instrument of crime

George Reynolds, a longtime member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was indicted in the District Court of the third judicial district of the Territory of Utah for bigamy after entering a second marriage to Amelia Jane Schofield while his first wife remained alive. Reynolds had obtained permission from recognized church authorities to contract the polygamous marriage. He and other male church members believed the practice was a religious duty enjoined by divine revelation to Joseph Smith. Refusal would bring damnation when circumstances permitted. The grand jury that returned the indictment consisted of fifteen persons under a territorial statute. This differed from the sixteen to twenty-three persons required by federal statute for United States circuit and district courts. During voir dire, the trial court overruled Reynolds's challenges for cause to prospective jurors including Charles Read who stated they had formed opinions about the case. The court sustained government challenges to other prospective jurors who were or had been living in polygamy. At trial the prosecution offered the transcript of testimony given by Amelia Jane Schofield at an earlier prosecution of Reynolds for the same offense under a different indictment. The government showed that subpoenas were served at Reynolds's house. An officer was told the witness was not at home. Reynolds declined to disclose her location. A later subpoena with the correct name also failed to locate her. Reynolds had been present and able to cross-examine at the prior trial but offered no explanation for her absence. Reynolds requested a jury instruction that he must be acquitted if the jury found he acted in the sincere belief that the second marriage fulfilled a religious duty. The court refused and instead instructed that religious belief could not excuse a knowing violation of the criminal law. The court further instructed the jury to consider the consequences of polygamy for innocent women and children. Reynolds was convicted and the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.

In the 1970s petitioners James E. Gray, a former Kentucky public official, and Charles J. McNally, a private individual, along with Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt, participated in arrangements involving the Commonwealth's insurance contracts. After Democrat Julian Carroll was elected Governor in 1974, Hunt became chairman of the state Democratic Party and obtained de facto control over selecting the insurance agencies from which Kentucky would purchase its policies. In 1975 the Wombwell Insurance Company agreed with Hunt that, in exchange for continuing as the Commonwealth's agent for a workmen's compensation policy, it would share commissions exceeding $50,000 a year with other agencies designated by Hunt. Between 1975 and 1979 Wombwell funneled $851,000 in commissions to 21 agencies specified by Hunt, including Seton Investments, Inc., a company controlled by Hunt and Gray and nominally owned and operated by McNally, which received approximately $200,000. Gray served as Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation from 1976 to 1978 and as Secretary of the Governor's Cabinet from 1977 to 1979. Prior to his 1976 appointment, Hunt and Gray had established Seton for the purpose of receiving the commission payments, which were used to benefit Gray and Hunt. Pursuant to Hunt's direction, Wombwell also made payments through the Snodgrass Insurance Agency that ultimately went to McNally. Hunt later pleaded guilty to mail and tax fraud charges and received a three-year prison sentence. Petitioners were charged with one count of conspiracy and seven counts of mail fraud; six of the mail fraud counts were dismissed before trial. The remaining mail fraud count was based on the mailing of a commission check to Wombwell by the insurance company that had secured coverage for the State. It alleged that petitioners had devised a scheme to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly. The count also charged that petitioners sought to obtain money and other things of value by means of false pretenses and the concealment of material facts. The conspiracy count alleged that petitioners had conspired to violate the mail fraud statute through that scheme. It further alleged that they had conspired to defraud the United States by obstructing the collection of federal taxes. After trial in the District Court the jury convicted petitioners on both the mail fraud and conspiracy counts, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions in 1986. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.