life insurance

In 1944, Lowell Franklin, a resident of California, purchased a life insurance policy from the Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona corporation. In 1948, the respondent International Life Insurance Company agreed with Empire Mutual to assume its insurance obligations. Respondent then mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin in California offering to insure him in accordance with the terms of the policy he held with Empire Mutual. He accepted this offer and from that time until his death in 1950 paid premiums by mail from his California home to respondent’s Texas office. Petitioner Lulu B. McGee, Franklin’s mother and the beneficiary under the policy, sent proofs of his death to the respondent, but it refused to pay, claiming that he had committed suicide. It appears that neither Empire Mutual nor respondent has ever had any office or agent in California, and respondent has never solicited or done any insurance business in California apart from the policy involved here. The California statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit on insurance contracts with residents became law in 1949, after respondent had entered into the agreement with Franklin. Petitioner recovered a judgment in a California state court against respondent on the contract of insurance, with service of process by registered mail at respondent’s principal place of business in Texas pursuant to the state statute. Unable to collect the judgment in California, petitioner filed suit on the judgment in a Texas court. The Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment, holding it void under the Fourteenth Amendment because service of process outside California could not give the courts of that State jurisdiction over respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.

Ralph Hague, a Wisconsin resident who had been employed in Red Wing, Minnesota, for the fifteen years preceding his death, died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck from behind by an automobile. The accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin, immediately across the Minnesota border from Red Wing. The operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents, as was the decedent, who resided with respondent in Hager City, Wisconsin. Mr. Hague held a policy issued by petitioner Allstate Insurance Co. covering three automobiles owned by him. The policy contained an uninsured motorist clause insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists. The uninsured motorist coverage was limited to $15,000 for each automobile. After the accident, respondent moved to Red Wing, Minnesota. She subsequently married a Minnesota resident and established residence with her new husband in Savage, Minnesota. At approximately the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed respondent personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate. Following her appointment, she brought this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband’s three automobiles could be stacked to provide total coverage of $45,000. Allstate defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law. Allstate pointed out that the insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident. The Minnesota District Court interpreted Wisconsin law to disallow stacking. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Minnesota’s choice-of-law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. The court refused to apply Wisconsin law as inimical to the public policy of Minnesota and granted summary judgment for respondent. The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court. The court interpreted Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking and applied Minnesota law after analyzing the Minnesota contacts and interests within the analytical framework developed by Professor Leflar. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars the Minnesota Supreme Court’s choice of substantive Minnesota law.

In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act to address land subsidence caused by underground coal mining. The Act authorizes the Department of Environmental Resources to implement and enforce a comprehensive program preventing or minimizing subsidence and consequent damage to surface structures. Section 4 prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries, and generally requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath such structures remain in place to provide surface support. Petitioners are an association of coal producers and several of its member corporations engaged in underground bituminous coal mining in western Pennsylvania. They own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and associated support estates beneath surface properties affected by the Subsidence Act. Many of these interests were severed from the surface estate between 1890 and 1920, and petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired waivers of liability for subsidence damage along with rights to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, and erect surface facilities. In 1982 petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Resources and other officials. They sought to enjoin enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations, alleging that Section 4 and Section 6 effected a taking of their property without compensation and that Section 6 impaired their contractual obligations. The parties entered a stipulation of facts concerning the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department officials. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional challenges to the Subsidence Act. Petitioners have never claimed that the Subsidence Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania, nor have they identified any specific mine rendered unprofitable by the statute. The evidence in the record shows that enforcement of the 50 percent rule has required petitioners to leave less than 27 million tons of coal in place. This applies across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons. It amounts to less than 2 percent of the total coal in those operations.