intellectual disability

Nicholas Romeo is a profoundly retarded individual with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child and an I.Q. between 8 and 10. Until he was 26, Romeo lived with his parents in Philadelphia. After his father's death in May 1974, his mother petitioned the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas for his permanent admission to a state facility, stating she was unable to care for him or control his violence. Following examinations by a physician and psychologist who certified that Romeo was severely retarded and unable to care for himself, the Court of Common Pleas committed him on June 11, 1974, to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act. At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on at least sixty-three occasions between July 1974 and November 1976, both by his own violence and by reactions from other residents. His mother filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as his next friend against three administrators of the institution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that the officials knew or should have known Romeo was suffering injuries and failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures. Romeo was transferred to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in the infirmary, he was physically restrained during portions of each day by order of a doctor. A second amended complaint filed in December 1977 alleged that the defendants were restraining him for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him with appropriate treatment or programs for his mental retardation. All claims for injunctive relief were dropped prior to trial because Romeo was a member of a class seeking such relief in another action. An eight-day jury trial was held in April 1978. Petitioners introduced evidence that Romeo participated in several programs teaching basic self-care skills. A comprehensive behavior-modification program designed to reduce his aggressive behavior was never implemented because of his mother's objections. Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his unit. The district court instructed the jury using a deliberate indifference standard drawn from Eighth Amendment cases, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded for a new trial in 1980. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981 because of the importance of the questions presented to the administration of state institutions for the mentally retarded.

Theon Jackson is a mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school child. He cannot read, write, or otherwise communicate except through limited sign language. In May 1968, at age 27, he was charged in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, with separate robberies of two women that had occurred the preceding July, involving property valued at four dollars and five dollars respectively. As the statute requires, the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Jackson. A competency hearing was subsequently held at which petitioner was represented by counsel. At the hearing, the court received the doctors' joint report concluding that Jackson was unable to understand the nature of the charges or participate in his defense due to his communication skills, hearing loss, and mental deficiency. The doctors testified that it was extremely unlikely Jackson could ever develop the necessary skills, and the interpreter testified that Indiana had no facilities that could help someone in Jackson's condition. The trial court found that Jackson lacked comprehension sufficient to make his defense and ordered him committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until certified sane. Jackson's counsel filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the commitment amounted to a life sentence without conviction and deprived him of constitutional rights, but the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the denial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. By the time of the Supreme Court's consideration, Jackson had been confined for three and one-half years on the basis of the incompetency finding.

On February 21, 1978, Freddie Lee Hall and his accomplice Mark Ruffin kidnapped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst, a pregnant 21-year-old newlywed. Afterward Hall and Ruffin drove to a convenience store they planned to rob and killed Lonnie Coburn, a sheriff’s deputy who attempted to apprehend them. Hall received the death penalty for both murders, although his sentence for the Coburn murder was later reduced on account of insufficient evidence of premeditation. When Hall was first sentenced, this Court had not yet ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits States from imposing the death penalty on persons with intellectual disability. After this Court held that capital defendants must be permitted to present nonstatutory mitigating evidence in death penalty proceedings, Hall was resentenced. Hall then presented substantial and unchallenged evidence of intellectual disability, including school records in which his teachers identified him on numerous occasions as mentally retarded, testimony from his prior lawyer that he could not understand anything Hall said, and testimony from medical clinicians that Hall was significantly retarded and had levels of understanding typically seen with toddlers. Hall’s siblings testified that there was something very wrong with him as a child, that he was slow with speech and slow to learn, and that he walked and talked long after his other brothers and sisters. The sentencing court found substantial evidence that Hall had been mentally retarded his entire life yet still imposed a death sentence, which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. In 2002, after this Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of persons with intellectual disability, Hall filed a motion claiming that he had intellectual disability and could not be executed. More than five years later, Florida held a hearing to consider Hall’s motion. Hall again presented evidence of intellectual disability, including an IQ test score of 71. Hall had received nine IQ evaluations in 40 years, with scores ranging from 60 to 80, but the sentencing court excluded the two scores below 70 for evidentiary reasons, leaving only scores between 71 and 80. In response, Florida argued that Hall could not be found intellectually disabled because Florida law requires that, as a threshold matter, Hall show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of his intellectual disability. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall’s appeal and held that Florida’s 70-point threshold was constitutional. This Court granted certiorari.

Christopher Simmons was 17 years old and a junior in high school when he committed the murder of Shirley Crook in Missouri. Simmons planned the crime with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, discussing breaking into a home, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge. On the night of the murder, Simmons and Benjamin entered Crook's home through an open window, bound her with duct tape, drove her to a state park, reinforced her bindings with electrical wire, wrapped her face in duct tape, and threw her from a railroad trestle into the Meramec River, where she drowned. Simmons was arrested the next day at his high school after bragging about the killing. Police read him his Miranda rights, and he waived his right to an attorney before confessing and agreeing to a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene. The State charged him with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-degree murder. Because Simmons was 17 at the time of the crime, he fell outside Missouri's juvenile court jurisdiction under Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 211.021 and 211.031 and was tried as an adult. At trial the State introduced Simmons' confession, the videotaped reenactment, and testimony about his advance planning and later bragging. The defense called no guilt-phase witnesses. The jury convicted Simmons of first-degree murder. In the penalty phase the State presented victim-impact testimony from Crook's family and proved three aggravating factors. The defense presented testimony from Simmons' family and a juvenile justice officer about his lack of prior record and family relationships, and both sides addressed his age as a mitigating factor. The jury recommended death, and the trial judge imposed it. Simmons obtained new counsel and moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance because trial counsel had not presented evidence of his immaturity, impulsiveness, difficult home environment, substance abuse, and poor school performance. The trial court denied the motion. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the denial of postconviction relief. Federal habeas relief was also denied. After this Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Simmons filed a new state postconviction petition arguing that Atkins required the same categorical exemption for juvenile offenders. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, set aside the death sentence, and resentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without parole. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.