land-use exaction

In 1972, Coy A. Koontz, Sr. purchased an undeveloped 14.9-acre tract of land on the south side of Florida State Road 50 east of Orlando that lies entirely within the jurisdiction of the St. Johns River Water Management District. The property contains wetlands as defined by Florida statute. A drainage ditch runs along the property's western edge, and high-voltage power lines bisect it into northern and southern sections. The northern 3.7-acre section drains well despite its classification. The southern section includes a small creek, forested uplands, and wetlands that sometimes have water as much as a foot deep. In 1984 the District adopted a rule requiring permit applicants whose projects would adversely impact wetlands to offset that loss by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands elsewhere. That requirement could be satisfied by purchasing credits from a mitigation bank. In 1994 Koontz applied to the District for Management and Storage of Surface Water and Wetlands Resource Management permits to develop the northern 3.7 acres. He proposed to raise the elevation of the building site, install a dry-bed pond, and grant a conservation easement over the remaining 11 acres. The District found the mitigation inadequate. It stated it would approve the permits only if Koontz reduced the development to one acre and deeded the remaining 13.9 acres to the District. In the alternative, Koontz could pay contractors to replace culverts or fill ditches on District-owned land several miles away to enhance approximately 50 acres of wetlands. Koontz found both alternatives unacceptable and filed suit in Florida circuit court under Fla. Stat. § 373.617(2) alleging that the demands constituted an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power. After a two-day bench trial at which experts testified that the northern section had already been seriously degraded by surrounding construction, the trial court found the demands lacked the required nexus and rough proportionality and awarded damages. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the permit denial was not a taking and that the District had not actually demanded any property from Koontz. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state courts of last resort on whether the Nollan and Dolan standards apply to a land-use agency's demand for money.

The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet. The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house. The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.

In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers. Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership. Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years. The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.

Respondents Santa Fe Elevator Corp. and other entities operated public grain warehouses in Illinois under licenses issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the United States Warehouse Act. The Rice partnership, an owner, shipper, and dealer in grain, served as one of their customers, while the Illinois Commerce Commission held regulatory jurisdiction over public grain warehouses under state law. In 1944 Rice filed a complaint with the Illinois Commerce Commission alleging that respondents maintained unjust and unreasonable rates, discriminated in storage rates in favor of the federal government, operated in dual conflicting positions as warehousemen and grain dealers, failed to provide reasonable and adequate facilities, issued securities and entered affiliate contracts without prior approval, operated without a state license, abandoned service without consent, failed to file and publish rate schedules, and mixed public grain with inferior grades. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the federal Warehouse Act superseded state authority. The Commission denied the motion and set the matter for hearing. Respondents then filed suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin further Commission proceedings and any enforcement actions by the Illinois Attorney General. The district court granted petitioners' motions to dismiss the suits. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the public importance of the questions presented. The United States Warehouse Act was enacted in 1916 and originally made federal regulation subservient to state warehouse laws, including by requiring bonds conditioned on compliance with state obligations. Congress amended the Act in 1931 to delete the state-law bond requirement and to provide that the Secretary's power, jurisdiction, and authority shall be exclusive for persons holding federal licenses. The complaint also raised three additional matters not expressly addressed in the federal Act. These were failure to obtain prior Commission approval for management, construction, and financial contracts with affiliates. They also included failure to obtain approval for contracts and leases with other public utilities. Finally they included failure to obtain approval for issuance of long-term securities.