Also known as: navally · navy law
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An adjective characterizing forces, vessels, operations, or personnel belonging to or associated with a navy.
Nalini Narula, a sailor in the naval forces, faced charges for an alleged offense committed while in active service during a declared public danger. Prosecutors proceeded by court-martial without a grand jury indictment. The exception in the Fifth Amendment permitted this direct military adjudication because the charges arose in the naval forces during wartime conditions.
Northstar Logistics, a private contractor, challenged a statute regulating conduct aboard naval vessels. Congress had enacted the measure under its enumerated power to make rules for the government and regulation of the naval forces. The court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of that authority over naval operations.
Nina Nielsen, an officer in the naval forces serving on a review board, challenged her removal without cause. The court examined whether for-cause protections applied to inferior officers within the naval structure. The analysis turned on the distinction between naval officers and other executive branch positions.
In 2002 Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a five-member entity appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Board oversees audits of public companies and possesses authority to inspect registered accounting firms, initiate investigations, and issue sanctions. Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, registered with the Board. The Board inspected the firm, released a report critical of its auditing procedures, and began a formal investigation. Free Enterprise Fund, a nonprofit organization of which the firm is a member, and Beckstead and Watts sued the Board and its members, the Commission, and the United States in federal district court. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Board's structure violated the Constitution. The district court determined it had jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNancy Nelson owned cargo seized from a vessel during a naval blockade. The government asserted title under wartime powers exercised through naval forces. The court considered whether a declaration of war alone authorized confiscation of enemy property found within the United States.
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View caseNyah Ndlovu, a civilian instructor at a naval academy, refused to lead a flag salute exercise required by regulation. The regulation aimed to foster discipline among naval personnel. The court weighed whether the compulsion violated First Amendment protections outside actual naval service.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseNatalie Norris owned waterfront property targeted for seizure to support a naval construction redevelopment plan. The city justified the taking as serving a public purpose tied to naval industry revival. The court evaluated whether the economic development plan satisfied the public use requirement under the Fifth Amendment.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseThe Fifth Amendment exempts cases arising in the land or naval forces when those forces are in actual service in time of war or public danger. This exception allows military authorities to proceed by court-martial without indictment.
Supporting sources
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to provide and maintain a Navy and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. This authority supports statutes governing conduct and discipline within naval operations.
Supporting sources
…proposed energy actions' involving fuel economy and pricing may be disapproved by resolution of either House). "20. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-258, § [201(3)], 90 Stat. 303, 309, 10 U. S. C. 7422(c)(2)(C) (President's extension of production period for naval petroleum…