Also known as: immediate possessions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A presently exercisable right to control or hold a chattel or other property to the exclusion of others. This right supports liability for conversion or trespass when another interferes with it and determines who may demand immediate delivery or recovery of the item.
Ines Ibarra lent her specialized camera to a colleague for a one-day shoot. The colleague intentionally smashed the camera beyond repair during an argument. Ines, who retained the right to immediate possession under the loan agreement, recovered the full value in a conversion action.
Idris Ives purchased a rare watch from a seller who lacked authority. Even though Idris believed the transaction was legitimate, the true owner retained the right to immediate possession. The owner recovered the watch in a conversion suit despite Idris's good-faith mistake.
Federal agents detained Isaiah Ishikawa's suitcase at an airport to conduct a dog sniff. The seizure interrupted Ishikawa's immediate possession of the luggage and his travel plans. The Court examined whether the detention violated Fourth Amendment standards.
Respondent Raymond J. Place arrived at Miami International Airport on August 8, 1980, aboard a nonstop flight from New York City. Two DEA agents, alerted to his arrival, approached him in the baggage claim area after observing his behavior while purchasing a ticket. The agents requested his airline ticket and identification, which Place provided, and he consented to a search of his two checked suitcases. Because his flight was about to depart, the agents decided not to search the luggage at that time. Prompted by Place's remark that he recognized them as police, the agents examined the address tags on his luggage and discovered discrepancies. Further investigation showed that the addresses did not exist and that the telephone number belonged to a different address. The Miami agents relayed this information to DEA authorities in New York. At La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached Place after he claimed his bags. Place refused consent to a search of his luggage. The agents informed him they would take the luggage to obtain a search warrant, and Place declined to accompany them. The agents transported the bags to Kennedy Airport for a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately 90 minutes after the seizure, the dog alerted positively to one bag. Due to the late Friday afternoon timing, the agents held the luggage until Monday, when they obtained a warrant and discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine inside. Place was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court denied his motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
View caseInfinity Bank threatened to stop supplying essential components unless Austin Instrument agreed to higher prices. The threat placed Austin's immediate possession of needed goods at risk. Austin signed the new contract under economic duress.
In July 1965, Loral Corporation received a $6,000,000 contract from the Navy to produce radar sets. The contract contained a schedule of deliveries, a liquidated damages clause applying to late deliveries, and a cancellation clause in case of default by Loral. Loral solicited bids for some 40 precision gear components needed to produce the radar sets and awarded Austin a subcontract to supply 23 such parts. Austin commenced delivery in early 1966. In May 1966, Loral was awarded a second Navy contract for the production of more radar sets and again went about soliciting bids. Austin bid on all 40 gear components but, on July 15, a representative from Loral informed Austin's president, Mr. Krauss, that his company would be awarded the subcontract only for those items on which it was low bidder. The Austin officer refused to accept an order for less than all 40 of the gear parts. On the next day he told Loral that Austin would cease deliveries of the parts due under the existing subcontract unless Loral consented to substantial increases in the prices provided for by that agreement—both retroactively for parts already delivered and prospectively on those not yet shipped. He also demanded that Loral place with Austin the order for all 40 parts needed under Loral's second Navy contract. Shortly thereafter, Austin did, indeed, stop delivery. After contacting 10 manufacturers of precision gears and finding none who could produce the parts in time to meet its commitments to the Navy, Loral acceded to Austin's demands. In a letter dated July 22, Loral wrote to Austin that "We have feverishly surveyed other sources of supply and find that because of the prevailing military exigencies, were they to start from scratch as would have to be the case, they could not even remotely begin to deliver on time to meet the delivery requirements established by the Government. ... Accordingly, we are left with no choice or alternative but to meet your conditions." Loral thereupon consented to the price increases insisted upon by Austin under the first subcontract. Austin was awarded a second subcontract making it the supplier of all 40 gear parts for Loral's second contract with the Navy. Although Austin was granted until September to resume deliveries, Loral did, in fact, receive parts in August and was able to produce the radar sets in time to meet its commitments to the Navy on both contracts. After Austin's last delivery under the second subcontract in July, 1967, Loral notified Austin of its intention to seek recovery of the price increases. On September 15, 1967, Austin instituted this action against Loral to recover an amount in excess of $17,750 which was still due on the second subcontract. On the same day, Loral commenced an action against Austin claiming damages of some $22,250—the aggregate of the price increases under the first subcontract—on the ground of economic duress. The two actions were consolidated and, following a trial, Austin was awarded the sum it requested and Loral's complaint against Austin was dismissed. A closely divided Appellate Division affirmed.
View caseA Wisconsin court awarded custody of children to their father. Their mother, residing in Ohio, retained her personal right to immediate possession of the children. Ohio courts refused to enforce the Wisconsin order without personal jurisdiction over the mother.
The parties, Owen Anderson and Leona Anderson May, were married in Wisconsin and lived there with their three children until marital difficulties arose in 1946. In December 1946, they agreed that the mother would take the children, Ronald, Sandra, and James, to Lisbon, Ohio, to consider her future course. By New Year’s Day 1947, the mother informed the father by telephone that she would not return to Wisconsin. Within a few days, the father filed suit in the County Court of Waukesha County, Wisconsin, seeking both an absolute divorce and custody of the children. The only service on the mother consisted of personal delivery of the Wisconsin summons and petition to her in Ohio. The mother entered no appearance in the proceeding. On February 5, 1947, the Wisconsin court issued a decree divorcing the parties and awarding custody of the children to the father, with visitation rights to the mother. The father, accompanied by a local police officer, obtained the children from the mother in Ohio. The children remained with their father in Wisconsin until July 1, 1951, when he brought them back to Lisbon, Ohio, for a visit with their mother. When the father later demanded their return, the mother refused to surrender them. On July 5, 1951, the father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Probate Court of Columbiana County, Ohio, seeking to enforce the Wisconsin custody decree. After a hearing on the petition, a stipulation of facts, and testimony, the Probate Court ordered the children discharged from the mother’s restraint. The Court of Appeals for Columbiana County affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review. The mother appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to consider the matter.
View caseA mortgagee purchased property at foreclosure and expected to gain immediate possession once the redemption period expired. State legislation extended the period by sixteen days. The extension postponed the mortgagee's right to immediate possession of the premises.
The Blaisdells executed a mortgage on their property in Minneapolis to the Home Building & Loan Association on August 1, 1928. The mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement. After default, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to the Association on May 2, 1932, for $3700.98. The period of redemption under the law then in effect was set to expire on May 2, 1933. On April 18, 1933, Minnesota enacted Chapter 339 of the Laws of 1933, known as the Mortgage Moratorium Law. The statute authorized district courts to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales for such additional time as the court deemed just and equitable, not beyond May 1, 1935, upon condition that the mortgagor pay a reasonable part of the income or rental value toward taxes, insurance, interest, and principal. The Blaisdells applied to the District Court of Hennepin County for an extension of the redemption period. The district court found that the reasonable rental value of the property was $40 per month and the present market value was $6000. It extended the redemption period to May 1, 1935, requiring the Blaisdells to pay $40 per month to the Association. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the order. The Home Building & Loan Association appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reviewed the judgment sustaining the statute as applied to the preexisting mortgage.
View caseA person in possession or entitled to immediate possession of the chattel may recover. The right exists even if the claimant is not the legal owner.
Supporting sources
No. Liability for conversion or trespass to chattels remains even if the actor mistakenly believes the other consented or that the actor is privileged.
Supporting sources
Immediate possession is a present right to control the item. Future possession is a right that will ripen only after some condition or time passes.
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The mortgagee does not gain immediate possession upon default. The mortgagor retains title and possession until foreclosure is completed.
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…as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their immediate possession. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, accordingly, is reversed and the cause is remanded to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and…