Also known as: natural born citizen · natural-born citizen · natural-born citizens · natural born citizen clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An individual who acquires United States citizenship at birth rather than through later naturalization proceedings. Such status arises either from birth within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction or from birth abroad to at least one citizen parent under the naturalization statutes in force at the time of birth. The category determines eligibility for the office of President under the Constitution.
Nadia Novak, born in Canada to a U.S. citizen mother who had resided in the United States before the birth, announces a campaign for President. Opponents argue that her foreign birth disqualifies her. Election officials confirm her status as a natural born citizen under the operative statute and place her name on the ballot.
Nicholas Nunez, a natural born citizen born in New York to two U.S. citizens, applies for a state civil service position reserved for citizens. The state denies the application on residency grounds unrelated to citizenship status. A court upholds his eligibility because his birthright citizenship satisfies the threshold requirement.
In 1971 four lawfully admitted resident aliens employed by New York City were discharged from their positions in the competitive class of the civil service solely because they were not United States citizens. The four appellees—Patrick McL. Dougall, Esperanza Jorge, Teresa Vargas, and Sylvia Castro—had previously worked for nonprofit organizations receiving funds from the United States Office of Economic Opportunity. Those organizations were absorbed by the Manpower Career and Development Agency of the city's Human Resources Administration. The appellees were initially continued in employment by the city. They were soon notified that section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law rendered them ineligible, and they were terminated. Dougall was born in Guyana in 1927 and had resided in New York City since 1964; he held the position of administrative assistant in the staff development unit. Jorge was born in the Dominican Republic in 1948 and had resided in New York City since 1967; she worked as a human resources technician. Vargas was born in the Dominican Republic in 1946 and had resided in New York City since 1963; she worked as a clerk-typist. Castro was born in El Salvador in 1944 and had resided in New York City since 1967; she worked as a human resources technician. None of the four had taken any steps toward United States citizenship. The appellees filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Administrator of the Human Resources Administration and the city's Director of Personnel and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. They sought a declaration that section 53 was invalid, an injunction against refusals to appoint or retain aliens in competitive civil service positions, and damages for lost earnings. A three-judge district court was convened. That court held the statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause and granted injunctive relief. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on direct appeal.
View caseNatasha Nielsen, a natural born citizen by virtue of birth in the United States, seeks Medicare eligibility after turning sixty-five. Officials initially question her status because her parents held temporary visas at the time of her birth. The agency ultimately grants benefits once it confirms her birth within the jurisdiction of the United States.
In August 1972 appellee Diaz filed a class action complaint. He is a Cuban refugee over age 65 who had been lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years earlier. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. It challenged the denial of his application for enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program. The complaint alleged that the denial rested on his failure to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) as a noncitizen. It sought relief on behalf of a class of persons denied enrollment for the same reasons. On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add appellees Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint. Clara is another Cuban refugee in similar circumstances who remained in the country at the discretion of the Attorney General. Espinosa is an alien admitted for permanent residence since 1971 who had not applied because he could not meet the five-year residence requirement. The amended complaint sought relief on behalf of a class represented by Diaz and Clara and a subclass represented by Espinosa. On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had exhausted administrative remedies under the Social Security Act. Two days later Espinosa filed his application for enrollment. Although none of the appellees completely exhausted available administrative review, the Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara raised no disputed issues of fact and treated the interlocutory denials as final, satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Secretary also stipulated that Espinosa’s application could not be allowed under the statute. The District Court overruled the motion to dismiss and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held that the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and could not be severed from the permanent residence requirement, enjoining the Secretary from refusing to enroll members of the represented classes. The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseThe first Congress enacted a statute treating children of U.S. citizens born outside the country as natural born citizens, provided the father had resided in the United States. Later statutes retained this rule with minor changes in phrasing and emphasis on parental residence.
Supporting sources
The Constitution uses the term in Article II Section 1 to set presidential eligibility but supplies no further definition. Courts and statutes have therefore looked to the common-law understanding and early naturalization acts to determine its scope.
Supporting sources
Natural born citizens acquire citizenship at birth by operation of law. Naturalized citizens acquire it later through a statutory process. Only the former category satisfies the eligibility clause for President.
Supporting sources
Yes. Birth within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction confers citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that citizenship is treated as natural born for purposes of presidential eligibility.
Supporting sources
…citizens for seven years, Art. I, §2, cl. 2, and Senators citizens for nine, Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, and that the President be a “natural born Citizen.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 5. A multitude of federal statutes distinguish between citizens and aliens. The whole of Title 8 of the United States Code, regulating aliens and nationality, is founded…