Also known as: incloses · inclosed · inclosing · inclosure · inclosures · enclose · enclosure
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
To surround land, a structure, or an area with a fence or other barrier that creates an enclosed space.
Lila waited until the charity gala ended and then slipped through a propped loading door. She used her badge to enter the locked administrative suite that housed the safe containing cash donations. Her unauthorized entry into that secured interior space after it had been inclosed constituted a substantial step toward theft.
Owner O built a road across the south twenty-five feet of Whiteacre and erected a fence along the north side of the strip. The fence remained in place for the statutory period while O used the road exclusively in connection with Blackacre. The enclosure created by the fence supported O's claim to fee simple title by adverse possession.
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences. Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate. Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community. During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity. The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
View caseA magazine article placed a subject's statements inside quotation marks that altered their meaning. The inclosed quotations created a false impression of the subject's actual words. The subject sued for defamation arising from the misleading enclosure of the altered language.
Jeffrey M. Masson served as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives until his termination. In 1983, Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New Yorker magazine detailing the circumstances of Masson's departure from the Archives and his disputes with board members including Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna Freud. The article drew primarily from tape-recorded interviews Malcolm conducted with Masson and was subsequently published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Masson claimed that several quotations attributed to him in the article did not appear on the tape recordings of his conversations with Malcolm. Among the challenged passages were statements that he changed his middle name because it sounded better, that he was viewed as an intellectual gigolo, that Freud's theory was the product of moral cowardice, that Anna Freud's house would have been a place of sex, women, fun, and that he would be considered the greatest analyst who ever lived after Freud. On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Malcolm, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Knopf. He alleged that the defendants had libeled him and placed him in a false light by fabricating quotations and by misleadingly editing his statements to portray him as unscholarly, irresponsible, vain, and lacking in honesty and moral integrity. Masson further alleged that The New Yorker and Knopf knew of Malcolm's misconduct prior to publication. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that Masson had failed to establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Masson appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard argument on June 16, 1988, and issued its decision on August 4, 1989.
View caseA retailer imported gray-market watches inside sealed shipping containers. Customs officials examined whether the inclosed merchandise violated trademark restrictions on parallel imports. The physical enclosure of the watches inside the containers determined the scope of the importation inquiry.
Gray-market goods consist of foreign-manufactured products bearing valid United States trademarks that enter the domestic market without the consent of the United States trademark holder. Three primary contexts produced such imports. A domestic firm might purchase trademark rights from an independent foreign manufacturer. A domestic firm might register a trademark for goods manufactured by an affiliated foreign entity. A domestic trademark holder might authorize an independent foreign manufacturer to use the mark abroad while restricting importation into the United States. Congress addressed parallel importation in 1922. It enacted section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 in response to a Court of Appeals decision that declined to enjoin such imports. The provision was later reenacted as section 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act. That statute generally prohibits importation of foreign-manufactured merchandise bearing a United States trademark without the owner's written consent. The Customs Service implemented the statute through regulations for over fifty years. Those regulations included exceptions from the general prohibition. The regulation at 19 CFR § 133.21(c) (1987) created a common-control exception. It allowed imports when the foreign and domestic trademarks were owned by the same entity or subject to common ownership or control. The regulation also created an authorized-use exception. It permitted imports when the foreign manufacturer applied the mark under authorization from the United States owner. In February 1984 the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks and two member companies filed suit. Respondents brought suit in Federal District Court in February 1984 seeking a declaration that the Customs Service regulation is invalid and an injunction against its enforcement. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the common-control and authorized-use exceptions were invalid. They also sought an injunction against enforcement. K Mart Corporation and 47th Street Photo intervened as defendants. The District Court upheld the regulation in 1984. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in 1986. It held the regulation inconsistent with the statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits. It affirmed jurisdiction in an earlier opinion and set the cases for reargument on the merits before issuing its decision in 1988.
View caseA resident kept a handgun inside a locked drawer within his residence. The drawer functioned as an inclosed space for the firearm under the District's storage rules. The resident challenged the storage requirement as an infringement on the right to keep arms for self-defense.
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for one-year periods. District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. Respondent Dick Heller is a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home. The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for self-defense. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA religious group performed animal sacrifice inside a fenced yard that had been inclosed for that purpose. City ordinances prohibited the killing of animals within such enclosures when done for religious reasons. The group challenged the ordinances as targeting its practices while permitting similar conduct outside religious contexts.
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseUnlawful entry into a structure, vehicle, or enclosure where the crime is planned counts as a substantial step when done with the required intent. The entry must strongly corroborate the criminal purpose. Courts focus on whether the actor has moved beyond mere preparation into conduct that demonstrates firm resolve.
A fence or other enclosure built and maintained for the statutory period can support acquisition of fee title when the other elements of adverse possession are met. The enclosure demonstrates exclusive use and notice to the true owner. If the enclosure instead serves only a limited purpose such as containing cattle, it may support only a prescriptive easement rather than fee title.
A signed writing and an unsigned writing may be read together as a memorandum when the party to be charged physically encloses them in the same envelope. The documents must clearly relate to the same transaction. Mere enclosure without any reference or acquiescence may be insufficient if the connection between the writings is not apparent from the circumstances.
…the infliction of pain or suffering "in the interest of medical science," § 828.02; the placing of poison in one's yard or enclosure, § 828.08; and the use of a live animal "to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunting," § 828.122(6)(b), and "to hunt wild hogs," § 828.122(6)(e). The city concedes that…