morsellum terrae

Allied Structural Steel Co., an Illinois corporation, maintained a pension plan for its salaried employees that it had adopted in 1963 and qualified under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. The plan provided that the company was the sole contributor to the pension trust fund. The company made contributions based on actuarial predictions. It retained the right to amend or terminate the plan at any time and for any reason. In the event of termination, assets were distributed first to retired employees, then to those eligible for retirement, and finally to other covered employees whose rights had not vested, with employees assured payment only to the extent of the assets. The plan expressly stated that no employee had any right to trust assets upon termination of employment except as provided, and that neither the employer nor trustee was liable beyond the assets. On April 9, 1974, Minnesota enacted the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, which applied to private employers of 100 or more employees with at least one Minnesota resident who provided pension benefits under a qualified plan. The Act imposed a pension funding charge on such an employer if it terminated the plan or closed a Minnesota office. It required the employer to purchase deferred annuities for employees with at least 10 years of service whose nonvested benefits would otherwise be forfeited. Periods of employment prior to the Act's effective date were included in the 10-year criterion. During the summer of 1974, the company began closing its Minnesota office, which had 30 employees, and on July 31 discharged 11 of them. At least nine of the discharged employees had worked for the company for 10 years or more but did not have vested pension rights under the plan. On August 18, the State notified the company that it owed a pension funding charge of approximately $185,000 under the Act. The company brought suit in federal district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally impaired its contractual obligations. A three-judge district court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act as applied to the company. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.

In 1925 the Oklahoma legislature passed Chapter 147 of the Session Laws. That statute declared the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice a public business. It prohibited any person from engaging in that business without first obtaining a license from the Corporation Commission. The statute directed that a license would issue only after a formal hearing at which competent evidence established the necessity for additional ice facilities at the proposed location. It authorized the Commission to deny an application if existing licensed plants already provided sufficient capacity to meet public needs. New State Ice Company secured such a license and for several years operated an ice manufacturing and distribution business in Oklahoma City in which it had invested $500,000. While New State Ice Company was operating under its license, E.A. Liebmann purchased a parcel of land in Oklahoma City and began construction of an ice plant without applying for or obtaining a license from the Commission. Liebmann acted with the purpose of entering the business in direct competition with the licensed company. New State Ice Company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking an injunction to prevent Liebmann from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice without a license. The district court dismissed the bill of complaint for want of equity. It concluded that the ice business is a private enterprise not subject to the statutory restrictions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The case arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the circuit court decree. The record before the Court included evidence of the structure of the ice industry in Oklahoma, the extent of competition or monopoly in communities across the state, the Commission's prior exercise of regulatory authority over ice plants under earlier statutes dating to 1908, and the practical effects of the 1925 licensing requirement on service and pricing in the state.

The city of Eastlake, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland, has a comprehensive zoning plan codified in a municipal ordinance. Respondent, a real estate developer, acquired an eight-acre parcel of real estate in Eastlake zoned for light industrial uses at the time of purchase. In May 1971, respondent applied to the City Planning Commission for a zoning change to permit construction of a multifamily, high-rise apartment building. The Planning Commission recommended the proposed change to the City Council. By popular vote, the voters of Eastlake amended the city charter to require that any changes in land use agreed to by the Council be approved by a 55% vote in a referendum. The City Council approved the Planning Commission's recommendation for reclassification of respondent's property to permit the proposed project. Respondent then applied to the Planning Commission for parking and yard approval for the proposed building. The Commission rejected the application on the ground that the City Council's rezoning action had not yet been submitted to the voters for ratification. Respondent filed an action in state court seeking a judgment declaring the charter provision invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people. While the case was pending, the City Council's action was submitted to a referendum, but the proposed zoning change was not approved by the requisite 55% margin. Following the election, the Court of Common Pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained the charter provision. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed.