Also known as: presently · at present
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Latin phrase denoting that a legal act, interest, or condition exists or takes effect at the present time rather than in the future. It requires an immediate intention or operation without deferral to a later date. Courts apply the phrase to test whether delivery, agreement, or residence has occurred now so that rights vest or jurisdiction shifts without waiting.
Odell moved with Uriah to State C two years earlier while Paula made only periodic work stops in State A. When Odell petitioned in State C to modify the decree, the court examined whether the child, parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in State A. Because no party maintained a current residence there, exclusive continuing jurisdiction ended and modification authority passed elsewhere.
Ivan Ivanov swung a metal pipe at Idina Iverson during an argument. Idina responded by striking Ivan once with a bat. The court measured whether the bat was intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm at the moment of use. Because the swing created only a risk of lesser injury under the circumstances, the privilege of self-defense applied without escalation to deadly force analysis.
Imran Iyer held authority under the trust terms to direct the trustee to distribute up to thirty percent of principal each year. The power required no future event or third-party consent beyond the trustee's ministerial role. Because the power was presently exercisable without an ascertainable standard limitation, it qualified as a general power of appointment under the code definition.
After the family relocated, the State C court considered whether it could modify the original State A custody decree. The statute required a determination that the child, parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. With all parties now living outside State A, the court found the condition satisfied and proceeded to initial-jurisdiction analysis.
State X enacted a three-year statute extending mortgage redemption periods after a housing crash. National Servicing Corp. argued the law impaired its existing servicing contracts. The court assessed whether the impairment operated in praesenti by immediately altering enforcement rights rather than only at some future foreclosure. Because the extension took effect at once on all covered loans, the Contract Clause claim was ripe for review.
The New York legislature passed a labor law in 1897 that regulated bakeries and confectionery establishments. Section 110 of article 8 of that law stated that no employee shall be required or permitted to work more than sixty hours in any one week or more than ten hours in any one day. This applied unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day of the week. The plaintiff in error violated the one hundred and tenth section of article 8, chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor law of the State of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employe working for him to work more than sixty hours in one week. The charge arose from a voluntary contract rather than any use of physical force. The judgments of the County Court of Oneida County, the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the conviction under the statute, although several judges dissented. The record indicated that the state courts had viewed the law as a measure relating to public health. The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States after argument on February 23 and 24, 1905. The Court rendered its decision on April 17, 1905.
View caseThe agency issued a rule interpreting a statute without first adopting the interpretation through notice-and-comment procedures. Challengers contended the interpretation lacked present legal force because it had not yet been tested in adjudication. The court examined whether the agency action created immediate obligations or merely announced a future enforcement position.
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively. In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record. NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977. The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
View caseIn praesenti requires an immediate intention to divest title upon delivery of the deed. In futuro defers the transfer until a later event occurs. Courts examine the grantor's words and actions at the time of delivery to decide which label applies.
Both parties must demonstrate a present agreement to be married at the time they begin cohabiting. Continuous cohabitation and public holding out as spouses supply corroboration. The agreement cannot be merely a promise to marry in the future.
The power must allow the holder to direct distribution of principal immediately without waiting for a future condition or event. Consent requirements or ascertainable standards may remove the power from the definition. The code focuses on whether the holder can act now.
A court loses exclusive continuing jurisdiction once it or another court determines that the child, parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the original state. The statute measures residence at the time of the modification request. Periodic visits alone do not preserve jurisdiction if no party maintains a current home there.