impressment

In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.

Harry Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He also claimed that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie Railroad Company denied liability, and the case was tried by a jury. The railroad insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers. The railroad further contended that it is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence unless the conduct is wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000, and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Erie had contended that application of the Pennsylvania rule was required by section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1913 the State of Washington enacted a statute entitled An Act to establish a minimum wage for women and minors. The law created an Industrial Welfare Commission. A later statute transferred its duties to an Industrial Welfare Committee consisting of the Director of Labor and Industries, the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance, the Supervisor of Industrial Relations, the Industrial Statistician and the Supervisor of Women in Industry. The statute required the commission to investigate wages and conditions of labor for women and minors. It required public hearings. When wages were found inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and maintain workers in health, the commission was to convene conferences of employers, employees and public representatives before issuing obligatory orders fixing minimum wages. Special licenses were authorized for physically defective or apprentice workers at lower rates. The statute had remained in force for more than twenty-three years by the time of the present litigation. Elsie Parrish was employed by the West Coast Hotel Company as a chambermaid. She and her husband brought suit against the company to recover the difference between the wages actually paid and the minimum wage. The minimum wage was $14.50 per week of 48 hours fixed by the Industrial Welfare Committee pursuant to the statute. The company had paid her less than the prescribed minimum during her employment. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial court judgment, sustained the statute, and directed entry of judgment for the plaintiffs. The West Coast Hotel Company appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The appeal brought before the Court the question of the constitutional validity of the Washington minimum wage statute. The Washington law was substantially identical to minimum wage statutes enacted in Oregon in the same year. Similar laws had been adopted in the District of Columbia in 1918 and in other states during the same period.

In March 2010, Darius Clark sent his girlfriend T.T. hundreds of miles away to Washington, D.C., to engage in prostitution while he cared for her two young children in Cleveland, Ohio: three-year-old L.P. and eighteen-month-old A.T. The next day Clark took L.P. to preschool. Teacher Ramona Whitley noticed that L.P.'s left eye appeared bloodshot. When they moved into the brighter lights of a classroom, Whitley noticed red marks like whips of some sort on L.P.'s face. After Whitley and lead teacher Debra Jones questioned him, L.P. identified his abuser as Dee and indicated that Dee was big. Jones's supervisor lifted L.P.'s shirt and found additional injuries; Whitley then called a child-abuse hotline. When Clark arrived at the school he denied responsibility and left with L.P. The following day a social worker located the children at Clark's mother's house and took them to a hospital, where a physician documented extensive injuries on both children, including black eyes, belt marks, bruises, a swollen hand, a large burn, and two pigtails ripped out at the roots. A grand jury indicted Clark on five counts of felonious assault, two counts of endangering children, and two counts of domestic violence. At trial the State introduced L.P.'s statements to his teachers, but L.P. did not testify because the trial court found him incompetent under Ohio Rule of Evidence 601(A). The court admitted the statements under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807 after finding sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and denied Clark's motion to exclude them on Confrontation Clause grounds. The jury convicted Clark on all counts except one assault count related to A.T. and sentenced him to twenty-eight years' imprisonment. A state appellate court reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds. In a four-to-three decision the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding the statements testimonial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.