judgments as a matter of law

In September 1980 respondent Catrett, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced a wrongful-death action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations including petitioner Celotex Corporation. The complaint alleged that her husband Louis H. Catrett died in 1979 from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on diversity grounds. After extensive discovery Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1981 asserting that respondent had failed to produce any evidence that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex asbestos products. In response respondent produced a transcript of the decedent's deposition taken in a separate California proceeding, a letter from an official of one of Celotex's former insurance companies, and a letter from one of Celotex's customers. In July 1982 the District Court granted summary judgment to Celotex on the ground that respondent had made no showing of exposure to Celotex products in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Respondent appealed only that ruling. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden because it made no effort to adduce affirmative evidence supporting its motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the proper standard under Rule 56.

Sandra Adickes, a white school teacher from New York, was working as a volunteer teacher at a Freedom School for Negro children in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, during the summer of 1964. On August 14, 1964, Adickes went with six of her Negro students to the Hattiesburg Public Library, where the librarian refused to allow the students to use the library and summoned the chief of police, who ordered the group to leave. The group then went to the S. H. Kress & Co. store in Hattiesburg to have lunch. Adickes filed suit against Kress in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the group sat down at the lunch counter, a policeman entered the store and observed them. A waitress took the orders of the Negro students but refused to serve Adickes on the ground that she was a white person in the company of Negroes. The group left the store without being served. As they reached the sidewalk, the same policeman arrested Adickes on a vagrancy charge. The vagrancy charge against Adickes was subsequently changed, and she was tried and acquitted. Her complaint contained two counts under § 1983. One count alleged that Kress had refused her service pursuant to a custom of the community to segregate the races in public eating places that was enforced by the State. The other count alleged that the refusal of service and the arrest were the product of a conspiracy between Kress employees and the Hattiesburg police. Kress moved for summary judgment on the conspiracy count and submitted depositions from the store manager, the waitress, and the arresting officers, along with affidavits from police officials, all denying any agreement or communication with the police about refusing service or making the arrest. Adickes opposed the motion by pointing to her deposition statement and an unsworn statement from a Kress employee indicating that a policeman had been in the store at the time of the refusal. The District Court granted summary judgment on the conspiracy count, holding that Adickes had failed to allege facts from which a conspiracy might be inferred. After a trial on the custom count, the District Court directed a verdict for Kress because Adickes had not proved other instances of whites being refused service while in the company of Negroes. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings on both counts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

Stewart Organization, Inc., an Alabama corporation, entered into a dealership agreement with Ricoh Corporation, a nationwide manufacturer whose principal place of business is in New Jersey, obligating Stewart to market Ricoh copier products. The agreement contained a forum-selection clause stating that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with the agreement. Business relations between the parties soured, and in September 1984 Stewart filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging breach of the dealership agreement together with claims for breach of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations. Relying on the forum-selection clause, Ricoh moved the district court to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406; the district court denied the motion after concluding that Alabama law governed and disfavored enforcement of such clauses, then certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that federal law governs venue questions in diversity actions and that the clause is enforceable; after rehearing en banc the full court adopted the panel result and reasoning, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.