Also known as:improper influence · improper motive
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A suggested basis for attacking a witness's credibility by claiming that the testimony results from a recent improper influence or motive. A prior consistent statement made before the alleged influence or motive arose may rebut the charge and qualify as nonhearsay.
Sources & Authorities
How it applies
Common Examples
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Pre-Motive Emails Rebut Fabrication Charge
Irene Ingalls testified at trial that Star Fitness omitted key contract terms. Defense counsel implied on cross that her account arose only after she began consulting for the opposing party. Emails Irene sent six months earlier repeating the identical account were offered to show the testimony predated any suggested motive.
Juror Alcohol Use Raises Competence Issue
Irene Ireland testified for the prosecution. Defense counsel implied on cross that her account arose only after she began consulting for the government. Emails Irene sent six months earlier repeating the identical account were offered to show the testimony predated any suggested motive.
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Federal Rules
Uniform Acts
Restatements
Study Supplements
Tanner v. United States483 U.S. 107 (1987)
Sentencing Enhancement Based on Motive Finding
Iris Irons testified against the defendant. Defense counsel implied on cross that her account arose only after she began consulting for the prosecution. Earlier statements Iris made repeating the identical account were offered to show the testimony predated any suggested motive.
Apprendi v. New Jersey530 U.S. 466 (2000)
Co-Defendant Testimony Raises Influence Concern
Isaac Irving testified against his alleged co-conspirator. The defense suggested Isaac's account was shaped by an improper motive to obtain favorable treatment from prosecutors. Earlier statements by Isaac consistent with his trial testimony were offered to rebut the charge.
Glasser v. United States(1942)
Eyewitness Identification Challenged as Influenced
Ines Ibarra identified the defendant at trial. The defense argued the identification resulted from improper influence during a suggestive police procedure. A prior consistent description given by Ines before any alleged influence was offered to support her testimony.
Perry v. New Hampshire132 S. Ct. 716, 738-739 (2012)
Coerced Statement Raises Motive Question
Isabelle Inman gave a statement to police implicating the defendant. Defense counsel implied the account arose only after she began cooperating with prosecutors. Earlier statements Isabelle made repeating the identical account were offered to show the testimony predated any suggested motive.
Malloy v. Hogan378 U.S. 1 (1964)
Common questions
Frequently Asked
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When is a prior consistent statement admissible to rebut a charge of recent improper influence or motive?+
The statement must be consistent with the witness's trial testimony and must predate the alleged influence or motive. It is then admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) both to rehabilitate and for its truth.
Supporting sources
Does the timing of the prior statement matter when rebutting an improper-motive charge?+
Yes. The statement must have been made before the motive to fabricate or improper influence arose. Statements made after the motive developed do not rebut the charge under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
Supporting sources
Can a prior consistent statement offered only to rehabilitate after a bias attack qualify under the improper-motive provision?+
No. Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) applies specifically to rebuttal of recent fabrication or improper influence. Rehabilitation after a different attack on credibility falls under subsection (ii) and has no timing requirement.
Supporting sources
What must the cross-examiner do to open the door to prior consistent statements rebutting improper motive?+
The cross-examination must expressly or impliedly charge that the witness recently fabricated testimony or acted from a recent improper influence or motive. Mere general attacks on credibility do not trigger the provision.
Supporting sources
530 U.S. 466 (2000)Evidence
…invoke any presumption to buttress the evidence of racial bias and did not claim that Apprendi had the burden of disproving an improper motive. The question whether Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury find such bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is starkly presented. Our answer to that question…