Also known as: knock-and-announce requirement · knock and announce rule · knock-and-announce rule · knock and announce · knock-and-announce
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Fourth Amendment rule requiring officers executing a search warrant to knock on the door, identify themselves, announce their purpose, and wait a reasonable time before entering a residence. The rule yields to reasonable suspicion that knocking would be dangerous, futile, or would lead to destruction of evidence. A violation does not trigger the exclusionary rule.
Officers approached Kurtis Kaiser's apartment door and knocked while announcing their presence. They immediately heard repeated toilet flushing and cabinet doors slamming inside. Believing evidence was being destroyed, the officers forced entry without a warrant and seized narcotics. The entry was upheld because the sounds supplied an objectively reasonable belief of imminent destruction that arose after the lawful knock and announcement.
Detectives obtained a warrant to search Kaito Kato's residence for betting records. They cut through a locked gate and broke a patio door without knocking or announcing. Inside they seized phones and ledgers. Kato's motion to suppress was denied because the exclusionary rule does not remedy a knock-and-announce violation during execution of a valid warrant.
Officers followed Kiara Kaur to her residence and entered through an unlocked side door without a warrant or announcement to arrest her for check fraud. They had maintained surveillance for weeks and observed no immediate danger or evidence destruction. The entry violated the Fourth Amendment because no exigent circumstances excused the failure to obtain an arrest warrant before entering the home.
In January 1970, New York detectives conducted a two-day investigation into the murder of a gas station manager. On January 14 they assembled evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Theodore Payton had committed the crime. On the morning of January 15 at about 7:30 a.m., six officers went to Payton’s apartment in the Bronx without having obtained a warrant. Although light and music emanated from inside, there was no response to their knock on the metal door. They summoned emergency assistance and approximately thirty minutes later used crowbars to break open the door and enter. No one was present, but the officers seized a .30-caliber shell casing that lay in plain view and that was later admitted into evidence at Payton’s murder trial. In a companion case, on March 14, 1974, police officers acting with probable cause went to the Queens house where Obie Riddick was living to arrest him for two armed robberies that had occurred in 1971. When Riddick’s young son opened the door the officers saw Riddick sitting in bed. They entered the house, placed him under arrest, and before permitting him to dress opened a chest of drawers two feet from the bed. They discovered narcotics and related paraphernalia that were later admitted at his trial on narcotics charges. In both cases the New York trial courts upheld the warrantless entries and plain-view seizures under provisions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure that authorized such actions, and the Appellate Divisions affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals, in a single 4-3 opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Payton and Riddick. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, which were argued together.
View caseOfficers responded to a report of violence at Kelsey Kirk's home and observed a juvenile striking an adult inside the kitchen. They entered without knocking to stop the ongoing assault. The entry was constitutional because the officers possessed an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone inside needed immediate assistance.
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2000, four police officers in Brigham City, Utah responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house around 3 a.m., the officers heard shouting from inside and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. They observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and then saw through a screen door and windows an altercation taking place in the kitchen. Four adults were attempting to restrain a juvenile who eventually broke free, swung a fist, and struck one of the adults in the face. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. One officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence, but amid the tumult nobody noticed, so the officer entered the kitchen and announced again until the occupants became aware of the police and the altercation ceased. The officers arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression ruling. Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued that the entry was reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine or the exigent circumstances exception, but the court rejected both contentions and affirmed over two dissenters. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation.
View caseOfficers detained Kimberly Knox outside her apartment after observing suspected drug activity. They prevented her from reentering while obtaining a search warrant. The brief seizure was upheld because it was supported by probable cause and lasted only long enough for officers to secure the warrant.
On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, to accompany her to the trailer where she lived with her husband Charles McArthur so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. The officers arrived with Tera at the trailer at about 3:15 p.m. Tera went inside while the officers remained outside. After collecting her possessions, Tera emerged and told Chief Love that Charles had marijuana in the trailer and that she had seen him slide some dope underneath the couch. Love knocked on the door, informed Charles of Tera's statements, and requested permission to search the trailer, which Charles denied. Love then sent Officer Skidis with Tera to obtain a search warrant. Love informed Charles, who was on the porch, that he could not reenter the trailer unless accompanied by a police officer. Charles reentered the trailer two or three times to get cigarettes and make phone calls, and each time Love stood just inside the door to observe him. Officer Skidis obtained the warrant by about 5 p.m. and returned with other officers to search the trailer. The officers found a marijuana pipe, a one-hitter box, and a small amount of marijuana under the sofa, leading to Charles McArthur's arrest. Illinois charged McArthur with unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and marijuana, both misdemeanors under Illinois law. McArthur moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. The trial court granted the suppression motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the decision. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal.
View caseAn officer stopped Kieran Kelly without reasonable suspicion and discovered an outstanding warrant during the encounter. The officer then arrested Kelly and found drugs on his person. The evidence was admissible because the discovery of the valid warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the seizure of evidence.
In December 2006, an anonymous tipster contacted the South Salt Lake City police department's drug-tip line to report narcotics activity at a particular residence, specifying that the activity involved a white male and providing a physical description of the man and his car. Detective Douglas Fackrell was assigned to investigate the tip and conducted intermittent surveillance of the home over the course of about a week. During this period, Fackrell observed visitors who would frequently enter the residence and leave after short periods of time, a pattern consistent with drug dealing in his experience. One of the visitors was Edward Strieff. Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store. In the store's parking lot, Fackrell detained Strieff without reasonable suspicion, identified himself as a police officer, and asked what Strieff was doing at the residence. As part of the stop, Fackrell requested Strieff's identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification card. Fackrell relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Fackrell arrested Strieff pursuant to the warrant. When Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The State of Utah charged Strieff with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained by exploitation of an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. The Utah Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement during execution of a valid search warrant. The interests protected by the rule, such as privacy and dignity at the threshold, are too attenuated from the later evidentiary use of seized items. Alternative remedies such as civil suits and internal discipline remain available.
Supporting sources
Officers may enter without knocking when they possess reasonable suspicion that compliance would be dangerous, futile, or would lead to destruction of evidence. This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis rather than through a blanket exception for an entire category of cases such as all drug warrants.
Supporting sources
Yes. Officers may enter without a warrant to prevent imminent destruction of evidence when they reasonably believe such destruction is occurring, even if the exigency arises after a lawful knock and announcement. The officers must not have created the exigency through an actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation.
Supporting sources
…rule. The Michigan Supreme Court also affirmed. Held: The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement. Majority opinion Opinion of Justice Scalia The common-law principle that law enforcement officers must announce their presence before entering a dwelling has long been part of…