Also known as: merger rules · merger doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An inchoate offense such as solicitation or attempt merges into the completed felony when the principal crime is accomplished by the defendant or another actor. The completed felony becomes the sole punishable offense. The inchoate conduct is absorbed and does not support a separate conviction.
An inchoate offense such as solicitation or attempt merges into the completed felony when the principal crime is accomplished by the defendant or another actor. The completed felony becomes the sole punishable offense. The inchoate conduct is absorbed and does not support a separate conviction.
A contract for the sale of real property merges into the deed upon delivery at closing and is extinguished. Contractual promises relating to title are discharged. Promises concerning the physical condition of the property remain enforceable absent clear intent to merge them into the deed.
A contract for the sale of real property merges into the deed upon delivery at closing and is extinguished. Contractual promises relating to title are discharged. Promises concerning the physical condition of the property remain enforceable absent clear intent to merge them into the deed.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Musa Mensah shoved a security guard to the ground while stealing a laptop from a restricted hangar. The shove supplied the force element that elevated the taking into robbery. Under the merger doctrine the misdemeanor battery merged into the completed felony, so only the robbery conviction stands.
Michael Miller agreed with two others to steal customer data and later directed a technician to write access scripts. The technician completed the theft. Miller's conspiracy liability survived because conspiracy does not merge into the completed offense, while any solicitation merged and could not support a separate conviction.
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri a jury convicted petitioner on two counts under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act. Count I charged conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extorting money and Count II charged the substantive offense of obstructing commerce by extortion. The district court imposed consecutive twelve-year terms on each count but suspended the sentence on Count II and replaced it with a five-year probation term to commence upon expiration of the Count I sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner then filed a motion in the district court under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking correction of the sentence. He asserted that the Act established a maximum penalty of twenty years for obstructing interstate commerce by any means and that Congress had not intended to authorize two separate penalties. The district court denied relief. It held that the Hobbs Act gave no indication of any departure from the usual rule allowing cumulative punishment for conspiracy and the substantive crime that was its object. Petitioner appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because it deemed the question raised by petitioner of sufficient importance.
View caseMadison Meyers recruited seasonal workers to steal pesticide and cut a fence to aid the plan. The workers later completed the theft without her. Her solicitation merged into the completed offense, leaving only liability for the theft itself.
The case began when eight petitioners, together with seven unindicted coconspirators and six codefendants, were tried in the Western District of Pennsylvania under a six-count indictment that alleged federal gambling offenses. Each petitioner faced charges of conspiring to violate and of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a statute that makes it a federal crime for five or more persons to conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own a gambling business prohibited by state law. At trial the evidence showed that the petitioners owned and operated a large-scale illegal numbers game violating state law. The jury convicted each petitioner of both the substantive offense under § 1955 and the conspiracy offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The trial judge then imposed sentences on both counts for every petitioner. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conspiracy convictions. It reversed the substantive convictions, however, because the evidence failed to prove that each petitioner had conducted a gambling business involving five or more participants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Wharton's Rule barred the conspiracy convictions.
View case2 common questions
Conspiracy does not merge into the completed felony. It remains a separate offense that can be punished in addition to the substantive crime. Solicitation and attempt, by contrast, merge when the target offense is completed.
Supporting sources
The misdemeanor merges into the felony. The defendant may be convicted only of the felony because the lesser offense is absorbed into the greater one when both arise from the same transaction.
Supporting sources
Mohan Malhotra sold an office building to Mosaic Retail under a contract that required a cooling-system upgrade before closing. The deed delivered at closing made no mention of the upgrade. After closing the buyer could not enforce the contractual promise because the contract merged into the deed.
2 common questions
Promises concerning the physical condition of the property survive unless the parties clearly intended merger. Promises relating to title are extinguished by the merger of the contract into the deed.
Supporting sources
A merger clause reinforces that the contract is extinguished upon delivery of the deed. It prevents enforcement of terms not restated in the deed unless an exception such as fraud or a collateral agreement applies.
Supporting sources
…offense in one provision, § 1951, manifested an intent not to punish commission of two offenses cumulatively. Unlike the merger doctrine, petitioner’s position does not question that the Government could charge a conspiracy even when the substantive crime that was its object had been completed. His concern is with the…