Also known as:matter of public concern · public concern · public concern doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Speech or expression addressing issues of political, social, or community importance that receives heightened First Amendment protection.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Funeral Picketing Protected
Miguel Mendoza and fellow church members stand on a public sidewalk near a military funeral holding signs criticizing government policy on homosexuality. The family of the deceased sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because the signs address political and moral views on matters of public concern, the First Amendment bars tort liability absent additional unprotected conduct.
Credit Report Remains Private
Mustafa Mahmoud receives a credit report about a small private company circulated only to a handful of subscribers. When the report contains false statements, the company sues for defamation and seeks presumed damages. Because the report concerns a purely private financial matter rather than a matter of public concern, the First Amendment does not require proof of actual malice for presumed or punitive damages.
Michelle Murphy, a private citizen, sues a newspaper for publishing false statements about her role in a local government contract dispute. The statements address a matter of public concern. Murphy must prove the statements false by clear and convincing evidence. The common-law presumption of falsity does not apply.
Cross-Burning Ordinance Struck Down
Malcolm McKinley burns a cross on the lawn of an African-American family. The city charges him under an ordinance banning symbols that arouse anger on the basis of race. Because the ordinance singles out expression on matters of public concern for disfavored treatment based on its message, the First Amendment invalidates the law.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota505 U.S. 377 (1992)
In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner R.A.V., then a juvenile, and several other teenagers assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where R.A.V. was staying. Although this conduct could have been punished under several Minnesota statutes carrying significant penalties, the City of St. Paul chose to charge R.A.V. under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.
The ordinance provides that whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, construing the ordinance to reach only fighting words and concluding that it was not impermissibly content-based. This Court granted certiorari.
Miles Montgomery, a city commissioner, sues a newspaper over an advertisement criticizing his official conduct. The statements concern matters of public concern. Montgomery must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence to recover damages.
New York Times v. Sullivan376 U.S. 254 (1964)
L. B. Sullivan is one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He has duties including supervision of the Police Department. He brought this civil libel action against the New York Times Company and four individual petitioners who were Alabama clergymen. The suit sought $500,000 in damages based on a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Sullivan the full amount claimed against all petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment.
The advertisement was signed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It described widespread non-violent demonstrations by Southern Negro students and an unprecedented wave of terror against them. Two paragraphs formed the basis of the claim. One alleged that after students sang on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled, truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus, and the dining hall was padlocked to starve students into submission. The other stated that Southern violators had bombed Dr. King's home, assaulted him, arrested him seven times, and charged him with perjury. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons. It was endorsed by the individual petitioners among others.
Sullivan contended that the references to police referred to him in his supervisory capacity. Six Montgomery residents testified that they read the statements as referring to him. However, several statements were inaccurate. The students sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsions were for a different incident. The dining hall was not padlocked. Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The bombings occurred before Sullivan's tenure with police efforts to apprehend the perpetrators.
The Times published the advertisement for approximately $4800. It acted upon an order from a New York advertising agency. The agency provided a letter from A. Philip Randolph certifying authorization. The Times made no efforts to confirm its accuracy against its own news files.
Sullivan served written demands for retraction on the petitioners pursuant to Alabama law. None of the individual petitioners responded as they had not authorized use of their names. The Times did not retract. It published a retraction only upon demand by Governor John Patterson after learning more facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the separate petitions of the individual petitioners and the Times due to the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
Mohan Malhotra, a private attorney, sues a magazine for an article accusing him of unethical conduct in a high-profile public controversy. The article addresses a matter of public concern. Malhotra may recover compensatory damages upon proof of negligence but needs actual malice for presumed or punitive damages.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record.
Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research.
Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
How does classifying speech as a matter of public concern affect defamation damages?
When speech involves matters of public concern, the First Amendment limits recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. Speech on purely private matters receives less protection, allowing states greater latitude to award such damages without that showing.
Supporting sources
Who bears the burden of proving falsity in defamation cases involving matters of public concern?
A private-figure plaintiff suing a media defendant must prove the defamatory statements false by clear and convincing evidence. The common-law presumption of falsity is displaced to avoid deterring true speech on public issues.
Supporting sources
Does speech on matters of public concern receive protection even if it causes emotional distress?
Yes. Peaceful picketing expressing political and moral views on matters of public concern near a funeral is protected by the First Amendment. Tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred absent additional unprotected conduct.
Supporting sources
When does public-employee speech on matters of public concern receive First Amendment protection?
A public employee speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern receives protection unless the employer shows adequate justification for treating the employee differently from the general public. Speech primarily addressing internal workplace grievances does not qualify.
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
…the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office." 78 Kan., at 723, 98 P., at 285. Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct is appropriately analogous to the protection accorded a public…