legal officer

In March 1965, New York City police officer Anthony Martin observed appellant Sibron over an eight-hour period in the vicinity of 742 Broadway in Brooklyn. During this time, Martin saw Sibron speaking with six to eight known narcotics addicts but did not overhear the conversations or see any objects pass between them. Later in the evening, after Sibron entered a restaurant and spoke with three more addicts, Martin approached him, directed him outside, and reached into Sibron's pocket to seize several glassine envelopes containing heroin. On July 10, 1964, Mount Vernon police officer Samuel Lasky, while at home in his apartment building where he had lived for twelve years, heard noises at his door and observed two men he did not recognize tiptoeing in the hallway. After the men fled down the stairs upon Lasky emerging from his apartment armed, Lasky pursued and apprehended appellant Peters between the fourth and fifth floors. Lasky then frisked Peters and removed a plastic envelope containing burglar's tools from his pocket. Both Sibron and Peters were charged with crimes based on the seized evidence. They moved to suppress the items prior to trial on Fourth Amendment grounds. After the trial courts denied the motions, both pleaded guilty while preserving their right to appeal the suppression rulings. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the searches under New York's stop-and-frisk statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to address the constitutional questions presented by the application of the statute. Sibron received a six-month sentence and was released after serving his term before his appeal could be fully processed through the state courts. He was arrested on March 9, 1965, remained in jail due to indigency until his sentence expired on July 10, 1965, and could not obtain bail pending appeal under state law. Delays in the New York court system meant his case reached the Court of Appeals only after release.

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address the long-standing problem of racial discrimination in voting that had persisted in parts of the country for nearly a century. Prior civil rights acts from 1957, 1960, and 1964 had proven largely ineffective because case-by-case litigation was slow, expensive, and inadequate to overcome widespread and persistent discrimination. South Carolina filed an original bill of complaint in the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that selected provisions of the Act were invalid and an injunction against enforcement by the Attorney General. The case proceeded on original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, after the Court dispensed with a special master and expedited the hearing due to South Carolina's desire for a ruling before its June 1966 primary elections. The Act's coverage formula applied to any state or political subdivision that maintained a test or device on November 1, 1964, and where less than 50 percent of voting-age residents were registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election. South Carolina was brought within the formula on August 7, 1965, along with Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, twenty-six counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona. The challenged provisions included the suspension of literacy tests and similar devices under section 4(a), the preclearance requirement for new voting rules under section 5, and the authorization for the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners under section 6(b). South Carolina had altered its voting laws in 1965 to extend polling hours from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. but had not submitted the change for federal review. The Court invited all states to participate as amici curiae, several of which submitted briefs or argued orally.

In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald. As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment. Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On April 11, 1983, the Richmond City Council adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan requiring prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises defined as businesses at least 51% owned and controlled by black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens with no geographic limit. The Plan was enacted after a public hearing at which council members relied on a study showing that although the city's population was 50% black, minority-owned businesses had received only 0.67% of the city's prime construction contracts from 1978 to 1983, and noted that local contractors' associations had virtually no minority members. No direct evidence was presented that the city had discriminated in letting contracts or that its prime contractors had discriminated against minority subcontractors. On September 6, 1983, the city issued an invitation to bid on plumbing fixtures for the city jail. J. A. Croson Company, a mechanical plumbing and heating contractor owned by a white person, submitted the sole bid of $126,530 on October 13, 1983. Croson contacted multiple minority firms but received no timely, competitive bid for the fixtures, which represented 75% of the contract value. Croson submitted a request for a waiver of the 30% set-aside requirement. The city denied Croson's waiver request, indicating that Croson had 10 days to submit an MBE Utilization Commitment Form, and warned that failure to do so could result in its bid being considered unresponsive. The city informed Croson that it had decided to rebid the project. Croson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that the Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court upheld the Plan in all respects. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the Plan. We granted the writ, vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of our intervening decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267 (1986). On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals struck down the Richmond set-aside program as violating both prongs of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction of the city's appeal, 484 U. S. 1058 (1988), and we now affirm the judgment.