matter of course

In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement. The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race. It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race. The district included fifty-seven parcels of land. The signers held title to forty-seven parcels. At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882. On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction. On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title. The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement. In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy. The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions. The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots. By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court. The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.

The defendant Buick Motor Company manufactured automobiles and purchased ready-made wheels from the Imperial Wheel Company of Flint, Michigan. The Imperial company had furnished the defendant with eighty thousand wheels, none of which had proved defective prior to this incident. The defendant sold one such automobile to a firm of automobile dealers in Schenectady, who in turn sold the car to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was driving the automobile at a speed of only eight miles an hour, a wheel collapsed because it was made of defective wood whose spokes crumbled into fragments. The plaintiff was thrown out and injured. The wheel had been bought from the outside manufacturer rather than produced by the defendant. Evidence showed that the defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, which the defendant omitted. There was no claim that the defendant knew of the defect and willfully concealed it. The car was designed to go fifty miles an hour. It had seats for three persons. The plaintiff commenced an action for negligence against the defendant. The case was tried to a jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with costs.

On November 21, 1973, Troy Gregg and Floyd Allen were hitchhiking north in Florida when they were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore in their car. Their car broke down. Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, the group picked up Dennis Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p.m. A short time later the four men stopped for a rest along the highway in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The next morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a nearby ditch. On November 23, after reading about the shootings in an Atlanta newspaper, Weaver communicated with the Gwinnett County police and related information concerning the journey with the victims, including a description of the car. The next afternoon, Gregg and Allen, while in Simmons' car, were arrested in Asheville, North Carolina. In the search incident to the arrest a .25-caliber pistol, later shown to be that used to kill Simmons and Moore, was found in Gregg's pocket. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing a written waiver, Gregg signed a statement admitting he shot Simmons and Moore but claiming self-defense. At the guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, a medical examiner testified that Simmons died from a bullet wound in the eye and that Moore died from bullet wounds in the cheek and in the back of the head. The examiner further testified that both men had several bruises and abrasions about the face and head. Gregg testified claiming self-defense after Simmons and Moore allegedly attacked with a pipe and knife, but the jury convicted him of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. At the penalty stage before the same jury, neither side presented additional evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could recommend either a death sentence or a life prison sentence on each count. The judge further charged the jury that in determining the sentence it was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The judge instructed that death could not be imposed unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the aggravating circumstances. The jury found the first and second aggravating circumstances and returned verdicts of death on each count. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the death sentences for murder after reviewing the record and comparing the sentences to similar cases, but it vacated the death sentences for armed robbery. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the death sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.