Also known as: mergers of offenses · offense merger · offenses merger · merger doctrine · merger rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common-law doctrine under which a lesser offense merges into a greater offense arising from the same conduct, barring separate convictions for both. The rule prevents cumulative punishment by treating the lesser crime as absorbed into the felony when the offenses stem from a single transaction or when an inchoate offense precedes a completed crime.
Cameron shoved Quinn aside and seized her handbag in one continuous motion inside the store. The Commonwealth charged both battery and robbery arising from the same act. Because the misdemeanor formed part of the conduct constituting the felony, the battery merged into the robbery. Cameron may be convicted only of the greater offense.
Alex offered to pay a coworker to steal trade secrets and the coworker completed the theft. The state charged both solicitation and the completed larceny arising from the same scheme. Because the inchoate misdemeanor merged into the felony once the crime was accomplished, Alex may be convicted only of the greater offense.
Ronald conspired with a foreign buyer to steal aerospace designs and solicited a coworker to help download files. The theft was completed by another participant in the scheme. The completed felony absorbed the attempt and solicitation charges, but the conspiracy conviction stands independently.
The case began when eight petitioners, together with seven unindicted coconspirators and six codefendants, were tried in the Western District of Pennsylvania under a six-count indictment that alleged federal gambling offenses. Each petitioner faced charges of conspiring to violate and of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a statute that makes it a federal crime for five or more persons to conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own a gambling business prohibited by state law. At trial the evidence showed that the petitioners owned and operated a large-scale illegal numbers game violating state law. The jury convicted each petitioner of both the substantive offense under § 1955 and the conspiracy offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The trial judge then imposed sentences on both counts for every petitioner. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conspiracy convictions. It reversed the substantive convictions, however, because the evidence failed to prove that each petitioner had conducted a gambling business involving five or more participants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Wharton's Rule barred the conspiracy convictions.
View caseDana met with fake policyholders to stage accidents and then approved multiple bogus insurance claims over several months. The prosecution charged both conspiracy and the completed fraud counts. Because the conspiracy consisted solely of preparation for the very crimes that were carried out, it merged into the substantive offenses at conviction.
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri a jury convicted petitioner on two counts under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act. Count I charged conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extorting money and Count II charged the substantive offense of obstructing commerce by extortion. The district court imposed consecutive twelve-year terms on each count but suspended the sentence on Count II and replaced it with a five-year probation term to commence upon expiration of the Count I sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner then filed a motion in the district court under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking correction of the sentence. He asserted that the Act established a maximum penalty of twenty years for obstructing interstate commerce by any means and that Congress had not intended to authorize two separate penalties. The district court denied relief. It held that the Hobbs Act gave no indication of any departure from the usual rule allowing cumulative punishment for conspiracy and the substantive crime that was its object. Petitioner appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because it deemed the question raised by petitioner of sufficient importance.
View caseJordan attempted to enter a warehouse by prying a lock but was interrupted. Later the same night a confederate completed the burglary. The prosecution charged both attempt and the completed felony from the same episode. Because the inchoate offense merged into the greater crime, Jordan may be convicted only of burglary.
No. At common law, conspiracy does not merge into the completed offense and remains independently chargeable even when the substantive crime is accomplished.
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Merger occurs when the misdemeanor forms part of the same act or transaction that constitutes the felony, preventing separate convictions for both offenses.
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The preparatory offense merges into the completed crime at the conviction stage, so the defendant may be convicted only of the completed offense.
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…offense in one provision, § 1951, manifested an intent not to punish commission of two offenses cumulatively. Unlike the merger doctrine, petitioner’s position does not question that the Government could charge a conspiracy even when the substantive crime that was its object had been completed. His concern is with the…