Also known as: mistake of law · mistake of law defense · ignorance of the law is no excuse · ignorance of law is no defense · ignorantia juris non excusat
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A principle of law providing that a defendant's erroneous belief that conduct is not prohibited by statute does not excuse liability. The defense is unavailable even when the mistake is reasonable unless the mistake negates a required mental state or the defendant reasonably relied on an official statement of law later determined to be erroneous.
Miranda Morales removed a neighbor's lawn equipment believing a local ordinance gave her the right to clear items left on a shared driveway. The ordinance did not apply to the equipment. Her mistaken view of the law did not relieve her of liability for trespass to chattels.
Meredith Maxwell divided cash deposits to avoid bank reporting thresholds while believing the practice was lawful. Prosecutors proved she knew the reporting rules existed. The mistake about legality supplied no defense to the structuring charge.
Waldemar Ratzlaf incurred a substantial gambling debt while playing blackjack at the High Sierra Casino in Reno, Nevada, in October 1988. The casino extended him one week to settle the $160,000 obligation. On the payment date, Ratzlaf returned with $100,000 in cash, prompting a casino official to explain the reporting requirements for cash transactions exceeding $10,000 and to recommend using a cashier's check. The casino arranged transportation and an escort to nearby banks for Ratzlaf. At the banks, Ratzlaf acquired several cashier's checks in amounts below $10,000 from different institutions to prevent the filing of currency transaction reports. He completed payment to the casino using these checks. The Ratzlafs engaged in additional similar transactions two months later, purchasing cashier's checks totaling $98,500 with cash and casino chips. Federal prosecutors charged Waldemar Ratzlaf and his wife Loretta with conspiracy and multiple counts of structuring currency transactions. Following a trial where the jury received instructions on the elements of the offense, the Ratzlafs were convicted on all counts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions in 1992. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the proper interpretation of the willfulness element in 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
View caseMichelle Murphy refused to file returns after concluding wages were not taxable income. She had received official IRS publications stating the opposite. The mistaken legal conclusion did not negate the willfulness element required for conviction.
John L. Cheek has been employed as a pilot by American Airlines since 1973. He filed federal income tax returns through 1979 but ceased to file returns thereafter. Cheek claimed an increasing number of withholding allowances on his W-4 forms, eventually claiming 60 allowances by mid-1980, and for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated that he was exempt from federal income taxes. In 1983, he unsuccessfully sought a refund of all tax withheld by his employer in 1982. His income during this period far exceeded the minimum necessary to trigger the statutory filing requirement. As a result of these activities, Cheek was indicted for ten violations of federal law. He faced six counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986. He was also charged with three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983. Because of the allowances and exempt status claimed on his W-4 forms, American Airlines withheld substantially less than the amount of tax Cheek owed. He was further charged with one count of presenting a false claim to an agency of the United States. At trial, evidence established that between 1982 and 1986 Cheek was involved in at least four civil cases challenging aspects of the federal income tax system. In those cases, courts informed the plaintiffs that arguments such as not being a taxpayer, wages not being income, and the Sixteenth Amendment not authorizing an income tax were frivolous. Cheek also attended at least two criminal trials of persons charged with tax offenses. An attorney had advised Cheek in 1980 or 1981 that courts had rejected the claim that wages are not income. Cheek represented himself and testified that since 1978 he had attended seminars sponsored by a group believing the federal tax system is unconstitutional. He produced a letter from an attorney stating that the Sixteenth Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on gain or profit. Cheek claimed he sincerely believed his actions were lawful based on this indoctrination and his own study. The trial court instructed the jury on willfulness as the voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty. It advised that an objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding would negate willfulness but mere disagreement would not. After several hours of deliberation, the jury sent out another note. It stated that it still could not reach a verdict because it was divided on whether Mr. Cheek honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income tax. The court gave supplemental instructions stating that a person's opinion that tax laws violate constitutional rights does not constitute good faith misunderstanding, and that an honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense. The jury convicted Cheek on all counts approximately two hours after the final instruction. Cheek appealed, arguing error in the jury instructions requiring objective reasonableness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation conflicted with decisions of other Courts of Appeals.
View caseMaria Morales kept a rifle after modifying it to fire automatically while believing the modification did not trigger registration requirements. Evidence showed she knew the weapon's features. The mistake of law provided no defense to the possession charge.
The National Firearms Act imposes strict registration requirements on statutorily defined firearms, including machineguns. A machinegun is defined as any weapon which shoots, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. In 1986, Congress amended the Act to criminalize the mere possession of an unregistered machinegun, a violation punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment. In 1989, local police and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents executed a search warrant at petitioner Steven Staples' home and recovered an AR-15 rifle. The AR-15 is the civilian version of the military's M-16 rifle and is manufactured with a metal stop on its receiver to prevent conversion to automatic fire. On Staples' rifle, however, the stop had been filed away, and the weapon had been assembled with an M-16 selector switch and several other M-16 internal parts, including a hammer, disconnector, and trigger. BATF agents tested the rifle and confirmed that it fired more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger. It was undisputed that the weapon was not registered as required by the statute. Staples maintained that the rifle had never been modified to fire automatically and that he had no knowledge that it was capable of doing so. At trial, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the gun would fire fully automatically. The District Court rejected that request. Instead, it charged the jury that the Government need only prove the defendant knew he was dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court sentenced Staples to five years' probation and a $5,000 fine. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals concerning the mens rea requirement under the statute.
View caseMarco Marquez sold guns after concluding his occasional sales fell outside licensing statutes. He had reviewed the statutes but misinterpreted their reach. The erroneous legal interpretation did not excuse the unlicensed dealing offense.
In 1996 Sillasse Bryan was charged in federal court with conspiring to violate and with a substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) by willfully engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license. The evidence at trial established that Bryan had no federal firearms license. He used straw purchasers in Ohio to acquire pistols he could not have purchased himself. The straw purchasers made false statements when buying the guns. Bryan assured the purchasers that he would file the serial numbers off the guns, and he resold the guns on Brooklyn street corners known for drug dealing. The record contained no evidence that Bryan was aware of the federal licensing requirement, although it showed he knew his overall conduct was unlawful. Bryan requested a jury instruction that he could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge rejected the request. Instead the judge instructed the jury that a person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and purposely with the intent to do something the law forbids. The person need not know the specific law or rule his conduct may be violating. The jury found Bryan guilty on both counts. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the instructions were proper and that the Government had presented ample proof of willfulness. Because the Eleventh Circuit had held that the Government must prove knowledge of the licensing requirement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
View caseMelissa Mills posted violent messages about a coworker while believing the statements were protected speech. The messages caused reasonable fear. The mistaken view of First Amendment coverage supplied no defense to the threat charge.
Anthony Douglas Elonis was an active user of the social networking website Facebook. In May 2010, Elonis’s wife of nearly seven years left him, taking with her their two young children. Elonis began listening to more violent music and posting self-styled rap lyrics inspired by the music under the pseudonym Tone Dougie. The lyrics Elonis posted included graphically violent language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, a kindergarten class, and state and federal law enforcement. This material was often interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were fictitious with no intentional resemblance to real persons. Elonis posted a photograph of himself holding a toy knife against a co-worker’s neck with the caption I wish, after which the chief of park security fired him. Elonis posted an adaptation of a satirical sketch in which he substituted his wife for the President. The posting described firing a mortar launcher at her house from the cornfield behind it. After viewing some of Elonis’s posts, his wife felt extremely afraid for her life and obtained a three-year protection-from-abuse order against him. Elonis posted about the order and referenced having enough explosives to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff’s Department. Elonis posted an entry stating he had enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined. After park security informed the FBI, agents monitored Elonis’s Facebook activity and visited his house. Elonis then posted Little Agent Lady describing slitting an FBI agent’s throat and detonating a bomb. A grand jury indicted Elonis on five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §875(c). At trial Elonis requested a jury instruction that the government must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat. The District Court instead instructed the jury that a statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury. The jury convicted Elonis on four of the five counts. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA mistake of law supplies a defense when it negates a required mental state or when the defendant reasonably relied on an official statement of law later found erroneous. Reliance on a private blog or internal company materials does not qualify.
Yes when the pamphlet comes from the agency charged with administering the law and the reliance is reasonable. The defense fails if the statement is unofficial or the defendant ignores explicit limitations in the official guidance.
Yes when the enactment was not published or reasonably made available before the conduct. The defense requires proof by a preponderance that the defendant lacked actual knowledge and the government failed to provide reasonable access.
No. Internal materials from a private employer are not official statements of law. The defense arises only when the statute itself makes the mistaken belief exculpatory or when reliance is on an official public source.
…188, 191-193 (CA1 1985), we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 1068 (1990). II The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system. See, e. g. , United States v. Smith , 5 Wheat. 153, 182 (1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting); Barlow v. United…