legal sufficiency

In 1982, respondent Betty Lou Powell’s husband, Ron Powell, aided by his 17-year-old son Jeff and others, was operating a lucrative cocaine and methaqualone distributorship from the Powell home near San Diego, Cal. Federal authorities tapped the Powells’ telephone pursuant to a court order, and many conversations were recorded, including at least four which indicated that respondent was playing a minor role in the drug distributorship. Three of these conversations indicated that respondent was helping her husband and son to distribute drugs and to collect money owed for drugs sold. The fourth involved a conversation with a travel agent in which respondent booked an airline ticket for her husband in an assumed name. In April 1982, Ron Powell learned of the wiretap and notified his son, who called respondent and told her to leave home and drive to Los Angeles. Respondent was followed by FBI agents, who after some difficulty managed to stop respondent and arrest her. A search of the car uncovered, inter alia, 2 kilograms of cocaine, 2,700 methaqualone tablets, a pistol, a machine gun, 2 silencers, and $30,000 cash. Respondent was indicted by a grand jury in the Southern District of California for 15 counts of violations of federal law. Ten of these counts alleged transgressions of the federal narcotics laws; a jury convicted respondent of only three of these, and acquitted her of the others. Count 1 charged respondent with conspiring with her husband and 17-year-old son, and others, to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute cocaine. Count 9 charged respondent with possession of a specific quantity of cocaine with intent to distribute it. The jury acquitted respondent of Counts 1 and 9. Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 charged respondent with using the telephone in committing and in causing and facilitating conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The jury convicted her of Counts 3, 4, and 5, and acquitted her of Count 6. Of the remaining five counts, four charged illegal possession of firearms on which respondent was acquitted and one charged making false statements in her petition for court-appointed counsel on which she was convicted. Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the telephone facilitation convictions in an opinion at 708 F. 2d 455 (1983). The Government petitioned for rehearing, and the court issued a second opinion at 719 F. 2d 1480 (1983) adhering to its reversal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

In November 2009 Robert McDonnell was elected the 71st Governor of Virginia. His campaign focused on promoting business in the state. He spoke about economic development on a daily basis while attending numerous events and referring constituents to meetings with staff and other officials. Shortly after the election Williams had dinner with Governor and Mrs. McDonnell. Williams was the CEO of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based company that developed and marketed Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement made from anatabine. Star Scientific hoped Virginia's public universities would undertake research studies on anatabine pursuant to a grant from Virginia's Tobacco Commission. Over the next two years Williams provided the McDonnells with more than $175,000 in gifts and loans. McDonnell arranged meetings for Williams with state health officials including Dr. Hazel. He hosted a lunch event for Star Scientific at the Governor's Mansion in August 2011. He also directed staff to forward materials and emails regarding Anatabloc research issues at state universities. Additional interactions included a March 2012 meeting with administration officials where McDonnell discussed Anatabloc. In January 2014 the Federal Government indicted McDonnell and his wife Maureen on one count of conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, three counts of honest services fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, six counts of Hobbs Act extortion, and two counts of making a false statement. The indictment alleged that McDonnell accepted the benefits in exchange for performing official actions on an as-needed basis to promote Star Scientific's products. Mrs. McDonnell faced similar charges plus one count of obstructing official proceedings. The case proceeded to a five-week jury trial in the Eastern District of Virginia. At trial Williams testified under an immunity agreement that he provided the benefits to obtain help with testing Anatabloc. McDonnell acknowledged requesting loans and accepting gifts but testified that arranging meetings was routine and that he expected staff only to meet with Williams. Several state officials testified they discussed Anatabloc but took no further action. The district court instructed the jury that official acts include acts a public official customarily performs, including those in furtherance of longer-term goals. McDonnell requested but was denied an instruction that merely arranging meetings or hosting events does not alone constitute an official act. The jury convicted Governor McDonnell on the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges, but acquitted him on the false statement charges. The District Court sentenced him to two years in prison. Following the verdict McDonnell moved to vacate the convictions, arguing the jury instructions were erroneous. He also moved for acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence and unconstitutional vagueness. The district court denied both motions. McDonnell appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the meaning of official act under the federal bribery statute.

McDonald was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to from five to fifteen years' imprisonment. He had been charged with second degree murder for aiding and abetting his employer, Davis, in the shooting of one Jenkins during an altercation. The District Court allowed this appeal in forma pauperis. This court appointed new counsel. After the case was heard by a division of this court, a rehearing en banc was ordered sua sponte. At trial a psychiatrist and a psychologist testified that the defendant had a mental defect, principally because his I.Q. rating shown by various tests was below the average intelligence range of 90 to 110. His overall I.Q. was 68. Neither witness was able to say whether appellant's mental defect stemmed from organic injury or from some other cause. The psychologist testified that a person suffering from a mental defect would have less ability than normal persons to distinguish between right and wrong in complex situations. The psychologist also testified that such a person would tend to act impulsively under stress and would readily become dependent upon and be strongly influenced by someone who befriended him. The psychiatrist stated that McDonald would lack the ability of normal persons to foresee the consequences of his acts. The psychiatrist offered an opinion that appellant's relationship to Davis was to some extent a product of his mental deficiency. After the charge was concluded, the court called a bench conference at which defense counsel expressed substantial satisfaction with the instructions. Defense counsel made no reference to or request concerning the so-called Lyles instruction on mandatory commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity. Thereupon the court told the jury that it could return any one of five possible verdicts: guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon, guilty of assault, or not guilty. Earlier in the charge the court had instructed on criminal responsibility. The court had stated that if the jury was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not a product of a mental defect, then the verdict must be not guilty because of insanity. The Government urged that defense counsel's failure to object showed it appeared affirmatively that appellant did not want the Lyles instruction. The Government also urged that the omission of an insanity verdict from the court's lists of alternatives must be deemed harmless because of reference to it elsewhere. The Government urged that the evidence was insufficient to require an instruction on responsibility.

Petitioner Burks was tried in the United States District Court for robbing a federally insured bank by use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). Burks' principal defense was insanity. He presented three expert witnesses who, though offering differing diagnoses, testified that he suffered from a mental illness at the time of the robbery that rendered him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the law. In rebuttal the Government offered testimony of two experts. One testified that Burks had a character disorder but was not mentally ill, and another acknowledged a character disorder but gave an ambiguous opinion on Burks' capacity to conform his conduct to the law. Several lay witnesses for the Government opined that Burks appeared capable of normal functioning and was sane at the time of the alleged offense. Before the case was submitted to the jury, the District Court denied a motion for a judgment of acquittal. The jury found Burks guilty. He then filed a timely motion for a new trial, asserting among other things that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The District Court denied the motion and concluded that Burks' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was utterly without merit. On appeal Burks narrowed the issues by admitting the affirmative factual elements of the charge and confined his appeal to criminal responsibility. The Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and reversed his conviction. That court noted that once a prima facie defense of insanity has been raised the Government has the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals concluded that Burks had met his obligation by presenting specific testimony of three experts with unchallenged credentials and that the prosecution had not effectively rebutted that proof. The prosecution's witnesses failed to express definite opinions on the precise questions the court deemed critical regarding sanity and criminal responsibility. The Court of Appeals did not order outright acquittal. Instead, it remanded to the District Court for a determination of whether a directed verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial ordered. It instructed the District Court to choose the appropriate course from a balancing of the equities. The United States has not cross-petitioned on the question whether the Court of Appeals was correct on the underlying substantive determination that the Government failed to meet its burden with respect to insanity.