Also known as: interracial marriages · mixed marriage
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
Marriage between persons of different races. Such unions receive protection as a fundamental liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State action that burdens or refuses to recognize an interracial marriage on the basis of race must satisfy strict scrutiny and demonstrate a purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Jordan and Mei, who are of different races, married validly in State X. After moving to State Y, they asked the vital records office to record the marriage so they could update licenses and tax filings. The office refused under an old family code provision disfavoring interracial unions. A federal court must evaluate whether the refusal burdens their protected choice of spouse.
Alicia, a white woman, married Marcus, a Black man, after obtaining a court finding of capacity. Her guardian petitioned to annul the marriage, claiming interracial unions destabilize the local legal community. The family court already confirmed Alicia's competence to marry. The petition must be assessed for whether it imposes an unconstitutional racial barrier on the couple's union.
Imani Idowu and Ian Iverson, an interracial couple, sought recognition of their marriage in a state that once criminalized such unions on moral grounds. Officials cited longstanding statutes still on the books. The couple argued the provisions could no longer stand once measured against protected personal liberty. The court must decide whether prior moral rationales survive current scrutiny.
Ingrid Innes and Imran Iyer, an interracial married couple, applied for married-student housing at a public university. The housing office denied them under a policy requiring units to reflect the predominant racial heritage of the student body. The couple challenged the denial as penalizing their marital choice. The court must determine whether the policy survives review when it burdens the right to marry across racial lines.
Ivy Ibarra and Ines Ibarra, an interracial couple married in another state, requested registration for spousal benefits. State officials refused, citing a rarely enforced family code provision originally aimed at interracial unions. The couple showed the office had recognized other interracial marriages recently. The court must decide whether selective nonrecognition imposes an unconstitutional racial classification.
Integrity Partners, a nonprofit led by an interracial married couple, applied for a state environmental grant. Officials denied funding under guidelines favoring leadership that matches the racially uniform character of traditional land stewards. The couple sued, claiming the denial penalizes their marriage. The court must assess whether the policy rests on a purpose independent of race.
Racial classifications in marriage laws trigger the most rigid scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The state must show a legitimate purpose wholly independent of invidious racial discrimination. The freedom to marry a person of another race is also protected as a fundamental liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
Supporting sources
…of the Circuit Court of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the…
…still had criminal statutes concerning the conduct at issue. Compare 388 U. S., at 6, n. 5 (noting that 16 States still outlawed interracial marriage), with ante , at 193-194 (noting that 24 States and the District of Columbia have sodomy statutes). Yet the Court held, not only that the invidious racism of Virginia's law violated the…
…and has continued after the repudiation of Lochner 's progeny, most notably on the subjects of segregation in public education, interracial marriage, marital privacy and contraception, abortion, personal control of medical treatment, and physical confinement. This enduring tradition of American constitutional practice is, in Justice…
…the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage
…Ct. at 1819. The Lovings were duly indicted for and convicted of violating Virginia’s miscegenation laws,[^maj-23] which banned interracial marriages
Yes when the refusal rests on a racial classification lacking any non-invidious purpose. The Constitution forbids state action that denies recognition to a valid interracial marriage solely because of race. Strict scrutiny applies and generalized interests in social stability or traditional definitions do not suffice.
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No. A petition that explicitly targets the interracial character of the union invokes a racial classification. The Constitution prohibits state courts from annulling a marriage on that basis even when capacity concerns are also raised, unless the state separates and justifies a non-racial ground.
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No. A state actor may not burden the right to marry across racial lines through explicit racial classifications without a compelling interest independent of racial prejudice. Interests in reflecting predominant racial heritage or avoiding confusing signals fail strict scrutiny.
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