Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
The malicious burning of the dwelling of another. Malice exists when the actor intends the structure to burn, knows that it will burn, or consciously disregards an obvious and substantial risk that it will burn. The burning must damage the fibers of combustible material rather than merely scorch or blacken the surface.
Sources & Authorities
How it applies
Common Examples
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Malice Found in Adjacent Ignition
Miguel Mendoza piled newspapers against the shared wall of Mustafa Mahmoud's apartment and lit them to damage insured equipment. The fire charred the fibers of the apartment door. Because Mendoza intended the fire to spread and consciously disregarded the obvious risk to the neighboring dwelling, the burning satisfied the malice element of common law arson.
Arson Elevates Homicide to Murder
Marco Marquez set fire to a neighbor's warehouse during a robbery. The blaze killed a bystander inside the adjacent dwelling. Because the malicious burning of another's dwelling was committed with conscious disregard of an obvious risk to human life, the homicide constitutes murder under the felony-murder rule.
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Statutes
Model Codes
Common Law
Restatements
Casebooks
Hornbooks
Course Outlines
Musa Mensah ignited a fire in an empty commercial building with the conscious object of destroying the structure to collect insurance. The building contained upper-floor apartments used for sleeping by tenants. The purposeful malicious burning of an occupied dwelling of another satisfies the elements of common-law arson.
Sentencing Factor Requires Jury Finding
Maria Morales was convicted of common-law arson after she maliciously burned a neighbor's home. The trial judge increased her sentence based on a finding that the burning created a grave risk of death. Because the enhancement increased the statutory maximum, the fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi v. New Jersey530 U.S. 466 (2000)
Federal Statute Covers Commercial Property
Matthew Martinez set fire to an owner-occupied residence that contained no commercial activity. The federal arson statute requires damage to property used in interstate commerce. Because the malicious burning targeted a dwelling lacking any commercial nexus, it did not violate the federal statute.
United States v. Jones529 U.S. 848 (2000)
Cross Burning as Protected Speech
Mosaic Retail employees burned a cross on private property during a rally. The city ordinance banned cross burnings that aroused anger on the basis of race. Because the ordinance singled out a particular viewpoint within the category of fighting words, it violated the First Amendment even though the malicious burning targeted a structure.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota505 U.S. 377 (1992)
Common questions
Frequently Asked
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What mental state satisfies malice for common law arson?+
Malice exists if the defendant intends the structure to burn, knows that it will burn, or consciously disregards an obvious and substantial risk that it will burn. Negligence alone is insufficient. The prosecution need not prove hatred or ill will.
Supporting sources
Does superficial scorching constitute a burning?+
No. Mere blackening by smoke or superficial discoloration from heat is not enough. The fire must damage the fibers of the wood or other combustible material.
Supporting sources
Can a defendant commit arson by burning a dwelling the defendant owns?+
Yes. Legal title does not matter. The offense protects habitation. Burning a dwelling that another occupies or uses as a home satisfies the element even if the defendant holds title.
Supporting sources
How does common law arson differ from houseburning?+
Houseburning is a misdemeanor that occurs when a person maliciously burns the defendant's own dwelling in a city or town or so close to other houses that the fire endangers neighboring structures. Arson requires burning the dwelling of another.
Supporting sources
478 U.S. 186 (1986)Constitutional Law
…comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, first-degree arson, § 16-7-60, and robbery, § 16-8-40.[^maj-1] In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much less convicted and sentenced.[^maj-2] Moreover, respondent has not raised the Eighth…