Also known as:long term debt · longterm debt · LTD · long-term liabilities
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A liability on a claim for a specific sum of money due by agreement or otherwise after an extended period.
See Our Sources· 8 primary sources
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Corporate Name Compliance for Bond Issue
Lighthouse Shipping filed articles to issue bonds as long-term debt financing for fleet expansion. The secretary of state rejected the filing because the chosen name lacked any required corporate indicator. Lighthouse Shipping amended the name to include the word corporation and resubmitted the bond documents.
LLC Name for Debt Financing
Lakeshore Industries formed an LLC to secure long-term debt through a bank loan for warehouse construction. The filing office refused the name Lakeshore Industries because it omitted any limited liability company abbreviation. The organizers added LLC to the name and completed the loan closing.
Loyal Insurance sought to pledge real estate as collateral for a long-term debt bond issue. Its articles lacked a corporate indicator after a prior name change. The board adopted an amendment substituting the word incorporated and filed the updated articles to clear title for the lender.
Arbitration Clause in Debt Agreement
Luna Lang purchased bonds issued by Linden Bank as long-term debt. The bond indenture contained an arbitration clause for disputes over repayment. When default occurred, the court enforced the clause and referred the claim to arbitration rather than allowing class litigation.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC. The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties but required that claims be brought in the parties' individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding. The agreement authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration provision on several occasions. The parties agree that the December 2006 revisions control.
The revised agreement requires customers to complete a one-page Notice of Dispute form. It allows AT&T to offer settlement. It provides that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims. Arbitration must take place in the county where the customer is billed. For claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may choose in-person, telephone, or submission-based proceedings. The agreement preserves the right to bring claims in small claims court. It requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery plus twice the claimant's attorney's fees if the arbitration award exceeds AT&T's last written settlement offer.
The Concepcions purchased AT&T service advertised as including free phones but were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phones' retail value. In March 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint against AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was consolidated with a putative class action alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free.
In March 2008, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with the Concepcions. The Concepcions opposed the motion on the ground that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures. The District Court denied AT&T's motion. It described the arbitration agreement favorably in several respects. Nevertheless, the court found the provision unconscionable under the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank decision because AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It also found the provision unconscionable under California law as announced in Discover Bank. The court held that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because the rule was simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Leo Lynch bought cruise line bonds as long-term debt. The indenture included a forum selection clause designating Florida courts. After a payment dispute arose during a voyage, the court upheld the clause and transferred the case despite the bondholder's residence in another state.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute499 U.S. 585 (1991)
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., a Florida corporation, sold passage tickets for a seven-day cruise aboard its ship the Tropicale to Eulala and Russel Shute, who resided in Washington. The Shutes purchased the tickets through a travel agent in Arlington, Washington. The agent forwarded the payment to Carnival's headquarters in Miami, Florida. Carnival then prepared the tickets and mailed them to the Shutes in Washington.
The face of each ticket directed passengers to read the terms and conditions on the last pages. Contract page 1 stated that acceptance of the ticket constituted agreement to all terms and conditions. This included a provision that all disputes arising under or in connection with the contract would be litigated, if at all, in a court located in the State of Florida to the exclusion of the courts of any other state or country.
The Shutes boarded the Tropicale in Los Angeles, California. The ship sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, and then returned to Los Angeles. While the vessel was in international waters off the Mexican coast, Eulala Shute slipped on a deck mat during a guided tour of the ship's galley and was injured.
The Shutes filed a negligence suit against Carnival in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Carnival moved for summary judgment. It contended that the forum-selection clause required the suit to be brought in Florida or, alternatively, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction because Carnival's contacts with Washington were insubstantial. The district court granted the motion on personal jurisdiction grounds.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It first concluded that Carnival's solicitation of business in Washington established sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction. It then held that the forum-selection clause was unenforceable because it was not freely bargained for and because the Shutes were physically and financially incapable of litigating in Florida. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Leah Lamb invested in long-term debt securities from a foreign manufacturer. The issuer had placed components in the forum state through a distributor. When default occurred, the court found insufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction and dismissed the action.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.480 U.S. 102 (1987)
In September 1978 Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle on Interstate Highway 80 in Solano County, California, and collided with a tractor. Zurcher suffered severe injuries while his passenger and wife Ruth Ann Moreno was killed.
In September 1979 Zurcher filed a product liability action in the Superior Court of California for Solano County against Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle tube, and other defendants. Zurcher alleged that defects in the tire, tube, and sealant caused the accident.
Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the Japanese manufacturer of the tube’s valve assembly. Zurcher’s claims against Cheng Shin and the other defendants were eventually settled and dismissed, leaving only Cheng Shin’s indemnity action against Asahi.
Asahi is a Japanese corporation. It manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells them to Cheng Shin and other tire manufacturers for use as components in finished tire tubes, with all sales to Cheng Shin taking place in Taiwan. Asahi sold Cheng Shin 150,000 valve assemblies in 1978, 500,000 in 1979, 500,000 in 1980, 100,000 in 1981, and 100,000 in 1982. Those sales accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi’s income in 1981 and 0.44 percent in 1982. Cheng Shin alleged that approximately 20 percent of its United States sales occur in California.
In 1983 an attorney for Cheng Shin examined valve stems at one cycle store in Solano County and found that of 115 tire tubes, 12 Asahi-marked valve stems were incorporated into Cheng Shin tubes. An affidavit from a Cheng Shin manager stated that discussions with Asahi had covered worldwide sales including the United States. Asahi’s president stated the company never contemplated that its limited sales would subject it to lawsuits in California. The Superior Court denied Asahi’s motion to quash service of summons. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ commanding the Superior Court to quash service. The California Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
What distinguishes long-term debt from other liabilities in financing contexts?
Long-term debt consists of obligations due after an extended period, such as bonds used to finance real property acquisitions or business operations. The Black's definition of debt as a specific sum due by agreement applies directly, with the extended maturity creating the long-term classification.
Can an entity with a defective corporate name issue valid long-term debt?
A defective name prevents proper formation or amendment under the model statutes, which in turn blocks the entity's ability to pledge assets or issue bonds as long-term debt. The filing office rejection halts the transaction until the name complies.
Does a forum selection clause in a bond indenture control disputes over long-term debt repayment?
Yes, courts enforce such clauses in debt instruments when the clause is reasonable, even if the holder resides elsewhere. The clause determines the forum for enforcement actions arising from default.
558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)
…office. If a corporation’s goal is to induce officeholders to do its bidding, the corporation would do well to cultivate stable, long-term relationships of dependency. So we do not have a solid theoretical basis for condemning §203 as a front for incumbent self-protection, and it seems equally if not more plausible that…
EvidenceHearsay and circumstances of its admissibility · Definition of hearsayUBEIntermediate