mental examination

Sibbach initiated an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking damages for bodily injuries that occurred in Indiana. Wilson & Co. filed an answer denying the complaint's allegations and moved for an order compelling Sibbach to undergo a physical examination by a court-appointed physician to assess the nature and extent of her injuries. The district court granted the motion and directed Sibbach to submit to the examination. Upon Sibbach's refusal to comply, Wilson obtained an order requiring her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt. Sibbach responded by contesting the court's authority to issue the examination order, pointing out that Indiana courts permitted such orders while Illinois courts did not, and that neither state had a governing statute. The district court found Sibbach in contempt and ordered her committed until she obeyed the examination order or was otherwise discharged. Sibbach appealed the contempt adjudication to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the question involved. The proceedings centered on Rules 35 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been promulgated pursuant to congressional authorization in the Act of June 19, 1934.

Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, Oklahoma, in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose of advising with the Court as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation. The examining psychiatrist reported that at times Ake appeared to be frankly delusional and claimed to be the sword of vengeance of the Lord. He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial. In March 1980, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his present sanity. On April 10, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a psychotic with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia chronic with exacerbation, that he was dangerous, and that he required a maximum security facility. The court found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial while receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine three times daily. At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. Counsel requested that a psychiatrist examine Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense or that the court provide funds for such an examination. The trial judge denied the motion. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase, defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined Ake at the state hospital, but none testified about his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists that Ake was dangerous to society. Ake had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce evidence in mitigation. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder in a Florida state court in 1974 and sentenced to death. There was no suggestion at the time that he was incompetent to stand trial or to be sentenced. In early 1982, while on death row, Ford began to exhibit bizarre behavior that grew more serious over time. After reading about a Ku Klux Klan rally, he developed an obsession with the Klan and delusions that he was the target of a conspiracy involving the Klan and prison guards, who he believed were holding 135 of his friends and family hostage in the prison and torturing his women relatives. He began referring to himself as Pope John Paul III and claimed to have fired prison officials and appointed new justices to the Florida Supreme Court. Ford's counsel arranged for examinations by two psychiatrists. Dr. Jamal Amin evaluated Ford over roughly 14 months using taped conversations, letters, interviews, and medical records and concluded that Ford suffered from a severe mental disease resembling paranoid schizophrenia with suicide potential. Dr. Harold Kaufman interviewed Ford in November 1983 and concluded that Ford had no understanding of why he was being executed, sincerely believed he would not be executed because he owned the prisons and could control the Governor through mind waves, and showed no signs of malingering. Pursuant to Florida Statute § 922.07, Ford's counsel invoked the state procedure for determining competency of a condemned inmate. The Governor appointed a panel of three psychiatrists who together interviewed Ford for approximately 30 minutes in the presence of eight other people. Each psychiatrist filed a separate two- or three-page report. Although the diagnoses differed, all three concluded that Ford had the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him. On April 30, 1984, the Governor signed a death warrant without explanation or statement. Ford's attorneys unsuccessfully sought a hearing in state court. They then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, proffering the conflicting findings and subsequent challenges by other psychiatrists. The District Court denied the petition without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Sandra Lockett was charged in Ohio with aggravated murder with two aggravating specifications and with aggravated robbery after a pawnbroker was killed during a robbery in which she participated. The State's primary evidence came from the testimony of coparticipant Al Parker. Parker had pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for dismissal of the robbery charge and the specifications that would have exposed him to the death penalty. Lockett had become acquainted with Parker and Nathan Earl Dew in New Jersey before they traveled together to her hometown of Akron, Ohio, where Parker and Dew needed money for their return trip. After Lockett rejected suggestions to pawn a ring, the group discussed robbing a grocery store and a furniture store. Lockett warned about the grocery operator's size and weapon and offered to retrieve a gun from her father's basement. When those stores closed, someone suggested robbing a pawnshop instead. Lockett's brother and Dew would enter pretending to pawn a ring. Parker would enter with bullets, load a gun, and rob the shop. Lockett would guide them to the location but remain outside because she knew the owner. The next day the four gathered at a friend's apartment, confirmed they were proceeding with the plan, drove by the pawnshop several times, and parked. Parker entered the pawnshop, announced a stickup, and the gun discharged when the pawnbroker grabbed it, killing him. Parker returned to the waiting car where Lockett had the engine running. She took the gun, placed it in her purse, and later hid it under the taxicab seat when police stopped them. After release, Lockett hid Parker and Dew in the attic when police arrived at her home. Parker later testified against her at trial. Lockett rejected three plea offers, including one to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery carrying a twenty-five-year maximum and one to aggravated murder without specifications carrying a mandatory life sentence. At trial the defense presented no witnesses after Lockett followed her mother's advice not to testify. The court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting. It also instructed on the presumption that participants in a robbery acquiesce in whatever is reasonably necessary to accomplish it. This included that an intent to kill could be found if the robbery was reasonably likely to produce death. The jury convicted Lockett of aggravated murder with specifications. Before sentencing the trial judge received a presentence report and psychiatric and psychological reports describing Lockett as a twenty-one-year-old with low-average or average intelligence, no psychosis or mental deficiency, a favorable prognosis for rehabilitation, a juvenile and adult record of only minor offenses, and progress in drug treatment at a clinic. The Ohio death penalty statute required the judge to impose death unless he found by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim induced or facilitated the offense, that the offender acted under duress, coercion, or strong provocation, or that the offense was primarily the product of psychosis or mental deficiency. After reviewing the reports the judge concluded none of the three statutory mitigating circumstances existed and sentenced Lockett to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On April 1, 1975, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida. Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the back door of the Kersey house and asked for water for an overheated car. When Mr. Kersey came out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, and told Jeanette Armstrong to take his money. Mr. Kersey cried for help, and his wife came out of the house with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, then shot and killed both of the Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and fled. Two witnesses testified that they drove past the Kersey house between 7:30 and 7:40 a.m. They saw a large cream- or yellow-colored car parked beside the road about 200 yards from the house. A man was sitting in the car. Another witness testified that at approximately 6:45 a.m. he saw Ida Jean Shaw, petitioner's common-law wife and Jeanette Armstrong's mother, driving a yellow Buick with a vinyl top which belonged to her and petitioner Earl Enmund. Enmund was a passenger in the car along with an unidentified woman. At about 8 a.m. the same witness saw the car return at a high rate of speed. Enmund was driving, Ida Jean Shaw was in the front seat, and one of the other two people in the car was lying down across the back seat. Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong were indicted for the first-degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys. Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together. The prosecutor maintained in his closing argument that Sampson Armstrong killed the old people. The judge instructed the jury on felony murder, including that the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery. The jury found both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. A separate sentencing hearing was held and the jury recommended the death penalty for both defendants. The trial judge then sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of first-degree murder after finding four statutory aggravating circumstances and that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied. The Florida Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by statute. The trial judge reiterated the findings, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and sentences after rejecting two of the four aggravating circumstances but concluding that the remaining two outweighed the absence of mitigating circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court found that there was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob the elderly couple led to their being murdered. However, the jury could have concluded he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes waiting to help the robbers escape. We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.