Also known as:intentional infliction of emotional distress · negligent infliction of emotional distress · IIED · NIED · emotional distress
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A tort imposing liability when extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. Liability extends to resulting bodily harm.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Outrageous Workplace Harassment
Ibrahim Iqbal's supervisor at Ideal Solutions locked him in a supply closet for hours while shouting insults about his family and heritage. Ibrahim developed severe anxiety requiring medical treatment. The supervisor's deliberate and extreme actions meet the threshold for liability.
Protected Protest Near Funeral
Members of a church group picketed peacefully on public land outside a military funeral with signs expressing political and moral opposition to government policy. The deceased soldier's father suffered severe emotional distress from the signs. No additional unprotected conduct occurred, so tort liability is barred.
Ismael Ibrahim confronted and berated his neighbor with extreme insults in the presence of the neighbor's spouse, Iris Irons. Iris suffered severe emotional distress from witnessing the targeted outburst. The conduct directed at the third person supports liability to the immediate family member who was present.
No Standalone Emotional Harm
Isaiah Ishikawa trespassed on Ivy Ibarra's property intending only to damage her fence. Ivy experienced emotional distress but no bodily harm or other invasion of protected interests beyond the trespass itself. The emotional distress alone does not create separate liability.
Damages Including Emotional Distress
Igor Ito suffered a physical assault that also produced lasting anxiety and depression. Recovery includes compensation for both the bodily harm and the resulting emotional distress. The emotional component is recoverable as part of the overall personal injury damages.
Media Breach of Promise
Integrity Partners promised confidentiality to a source in exchange for information. After publishing the source's identity, the source experienced severe emotional distress from resulting public backlash. The claim proceeds under general applicability principles without First Amendment bar.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.501 U.S. 663 (1991)
On October 27, 1982, during the closing days of the Minnesota gubernatorial election campaign, Dan Cohen separately approached Lori Sturdevant of the Star Tribune and Bill Salisbury of the Pioneer Press Dispatch. Cohen, a political associate of IR candidate Wheelock Whitney, offered each reporter copies of two public court records concerning DFL lieutenant governor candidate Marlene Johnson: a 1969 record of three counts of unlawful assembly that were dismissed and a 1970 record of a petit theft conviction that was vacated about a year later. Cohen requested and received promises from both reporters that he would be treated as an anonymous source. His name would not appear in any material connected with the documents. The reporters would not pursue questions about his source.
The reporters were experienced and covering the gubernatorial election. They knew Cohen as an active Republican associated with the Wheelock Whitney campaign and promised to keep his identity confidential, intending to honor that promise at the time it was made. Cohen also met with reporters from the Associated Press and WCCO-TV, who likewise promised anonymity and received the documents. The Associated Press published the story while honoring its promise, while WCCO-TV did not run the story. After receiving the documents, both newspapers interviewed Johnson for her explanation. The Star Tribune assigned a reporter to locate the original court records, discovering that another Whitney supporter had checked them out the previous day.
Editors at both the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch independently decided to publish the stories while identifying Cohen as the source. On October 28, 1982, both newspapers published stories about Johnson's arrests and convictions. Both articles published Cohen's name, along with denials by the regular Whitney campaign officials of any connection with the published stories. The Pioneer Press Dispatch quoted Johnson as saying the release of the information was a last-minute smear campaign. Cohen was fired from his job at a Minneapolis advertising firm the same day. The Star Tribune subsequently published a column and cartoon criticizing Cohen's tactics.
Cohen sued Northwest Publications, Inc., publisher of the Pioneer Press Dispatch, and Cowles Media Company, publisher of the Star Tribune, for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The trial court ruled that the First Amendment did not bar the claims. The jury found liability on both claims and awarded Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages jointly and severally against the defendants plus $250,000 in punitive damages against each defendant. The court of appeals upheld the jury's finding of a breach of contract and affirmed the award of $200,000 compensatory damages. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted petitions for further review from all parties.
What conduct qualifies as extreme and outrageous for this tort?
The conduct must exceed all bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults or annoyances fall short.
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Does the First Amendment protect speech that causes emotional distress?
Speech on matters of public concern receives special protection and bars tort liability absent additional unprotected conduct. Offensive but peaceful picketing at a public funeral illustrates this limit.
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Can a bystander recover when conduct targets a third person?
Recovery is available to an immediate family member present at the time or to any other person present if bodily harm results. The actor must have intentionally or recklessly caused the distress.
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Is emotional distress recoverable when it is the only consequence of otherwise tortious conduct?
No separate recovery exists for emotional distress alone when the underlying conduct is tortious only because it was intended to cause bodily harm or invade other protected interests.
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How does this tort interact with damages for personal injury?
A plaintiff whose personality interests are invaded may recover for both bodily harm and emotional distress as elements of compensatory damages.
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418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)
…to reputation was presumed and damages could be awarded by the jury, along with any special damages such as pecuniary loss and emotional distress. At the very least, the rule allowed the recovery of nominal damages for any defamatory publication actionable per se and thus performed "a vindicatory function by enabling the…