Also known as: larceny-by-trick · larceny by deception
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A form of common-law larceny committed when a defendant obtains possession or custody of another's personal property through fraud or misrepresentation that invalidates the victim's consent. The taking is treated as trespassory because the victim intended to transfer only temporary control rather than title. Courts distinguish this offense from false pretenses by examining what interest the victim meant to convey.
Lillian Locke approached Lotus Pharmaceuticals and offered to lease a company vehicle for a one-week sales trip, presenting a falsified corporate authorization letter. At the moment of the rental, Locke already intended to sell the car and keep the proceeds. Because the company intended to transfer only temporary possession for the trip, the law treats Locke's acquisition as a trespassory taking that constitutes larceny by trick.
Luke Latham visited Lighthouse Shipping's stable and asked to hire a delivery horse for the afternoon, stating he would return it by evening. Latham had already arranged a buyer and planned to sell the horse immediately. Because the stable intended only to grant temporary custody for the stated purpose, Latham's acquisition by misrepresentation is treated as larceny by trick rather than a lawful bailment.
In December 1948, Morissette went hunting on a large tract of land in Michigan that the Government had used as a practice bombing range for the Air Force. Spent bomb casings from the range had been dumped into heaps and left exposed to the weather for four years or more. Morissette collected three tons of the casings, flattened them at a nearby farm, and sold them for eighty-four dollars. Morissette worked as a fruit stand operator in the summer and as a trucker and scrap iron collector in the winter. He was an honorably discharged veteran of World War II who had a good reputation among his neighbors. He loaded the casings onto his truck and transported them in broad daylight without any effort to conceal what he was doing. When authorities began an investigation, Morissette voluntarily and candidly told them the whole story, explaining that he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intention of stealing them. He was indicted for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting property of the United States valued at eighty-four dollars in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. At trial, the District Court refused to permit Morissette to show that he thought the property was abandoned or to argue that he lacked criminal intent. The court instructed the jury that if it believed the government testimony, Morissette was guilty, and the jury convicted him. The court sentenced him to two months in prison or a fine of two hundred dollars. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLarceny by trick occurs when the victim intends to transfer only possession or custody, while false pretenses requires the victim to intend to transfer title. Courts look to the victim's intent at the time of the transfer to decide which offense applies.
Supporting sources
Consent obtained through misrepresentation is treated as invalid, rendering the taking trespassory. The fraud vitiates the apparent permission at the moment the defendant secures possession.
Supporting sources
Larceny by trick is not a distinct offense but one method of satisfying the trespassory-taking element of common-law larceny. The fraud supplies the trespass that would otherwise be missing when the victim voluntarily hands over the property.
The defendant must intend from the outset to misappropriate the property rather than return it or use it only for the stated purpose. A later-formed intent to keep the item supports embezzlement instead.
…twelve hundred and ninety of the penal law, was denominated a larceny, to wit: common law larceny by asportation, common law larceny by trick and device, obtaining property by false pretenses, and embezzlement.” : Cf. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59; Morgan, Some…