Also known as: multifarious pronouncement · multiple rulings · diverse holdings
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factor within the political question doctrine that renders a case nonjusticiable when different branches of government have issued or might issue conflicting statements on the same matter. This factor protects against judicial rulings that would produce inconsistency and resulting embarrassment among the branches.
Madison Meyers and fellow residents sued the state reapportionment board over new district lines that split their manufacturing community. The court applied equal-population standards to the maps and issued a single ruling enforcing constitutional requirements. No other branch had taken a conflicting position on the same plan, so the factor did not bar adjudication.
Mariam Mansour challenged the House's exclusion of a duly elected member who met all constitutional qualifications. The Court resolved the claim under the Qualifications Clause without creating any inconsistency with a prior political-branch decision. The factor did not prevent adjudication because no multifarious statements existed.
In November 1966 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District to serve in the 90th Congress. During the preceding Congress a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration investigated expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor. The subcommittee issued a report concluding that Powell had deceived House authorities about travel expenses and that illegal salary payments had been made to his wife at his direction. The report also found that Powell met the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence. When the 90th Congress organized in January 1967 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1 by a vote of 363 to 65. The resolution appointed a nine-member Select Committee to inquire into Powell's qualifications and alleged misconduct. Powell appeared before the committee but, on advice of counsel, limited his testimony to the three standing qualifications and refused to answer questions about other matters. The Select Committee issued a report finding that Powell met the standing qualifications yet recommending that he be seated, censured, fined $40,000, and deprived of seniority. On March 1, 1967, the House rejected a motion to vote on that recommendation. The House then adopted an amendment calling for exclusion by a vote of 248 to 176 and passed House Resolution No. 278 by a vote of 307 to 116, thereby excluding Powell and declaring the seat vacant. Powell and thirteen voters from his district filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Speaker John W. McCormack, four other House members, and the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution because Powell satisfied the standing qualifications and requested declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus to compel seating and payment of salary. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the case was pending the 90th Congress ended. Powell was reelected in November 1968 and seated in the 91st Congress under a resolution that imposed a $25,000 fine. Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness, but Powell's claim for back salary from the period of exclusion remained unresolved.
View caseMegan Moore sued after the Senate used a small committee and remote proceedings to conduct an impeachment trial. The Constitution assigns the sole power to try impeachments to the Senate, and judicial review would risk conflicting pronouncements on the same procedural question. The factor supported dismissal as a political question.
Walter L. Nixon, Jr., served as Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. A federal grand jury investigated reports that Nixon had accepted a gratuity from a Mississippi businessman in exchange for influencing a local prosecution. Nixon was convicted by a jury of two counts of making false statements before the grand jury and sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his judicial office and continued to receive his salary during his incarceration. On May 10, 1989, the House of Representatives adopted three articles of impeachment against Nixon. The first two articles charged him with giving false testimony before the grand jury, and the third charged him with bringing disrepute on the Federal Judiciary. The Senate then invoked its Impeachment Rule XI, which permits a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony and report to the full Senate. The committee held four days of hearings at which ten witnesses, including Nixon, testified. It submitted a complete transcript and a report summarizing the evidence to the full Senate. Nixon and the House managers submitted briefs and presented oral arguments to the Senate. The Senate convicted Nixon on the first two articles by the required two-thirds majority and removed him from office. Nixon filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that his conviction was void and that his salary and privileges should be reinstated. The district court dismissed the action as nonjusticiable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseMiranda Morales and voters alleged that a new map deliberately diluted their party's voting strength across multiple districts. Different courts applying varying tests could reach inconsistent results on the same map, creating the precise risk of multifarious pronouncements. The factor contributed to finding the claim nonjusticiable.
In 2000, the census showed that Pennsylvania was entitled to only 19 Representatives in Congress, a decrease of 2 from its previous delegation. Pennsylvania's General Assembly, controlled by Republicans who also held the Governor's office, undertook the task of drawing a new districting map. Prominent national Republican figures pressured the Assembly to adopt a partisan plan as punishment for Democratic redistricting elsewhere. On January 3, 2002, the General Assembly passed its plan, signed into law as Act 1. Registered Democrats Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Act 1 created malapportioned districts and constituted a political gerrymander in violation of Article I and the Equal Protection Clause. A three-judge panel dismissed the gerrymandering claim but allowed the apportionment claim to proceed. After trial, the court ruled for plaintiffs on apportionment and retained jurisdiction pending a remedial plan. Governor Schweiker signed Act 34, a remedial plan enacted by the General Assembly, on April 18, 2002. Plaintiffs moved to impose their own remedial districts, arguing Act 34 was both malapportioned and an unconstitutional gerrymander. The District Court denied the motion, finding the new districts properly apportioned and rejecting the gerrymandering claim for the reasons stated earlier. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Act 34 gerrymandering claim, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The complaint alleged that the districts were meandering and irregular, ignored traditional redistricting criteria solely for partisan advantage, and that the plan was designed to maximize Republican seats. The District Court dismissed the political gerrymandering claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
View caseMohan Malhotra challenged a one-house legislative veto that canceled his deportation suspension. The Court addressed the constitutional separation-of-powers issue in a single authoritative decision. No prior conflicting pronouncement from another branch existed on the same statutory mechanism, so the factor did not bar review.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View caseMelissa Mills and other voters sued over a statewide map alleged to favor one party through cracking and packing. Multiple courts could reach divergent conclusions on the identical map using different fairness metrics, producing conflicting statements from the judiciary and legislature. The factor did not bar adjudication because no actual multifarious pronouncements by coordinate branches existed on the same plan.
The Indiana Legislature consists of a 50-member Senate and a 100-member House of Representatives. In early 1981, following the 1980 census, the Republican-controlled General Assembly initiated reapportionment of the state's legislative districts. The resulting 1981 Reapportionment Act created 50 single-member Senate districts and, for the House, 7 triple-member districts, 9 double-member districts, and 61 single-member districts. The plan was drafted by Republican leadership with the assistance of a private computer firm using precinct-level political data, passed along party lines over unanimous Democratic opposition, and signed into law by the Republican Governor. In early 1982, several Indiana Democrats, including state legislators, local officials, and private citizens, filed suit against state officials alleging that the 1981 plan constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the claims. In November 1982, the first elections were held under the new districting plan. Democratic candidates received 51.9 percent of the statewide House vote but won only 43 of 100 seats, and 53.1 percent of the Senate vote but won 13 of the 25 seats up for election. In Marion and Allen Counties, which used multimember House districts, Democratic candidates received 46.6 percent of the vote but won only 3 of 21 seats. After trial, the District Court found that the plan intentionally discriminated against Democrats on a statewide basis, that the discrimination was likely to continue throughout the decade, and that it would deny Democrats a fair chance to influence the political process. The court declared the plan unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement, and ordered the General Assembly to prepare a new plan. The defendants appealed, seeking review of the District Court's rulings on justiciability and the existence of an equal protection violation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseThe two factors often reinforce each other in redistricting and gerrymandering cases. When no clear judicial standard exists, different courts are likely to reach inconsistent results on the same issue, creating the risk of conflicting pronouncements that the sixth factor seeks to avoid.
No. The factor applies only when a judicial decision would create a genuine risk of embarrassment from conflicting statements on the same question. A single consistent judicial ruling that aligns with or clarifies prior branch action does not trigger the factor.
Different courts applying varying tests to the same map could produce inconsistent outcomes, leading to multiple pronouncements on the identical districting question. This risk of conflicting judicial and legislative statements on partisan fairness triggers the factor and supports nonjusticiability.
The factor does not bar review when the claim rests on objective equal-population standards that produce a single consistent judicial result. No conflicting pronouncements arise when the court applies established metrics that other branches have not contradicted on the same plan.
…or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of the Baker factors by asserting that Chadha's claim is "an assault…