory that the babies would be sold to third parties. Pregnant surrogates were detained in a military hospital and some were chained during delivery. Sentences included prison terms that could be avoided only by immediate release conditions.
…not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining—in short, every branch of human industry.' " E. C. Knight, supra , at 14. If federal power extended to these types of production "comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state control."…