Also known as: necessaries · necessary of life · necessities of life
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common-law doctrine imposing liability on a spouse or parent for basic support items such as food, clothing, shelter, and medical care purchased by the other spouse or by a child when the obligated party fails to supply them directly. Liability attaches when the dependent purchases such items and the obligated party fails to provide them.
Nestor Navarro stopped depositing paychecks into the joint account after separating from Natalie Norris. Natalie purchased prescription medication and paid for the couple's child's therapy sessions using her credit card. The clinic billed the charges directly. Nestor is held personally liable because the purchases qualify as necessaries that he had a duty to supply.
Noreen Nguyen filed for legal separation from Neville Norton and obtained a temporary order restraining asset transfers. Neville sold company cryptocurrency to cover payroll and rent for the family home. The court permitted the sale because the expenditures qualified as necessities of life rather than ordinary-course business activity.
Naomi Norton received state welfare benefits calculated under a maximum-grant rule that reduced per-child aid for larger families. She used the funds to purchase food and clothing for her children. The rule was upheld even though it limited resources available for necessaries of life.
Maryland participates in the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program under the Social Security Act of 1935. The state computes a standard of need for each eligible family that increases with family size, though increments become proportionately smaller. Through an administrative regulation in force since 1947, Maryland imposes an upper limit on the total monthly grant any single family may receive: $250 in Baltimore City and counties under Plan A, and $240 elsewhere under Plan B. Several AFDC recipients in Baltimore with large families brought suit challenging the regulation. Appellee Williams, for example, had a computed need of $296.15 per month for herself and eight children but received only the $250 maximum. Appellees Gary had a computed need of $331.50 for themselves and eight children but likewise received only $250. The recipients alleged that the regulation discriminated against larger families by reducing per capita benefits as family size increased. The suit was filed in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A three-judge district court first held that the regulation conflicted with the Social Security Act and also violated the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court rested its invalidity determination solely on the constitutional ground and enjoined enforcement of the maximum. The state officials appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction. The parties stipulated that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare had approved Maryland's welfare plan, including its maximum grant provisions, on numerous occasions. A majority of states impose some form of maximum on family grants, and twenty states use family maximums of the type at issue here. The regulation permits recipients to retain a portion of outside earnings without reduction in the grant and requires recipients to seek and accept available employment.
View caseNexus Technologies sought to open a new ice plant in a town already served by an existing supplier. State regulators denied the license. The denial was evaluated in light of preserving community access to a basic commodity at reasonable prices.
In 1925 the Oklahoma legislature passed Chapter 147 of the Session Laws. That statute declared the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice a public business. It prohibited any person from engaging in that business without first obtaining a license from the Corporation Commission. The statute directed that a license would issue only after a formal hearing at which competent evidence established the necessity for additional ice facilities at the proposed location. It authorized the Commission to deny an application if existing licensed plants already provided sufficient capacity to meet public needs. New State Ice Company secured such a license and for several years operated an ice manufacturing and distribution business in Oklahoma City in which it had invested $500,000. While New State Ice Company was operating under its license, E.A. Liebmann purchased a parcel of land in Oklahoma City and began construction of an ice plant without applying for or obtaining a license from the Commission. Liebmann acted with the purpose of entering the business in direct competition with the licensed company. New State Ice Company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking an injunction to prevent Liebmann from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice without a license. The district court dismissed the bill of complaint for want of equity. It concluded that the ice business is a private enterprise not subject to the statutory restrictions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The case arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the circuit court decree. The record before the Court included evidence of the structure of the ice industry in Oklahoma, the extent of competition or monopoly in communities across the state, the Commission's prior exercise of regulatory authority over ice plants under earlier statutes dating to 1908, and the practical effects of the 1925 licensing requirement on service and pricing in the state.
View caseNina Nielsen moved to a new county and immediately required emergency surgery. The county hospital refused treatment under a one-year residency rule for free care. The rule was struck down because it blocked access to medical necessaries for recent arrivals.
In early June 1971, appellant Henry Evaro, an indigent suffering from a chronic asthmatic and bronchial illness, moved from New Mexico to Phoenix in Maricopa County, Arizona. On July 8, 1971, Evaro experienced a severe respiratory attack and was sent by his attending physician to appellant Memorial Hospital, a nonprofit private community hospital in the county. Memorial notified the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors of the indigent patient in its charge and requested Evaro's transfer to the county's public hospital facility, while also claiming reimbursement of $1,202.60 for services rendered. Arizona law imposes on each county the mandatory duty to provide necessary hospital and medical care to its indigent sick. Eligibility for free nonemergency care requires that the indigent have resided in the county for the preceding twelve months. Maricopa County refused to admit Evaro to its public hospital or to reimburse Memorial solely on the ground that he had not satisfied the one-year residence requirement. Appellees do not dispute that Evaro is indigent and a bona fide resident of the county. Appellants Memorial Hospital and Evaro then brought this action against Maricopa County to determine the county's obligation to provide care for Evaro or to reimburse the hospital for its costs. The trial court held the durational residence requirement unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. A prior federal district court decision had reached the same conclusion with respect to Pinal County, yet the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the requirement as applied to Maricopa County. To resolve the conflict between the federal court and the state supreme court, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA school principal searched a student's purse after reports that she was distributing cigarettes. The search uncovered evidence of drug activity. The Court upheld the search because schools have authority to protect students from items that threaten health and safety.
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, New Jersey, discovered two girls, including fourteen-year-old freshman T. L. O., smoking in a school lavatory in violation of school rules. The teacher escorted the girls to the principal’s office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. When questioned, T. L. O. denied smoking in the lavatory. Choplick then took T. L. O. into his private office and demanded to inspect her purse. Upon opening the purse, Choplick found a pack of cigarettes and a package of cigarette rolling papers. Suspecting drug involvement, he conducted a thorough search of the purse, uncovering a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of one-dollar bills, an index card listing students who owed T. L. O. money, and two letters implicating her in marijuana dealing. Choplick turned this evidence over to the police, and T. L. O. was charged with delinquency based on possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. T. L. O. moved to suppress the evidence from her purse, arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion but remanded on other grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding the search unreasonable and ordering suppression of the evidence. The State of New Jersey petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted. The Court initially focused on the exclusionary rule but later ordered reargument on the Fourth Amendment standard applicable to school searches.
View caseNecessaries include food, clothing, shelter, and medical care purchased by one spouse when the other fails to provide them. The extent of the obligation turns on the circumstances of the parties, including the need of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay.
No. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act expressly permits transfers or expenditures for the necessities of life even when a temporary restraining order is in place. The restrained party must still notify the moving party of any extraordinary expenditures.
A minor remains liable for the reasonable value of necessaries actually furnished even though most contracts are voidable. Housing obtained when the minor could have lived with parents is not treated as a necessary.
Community property is liable for debts incurred for necessaries of life during marriage. Creditors may reach community assets and, in some states, the separate property of either spouse for such obligations.
…welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life. In each case, the District Court found that appellees met the test for residence in their jurisdictions, as well as all other eligibility requirements except the requirement of residence…