Also known as: landowner invitee · landowner-invitees · invitee · premises liability invitee
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A special relationship between a possessor of land and an invitee that imposes on the possessor a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from physical harm on the premises.
Lorenzo Lugo bought a ticket and entered the stadium owned by Star Fitness. He climbed onto a low railing despite visible warnings after the crowd surged forward during a key play. Star Fitness faces liability because its failure to anticipate the risk to ticket holders in a public facility overrides the obviousness of the danger.
Luna Lang entered Peak Trade to buy a television and climbed a rack after waiting for unavailable staff. The heavy boxes fell and injured her. Peak Trade remains liable because the store's merchandising and staffing decisions made the harm foreseeable to public shoppers despite posted signs.
Lila Lin bought a ticket and arrived early at the festival site. She fell into an uncovered trench while seeking a better viewing spot near the stage. National Media owes a duty because the open gate and public invitation to the event made the risk to ticket holders reasonably anticipatable.
Lucas Lee accompanied his parent to a store and wandered into an area with exposed wiring. The child suffered burns after touching the hazard. The store is liable because the invitee status of the accompanying adult extends protection to the child even if the danger would not trigger liability to a trespasser.
Logan Lane visited a homeowner's backyard at the owner's request to help with repairs. He stepped on a rotted board that collapsed. The homeowner owes a duty of care because the modern approach rejects rigid status categories and focuses on the foreseeability of harm to a lawful visitor.
Nancy Christian was the tenant of an apartment whose lessors had been notified by her on November 1, 1963, that the knob of the cold water faucet on the bathroom basin was cracked and should be replaced. On November 30, 1963, plaintiff Rowland entered the apartment at Christian's invitation as a social guest and was injured while using the bathroom fixtures when the porcelain handle of one of the water faucets broke in his hand. The injury severed the tendons and medial nerve in Rowland's right hand. He incurred medical and hospital expenses, suffered loss of wages, and sustained damage to his clothing. Rowland later filed a complaint alleging that the bathroom fixtures were dangerous, that Christian was aware of the dangerous condition, and that his injuries were proximately caused by her negligence. Christian filed an answer containing a general denial except that she admitted telling the lessors the faucet was defective and should be replaced. She also alleged contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the ground that Rowland had failed to use his eyesight and knew of the condition of the premises. Christian supported her motion for summary judgment with an affidavit stating that Rowland was a social guest who had used the bathroom on a prior occasion and that the handle broke while he was using the faucet. In opposition, Rowland filed an affidavit stating that immediately prior to the accident he told Christian he was going to use the bathroom facilities, that she had known for two weeks that the faucet handle was cracked, that she had warned the manager of the building of the condition but nothing was done to repair it, that she did not warn him of the condition, and that the handle broke when he turned off the faucet. The trial court granted summary judgment for Christian, and Rowland appealed.
Legacy Motors sent bulk messages through CompuServe's servers after receiving explicit notice that such use was prohibited. CompuServe blocked the messages and faced a trespass claim. The court treated the servers as land held open only to authorized users, so the sender lost any invitee protection once consent was withdrawn.
CompuServe Incorporated operates one of the major national commercial online computer services through a proprietary nationwide computer network that provides subscribers with access to its content and a link to the Internet for exchanging electronic mail. Defendants Cyber Promotions, Inc. and its president Sanford Wallace are in the business of sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements on behalf of themselves and their clients to hundreds of thousands of Internet users, many of whom are CompuServe subscribers. Over the past several months, CompuServe received many complaints from subscribers threatening to discontinue their subscriptions unless the company prohibited electronic mass mailers from using its equipment. In or around October 1995, CompuServe employee Jon Schmidt specifically told Sanford Wallace that he was prohibited from using CompuServe's equipment to send junk e-mail messages. CompuServe later posted an online policy statement declaring that it does not permit its facilities to be used by unauthorized parties to process and store unsolicited e-mail. Despite the notification, defendants sent an increasing volume of e-mail solicitations to CompuServe subscribers. CompuServe attempted to block the messages with software programs, but defendants modified their equipment and messages to circumvent the screening by falsifying the point-of-origin information in the headers, removing sender information, and configuring their servers to conceal their true domain name. CompuServe submitted affidavits from software developer Michael Mangino on the burden to its equipment, customer service manager Patrick Hole on receiving approximately 9,970 e-mail complaints in November 1996, and others documenting the evasion tactics. On October 24, 1996, the court issued a temporary restraining order, and following a hearing on December 15, 1996, the court considered CompuServe's application for a preliminary injunction to extend the order and enjoin defendants from sending any unsolicited advertisements to CompuServe subscribers.
A possessor of land owes an invitee a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises safe or to warn of known dangers that are not obvious. This duty arises because the invitee enters for a purpose connected to the land's public or business use. The duty extends to conditions the possessor should anticipate despite the invitee's knowledge.
…rule of liability for negligence has been accomplished by classifying the plaintiff either as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee and then adopting special rules as to the duty owed by the possessor to each of the classifications. Generally speaking a trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land of another…
…Similarly, in Sharkey v. Board of Regents , 260 Neb. 166, 182, 615 N.W.2d 889, 902 (2000), we held that a university "owes a landowner-invitee duty to its students to take reasonable steps to protect against foreseeable acts of violence on its campus and the harm that naturally flows therefrom." However, we have adopted…
…principles of landowner liability.” Recent Development, Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and
An invitee enters by invitation for a public or business purpose tied to the land's use. A licensee enters with permission but for the licensee's own purpose. A trespasser enters without consent. The landowner owes the highest duty to an invitee and the lowest to a trespasser.
Liability persists if the possessor should anticipate that the invitee will encounter the danger anyway. Factors include the land's public character and the invitee's entitlement to use the facilities. Prior incidents or design defects that encourage risky behavior support anticipation of harm.
Yes. When a possessor would be liable to a child trespasser under the attractive nuisance doctrine, the same possessor is liable if the child is a licensee or invitee. The child's status therefore raises rather than lowers the duty of care.
Some jurisdictions have abandoned rigid status distinctions in favor of a general reasonable-care standard based on foreseeability. The shift treats the relationship as one factor among others rather than a conclusive limit on duty.