Also known as: knock and announce standards · knock-and-announce rule · knock and announce rule · knock-and-announce requirement · Wilson rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Fourth Amendment principle requiring law enforcement officers to knock and announce their presence before forcibly entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant. The requirement protects interests in life, property, privacy, and dignity during entry. A violation does not trigger the exclusionary rule when officers otherwise hold a valid warrant.
Narcotics officers obtained a warrant for Dana's apartment. Believing drugs might be flushed, they forced the door without knocking or announcing. They seized pill bottles and logs inside. Dana's motion to suppress the evidence fails because the knock-and-announce violation does not require exclusion of items seized under a valid warrant.
Officers responded to a home where a juvenile was striking an adult. They entered through the back door without knocking after seeing the ongoing violence. The entry satisfied knock-and-announce standards because exigent circumstances made announcement unreasonable. Evidence obtained inside remains admissible.
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2000, four police officers in Brigham City, Utah responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house around 3 a.m., the officers heard shouting from inside and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. They observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and then saw through a screen door and windows an altercation taking place in the kitchen. Four adults were attempting to restrain a juvenile who eventually broke free, swung a fist, and struck one of the adults in the face. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. One officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence, but amid the tumult nobody noticed, so the officer entered the kitchen and announced again until the occupants became aware of the police and the altercation ceased. The officers arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression ruling. Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued that the entry was reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine or the exigent circumstances exception, but the court rejected both contentions and affirmed over two dissenters. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation.
View caseOfficers arrested a driver for suspected drunk driving. They sought a warrantless blood draw to prevent dissipation of alcohol. The driver argued that the delay for a warrant would destroy evidence. The court holds that the natural metabolization of alcohol alone does not create a per se exigency justifying a warrantless search.
In the early morning hours, a Missouri police officer on highway patrol stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck at approximately 2:08 a.m. after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline. The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. McNeely acknowledged that he had consumed a couple of beers at a bar, appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck, and performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests before declining to use a portable breath-test device. The officer placed McNeely under arrest and began transporting him to the station house. When McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took him to a nearby hospital for blood testing without attempting to secure a warrant. Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer read McNeely a standard implied consent form explaining that refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to immediate revocation of his driver’s license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution under Missouri law. McNeely nonetheless refused consent. The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, which was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m. Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.154 percent. McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated. He moved to suppress the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the exigency exception did not apply because, apart from the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency in which he could not practicably obtain a warrant. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the suppression order. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
View caseOfficers knocked on an apartment door after smelling marijuana. When they heard movement inside, they announced their presence and forced entry. The occupant claims officers manufactured the exigency by knocking. The court rules that the knock itself did not create the exigency that justified the warrantless entry.
Police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. Undercover Officer Gibbons watched the deal from an unmarked car in a nearby parking lot and radioed uniformed officers to move in on the suspect as he moved quickly toward the breezeway of an apartment building. Upon arriving at the breezeway, the uniformed officers detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from the apartment on the left. Officer Steven Cobb banged on the door of that apartment as loud as he could and announced "This is the police" or "Police, police, police." As soon as the officers began banging, they heard people inside moving and sounds consistent with things being moved, which led them to believe drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed. The officers announced they were going to make entry, kicked in the door, and found respondent Hollis King, his girlfriend, and a guest inside the front room. During a protective sweep the officers saw marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view, and a later search uncovered crack cocaine, cash, and drug paraphernalia. Police later entered the apartment on the right and found the initial suspected drug dealer. A Fayette County grand jury charged King with trafficking in marijuana, first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and second-degree persistent felony offender status. The Fayette County Circuit Court denied King's motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search. King entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling and was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The exclusionary rule does not apply to knock-and-announce violations during execution of a valid search warrant. The interests protected by the rule are too attenuated from the later evidentiary use of seized items, and alternative remedies such as civil suits and internal discipline suffice.
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It protects life and safety of occupants and officers, prevents unnecessary property damage, and preserves privacy and dignity by giving occupants a chance to answer the door peacefully.
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Officers may enter without knocking when exigent circumstances exist, such as imminent risk of evidence destruction, danger to officers, or escape of a suspect. The determination is based on the totality of circumstances at the time of entry.
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…rule. The Michigan Supreme Court also affirmed. Held: The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement. Majority opinion Opinion of Justice Scalia The common-law principle that law enforcement officers must announce their presence before entering a dwelling has long been part of…