Also known as:moratoria · moratory · mora · moratoriums · debt delay · payment suspension
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A temporary government-ordered suspension of development or other specified activity. Courts evaluate the duration of the restriction, the government's planning purposes, owners' reasonable expectations, and effects on property value to decide whether fairness requires compensation.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Development Moratorium Review
Mosaic Retail purchased land intending to build a shopping center. The city enacted a two-year moratorium on all new commercial construction while it revised its zoning plan. Mosaic challenged the moratorium as a taking. The court examined the moratorium's limited duration, the city's good-faith planning goals, and the modest impact on land value before concluding that compensation was not required.
Execution Moratorium Challenge
Matthew Martinez was sentenced to death. State officials imposed a moratorium on all executions pending review of sentencing procedures. Martinez argued the delay violated his rights. The court upheld the moratorium because the temporary halt served legitimate administrative purposes without permanently denying any constitutional claim.
Furman v. Georgia408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)
In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969).
Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972.
The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.
Marathon Logistics owned an apartment building. The city imposed a moratorium on new utility installations while studying infrastructure needs. When a cable company sought access, the moratorium blocked permanent physical occupation. The court treated the moratorium as a temporary regulatory measure rather than a permanent taking.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Melanie Morris proposed low-income housing on vacant land. After learning of the project, the village declared a moratorium on new subdivisions and rezoned the area for park use. Morris claimed discriminatory intent. The court scrutinized the timing and sequence of the moratorium to determine whether it masked an improper purpose.
Arlington Heights, Village of v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), on remand 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.1977)
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements.
In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans.
During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.
In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
Megan Moore defaulted on her home loan during an economic crisis. The state enacted a moratorium delaying foreclosure sales for two years. The lender challenged the law as impairing contract rights. The court upheld the moratorium because its temporary nature and emergency justification preserved fairness between borrowers and lenders.
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934)
The Blaisdells executed a mortgage on their property in Minneapolis to the Home Building & Loan Association on August 1, 1928. The mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement. After default, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to the Association on May 2, 1932, for $3700.98. The period of redemption under the law then in effect was set to expire on May 2, 1933.
On April 18, 1933, Minnesota enacted Chapter 339 of the Laws of 1933, known as the Mortgage Moratorium Law. The statute authorized district courts to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales for such additional time as the court deemed just and equitable, not beyond May 1, 1935, upon condition that the mortgagor pay a reasonable part of the income or rental value toward taxes, insurance, interest, and principal. The Blaisdells applied to the District Court of Hennepin County for an extension of the redemption period.
The district court found that the reasonable rental value of the property was $40 per month and the present market value was $6000. It extended the redemption period to May 1, 1935, requiring the Blaisdells to pay $40 per month to the Association. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the order.
The Home Building & Loan Association appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reviewed the judgment sustaining the statute as applied to the preexisting mortgage.
Millennium Media planned a nuclear power facility. The state commission imposed a moratorium on new plant certifications until safety standards were updated. The company argued federal preemption. The court analyzed whether the moratorium regulated construction timing or safety, ultimately finding it fell within state authority over economic aspects of energy production.
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983)
By the late 1970s, spent nuclear fuel had accumulated at reactor sites across the country, totaling some 8,000 metric tons with projections of 72,000 metric tons by the year 2000. Government studies indicated that several reactors could be forced to shut down in the near future due to insufficient storage capacity in on-site pools. California responded to these concerns and the absence of a permanent disposal method by amending its energy laws in 1976.
In 1974 California had enacted the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act. The Act requires any utility seeking to construct an electric power generating plant, including a nuclear facility, to obtain certification from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission after a multi-stage review process. The Warren-Alquist Act was amended in 1976 to provide additional state regulation of new nuclear powerplant construction. This section directs the Commission to determine on a case-by-case basis that adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods will exist when needed. Each utility must also maintain continuous on-site full core reserve storage capacity.
Section 25524.2 established a moratorium on the certification of new nuclear plants. Certification is barred until the Commission finds that a demonstrated technology or means for the permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste has been developed and approved by the United States. In 1978 petitioners Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Southern California Edison Co. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. They sought a declaratory judgment that the two sections and other provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act were pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
The District Court held that the petitioners had standing, that the challenges were ripe, and that both sections were invalid as pre-empted. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed standing and ripeness as to section 25524.2 but held the challenge to section 25524.1(b) unripe. On the merits, the court held that the nuclear moratorium provisions of § 25524.2 were not pre-empted because §§ 271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act constitute a congressional authorization for States to regulate nuclear powerplants for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the ripeness of the challenges to both sections and the pre-emption of section 25524.2.
How long can a moratorium last before it risks becoming a taking?
Courts weigh the actual duration against the government's planning needs and the owner's expectations. A short, good-faith moratorium that preserves future value is less likely to require compensation than an indefinite or bad-faith restriction.
Supporting sources
Does a moratorium on executions automatically violate the Eighth Amendment?
No. A temporary administrative moratorium does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when it serves legitimate review purposes and does not permanently foreclose sentencing options.
Supporting sources
When does a moratorium cross from regulation into a physical taking?
A moratorium that merely delays activity differs from one that authorizes permanent third-party occupation of property. The latter triggers per se taking analysis while the former requires case-specific fairness review.
Supporting sources
Can evidence of discriminatory intent turn a facially neutral moratorium into a constitutional violation?
Yes. When the sequence and timing of a moratorium reveal an intent to block protected housing development, courts may find an equal protection violation even if the stated purpose appears neutral.
Supporting sources
458 U.S. 419 (1982)
…Willingham , 321 U. S. 503 (1944) (rent control); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell , 290 U. S. 398 (1934) (mortgage moratorium); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel , 258 U. S. 242 (1922) (emergency housing law); Block v. Hirsh , 256 U. S. 135 (1921) (rent control). In none of these cases, however, did the…