lay, vb.

The plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership at the City Steam-Mills in Gloucester and operated a steam-engine there to clean corn, grind it into meal, and dress it into flour, sharps, and bran. A crank shaft of the steam-engine broke, stopping the mill. The plaintiffs ordered a new crank shaft from W. Joyce & Co. at Greenwich, who required the broken shaft to be sent as a pattern so the replacement would fit the uninjured parts of the engine. On 13 May the plaintiffs' servant delivered the broken shaft to the defendants, who traded as Pickford & Co. and acted as common carriers, at their Gloucester office. The servant told the clerk the mill was stopped and the shaft must be sent immediately. The clerk stated that if the shaft were sent by twelve o'clock that day it would be delivered at Greenwich the following day. The defendants took the shaft before noon and the plaintiffs paid £2 4s. for its carriage the whole distance. The defendants delayed delivery of the shaft to Greenwich through neglect. As a result, the plaintiffs did not receive the new shaft until several days later than they otherwise would have. Their mill remained idle for five days beyond the time they otherwise would have been prevented from working. During that period the plaintiffs were unable to supply many customers with flour, sharps, and bran, were obliged to buy flour for some customers, lost the opportunity to sell their products, and had to pay wages to workmen they could not employ. The defendants paid £25 into court in satisfaction of the claim under the second count. At trial before Crompton, J., at the Gloucester Assizes the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs with £25 damages in excess of the amount paid into court. A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained on the ground of misdirection.

In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.

In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.