Also known as: majestas · laesa maiestas · crimen maiestatis · lèse-majesté · lese-majesty · treason
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An offense against the sovereign authority of the state consisting only of levying war against the United States or adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort.
Michelle Murphy faces charges of treason in State A after organizing an armed uprising against federal authority. She flees to State B. State A's governor issues a formal demand for her return. State B must deliver Murphy to State A under the constitutional extradition clause because the charge involves a qualifying offense against the sovereign.
President Matthew Martinez secretly diverts national defense resources to aid a foreign adversary in exchange for personal gain. Congress learns of the conduct and views it as treason. The House impeaches and the Senate convicts under the constitutional standard for removal of civil officers who commit offenses against the state.
Melissa Mills is convicted of treason for assisting an enemy power. A legislative veto later attempts to alter her deportation order. The court holds that the veto mechanism violates separation of powers because only the full legislative process can affect rights arising from a sovereign offense.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View caseMalcolm McKinley is charged with treason based on conduct that was not criminal when committed. The court refuses to apply a later statute expanding the definition of the offense. The prohibition on ex post facto laws prevents retroactive enlargement of sovereign crimes.
The grandson Normand Morrison executed his will on August 21, 1779. On March 21, 1793, the Court of Probate for Hartford County disapproved the will and refused to record it. More than eighteen months elapsed from this decree, during which the right of appeal was lost under Connecticut law. There was no law in Connecticut allowing a new hearing before the court of probate except through special legislative action. On the second Thursday of May 1795, the Legislature of Connecticut passed a resolution setting aside the March 1793 decree of the Court of Probate. The resolution granted a new hearing before the same court of probate with liberty of appeal in six months. This resolution was passed after the time for appeal from the original decree had expired. A new hearing occurred on July 27, 1795, resulting in the court of probate approving the will and ordering it recorded. An appeal followed in August 1795 to the Superior Court at Hartford, which affirmed the decree in February 1796. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut then reviewed the case and in June 1796 confirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Calder and his wife asserted a claim to the premises as the heiress of Normand Morrison the physician. Bull and his wife asserted their claim under the will of Normand Morrison the grandson. The matter came before the United States Supreme Court for review of the state court proceedings.
View caseMason McCarthy receives a death sentence after conviction for treason while others charged with similar sovereign offenses receive life terms. He alleges racial bias in prosecutorial decisions. The court requires proof of purposeful discrimination rather than statistical disparity alone to overturn the sentence.
In 1978, Warren McCleskey, a black man, was convicted in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder arising from the robbery of a furniture store in which a white police officer was killed. McCleskey and three accomplices, all armed, planned and carried out the robbery. McCleskey secured the front of the store, forcing customers to lie down, while the others tied up employees and took receipts, a watch, and six dollars. When a police officer responding to a silent alarm entered, two shots were fired, both striking him, one fatally in the face. At trial, the State introduced evidence that at least one of the bullets that struck the officer was fired from a .38 caliber Rossi revolver matching the gun McCleskey had carried. The State also introduced the testimony of two witnesses who had heard McCleskey admit to the shooting. The jury convicted McCleskey of murder. At the penalty hearing, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: the murder was committed during armed robbery and upon a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. McCleskey offered no mitigating evidence. The jury recommended death on the murder charge and consecutive life sentences on the robberies. The court imposed the death sentence. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in 1980. This Court denied certiorari. After state habeas relief was denied, McCleskey filed a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Georgia raising 18 claims, one of which was that the Georgia capital sentencing process is administered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He supported this with the Baldus study, a statistical analysis of over 2,000 murder cases from the 1970s examining more than 200 variables. The raw numbers showed defendants charged with killing white victims received the death penalty in 11% of cases, compared to 1% for killing black victims. When divided by race combinations, black defendants killing white victims received death in 22% of cases, white defendants killing white victims in 8%, black defendants killing black victims in 1%, and white defendants killing black victims in 3%. After controlling for 230 nonracial variables, one model showed defendants killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive death, and black defendants 1.1 times as likely. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and found the study statistically valid but flawed in methodology and insufficient to show racial considerations in McCleskey's case or a prima facie case. The Eleventh Circuit, en banc, assumed the study's validity but held the statistics insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent or unconstitutional arbitrariness. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986, limited to the equal protection claim.
View caseMeredith Maxwell sues claiming that a legislative finding of treason against a foreign national violates due process. The court dismisses the suit as a nonjusticiable political question because the determination involves core sovereign and foreign affairs judgments committed to the political branches.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseTreason consists of levying war against the United States or adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort. Conviction requires testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court. Congress holds power to set the punishment but may not impose corruption of blood or forfeiture beyond the life of the person convicted.
The clause guarantees citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. It operates alongside the extradition provision requiring delivery of a person charged with treason or other crime who flees to another state upon proper demand by the executive authority of the charging state.
The Constitution authorizes removal of the President upon impeachment and conviction for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Conduct amounting to treason fits within the enumerated categories because it constitutes betrayal of sovereign authority.
…occurred in the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries. One such was the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason. Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury. Raleigh argued…