Also known as:waste · doctrine of waste · waste (property) · property waste
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine imposing a duty on persons holding limited estates in land not to impair the value of the property in a manner that prejudices the interests of those entitled to future possession or security.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Mortgagor Cuts Timber
Mortgagee holds a loan secured by Blackacre, a wooded tract. Mortgagor, without consent, cuts all merchantable timber and sells it. The removal constitutes waste impairing the security, entitling Mortgagee to foreclosure, injunction, or damages.
Fee Tail Holder Cuts Timber
Lola Langley holds a fee tail preserved for a single lifetime. She begins harvesting all merchantable timber from the parcel without regard to future interests. The action violates the duty that limits her privileges to those of a fee simple owner except for the prohibition on waste.
Mortgagee holds a loan secured by Blackacre. After natural wear causes a roof leak, Mortgagor does not repair it. The timbers rot and the roof collapses. The preventable damage constitutes waste for which Mortgagee may obtain foreclosure, injunction, or damages.
Mortgagor Ignores Earthquake Damage
Mortgagee holds a loan secured by Blackacre. An earthquake damages the house, but Mortgagor makes no repairs. The failure to act after a natural event does not constitute waste because the damage is not preventable by the mortgagor.
Will Directing Property Destruction
Lucy Liu's will directs the executor to raze her residence before distribution to the remaindermen. The court refuses to enforce the direction because deliberate destruction would constitute waste that harms the interests of those entitled to the property in its existing condition.
Estate of Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
In 1902, a trust indenture established Kingsbury Place as a private subdivision in St. Louis, with covenants requiring maintenance as desirable residence property of the highest class. The indenture empowers trustees and property owners to enforce its provisions against encroachment or injury. Except for one vacant lot, the subdivision features spacious two and three-story homes used exclusively as private residences.
Louise Woodruff Johnston, owner of the house at #4 Kingsbury Place, died on January 14, 1973. Her will directed the executor, Mercantile Trust Co., to cause the home to be razed and the land sold, with proceeds transferred to the residue of the estate.
Following Johnston's death, neighboring property owners and trustees for the Kingsbury Place Subdivision filed suit against the executor seeking an injunction to prevent demolition of the house. The plaintiffs contended that razing the home would adversely affect their property rights and the community.
During trial, uncontradicted testimony established that the current value of the house and land totaled $40,000, while the empty lot would fetch no more than $5,000 after $4,350 in demolition costs. The St. Louis Commission on Landmarks and Urban Design had designated Kingsbury Place as a city landmark due to its architectural significance. Witnesses testified that demolition would depreciate adjoining property values by an estimated $10,000 and create a break in the urban design continuity.
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and ruled against the plaintiffs on all issues. The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of their petition to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Leo Lynch extracts coal from beneath land subject to a mortgage held by Liberty Trust. The extraction causes surface subsidence that reduces the parcel's value below the mortgage debt. The impairment constitutes waste for which the mortgagee may obtain injunctive relief or damages.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis480 U.S. 491, 491-492 (1987)
Beginning well over 100 years ago, landowners in western Pennsylvania began severing title to underground coal and the right of surface support while retaining or conveying away ownership of the surface estate. Approximately 90 percent of the coal that petitioners mine or will mine was severed from the surface in the period between 1890 and 1920.
When acquiring or retaining the mineral estate, petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired the right to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, erect surface facilities, and obtained waivers of claims for damages resulting from coal removal.
In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act after concluding that existing subsidence legislation had failed to protect public safety, land conservation, municipal tax bases, and land development. Section 4 of the Act prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings and noncommercial buildings used by the public, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries that were in place on April 17, 1966. The Department of Environmental Resources applies a formula that generally requires 50 percent of the coal beneath protected structures to remain in place. Section 6 authorizes the Department to revoke a mining permit if removal of coal causes damage to a protected structure and the operator has not repaired the damage, satisfied any claim, or deposited security equal to the reasonable cost of repair within six months.
Petitioners are an association of coal mine operators and four corporations engaged in underground mining of bituminous coal in western Pennsylvania. Their members and the corporate petitioners own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and support estates beneath surface property affected by the Act. In 1982, petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin officials of the DER from enforcing the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations.
The parties entered a stipulation of facts on the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted respondents' motion in 1984. The Court of Appeals affirmed in 1985. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.
Stipulations established that enforcement of the 50 percent rule would require petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons total. This amount represents less than 2 percent of the coal in those mines. Petitioners did not claim that any specific mine had become unprofitable since the Act's passage.
What remedies are available when a mortgagor commits waste?
A mortgagee may foreclose, obtain an injunction, or recover damages. The choice among remedies belongs to the mortgagee, and reasonable repair costs may be added to the secured obligation.
Does natural wear and tear constitute waste?
No. Ordinary depreciation from use or the elements does not qualify as waste. Only affirmative acts or omissions that cause preventable damage beyond normal aging trigger liability.
Can a life tenant remove minerals without committing waste?
Removal is permissible only if the life tenant holds an interest that expressly or impliedly authorizes extraction. Otherwise the act constitutes waste because it permanently depletes the corpus that the remainderman expects to receive.
…down by the Court today leads to the conclusion that this long and arduous refining process of § 501(c)(3) was certainly a waste of time, for when enacting the original 1894 statute Congress intended to adopt a common-law term of art, and intended that this term of art carry with it all of the common-law baggage…