Also known as: Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare · Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare · privilege against self-incrimination · right against self-incrimination
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The constitutional privilege that protects a person from being compelled to provide testimony that could be used against them in a criminal case. The protection extends to answers that would furnish a lead to incriminating evidence and applies only when the risk is of criminal liability rather than civil exposure.
Naomi Norton testified on direct about revenue calculations at her company. On cross-examination counsel asked whether she had skimmed cash tips and failed to report the income. Her lawyer asserted the privilege because the question concerned only her character for truthfulness. The court sustained the objection and barred the inquiry.
Nigel Nelson appeared before a grand jury investigating procurement fraud. The prosecutor asked whether Nelson had signed off on safety reports he knew were false. Nelson refused to answer claiming any response would furnish a lead to evidence of criminal falsification. The court upheld the invocation because the question created a realistic risk of criminal liability.
Nora Nash was arrested and questioned at the station about a theft. Officers never advised her of her rights before asking about her involvement. Nash made incriminating statements that the prosecution later sought to introduce. The court suppressed the statements because the questioning occurred without the required warnings.
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
View caseNeville Norton faced state charges and sought to suppress statements obtained during a lengthy interrogation. He argued that the state procedures failed to protect his right against compelled self-incrimination. The court applied the federal standard to the state proceeding and excluded the statements.
Nia Nkosi refused to answer questions in a state civil contempt hearing fearing criminal exposure. The state court held her in contempt for the refusal. On review the federal court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies fully to state proceedings and overturned the contempt finding.
In November 1959, Harold Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in Hartford, Connecticut, on charges related to pool selling. He pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor, receiving a sentence of one year in jail and a five-hundred-dollar fine, with the jail term suspended after ninety days followed by two years of probation. Approximately sixteen months later, Malloy was subpoenaed to appear before a referee appointed by the Superior Court of Hartford County to investigate alleged gambling and other criminal activities in the county. During the inquiry, he was questioned about the circumstances of his 1959 arrest and conviction, including the identity of his employer, who paid his fine and bondsman, the tenant of the apartment where he was arrested, and whether he knew a man named John Bergoti. Malloy refused to answer any of these questions, asserting that his responses might tend to incriminate him. The Superior Court adjudged Malloy in contempt and ordered him committed to prison until he answered the questions. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the contempt adjudication, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege was unavailable in state proceedings and that Malloy had not properly invoked the state constitutional privilege. Malloy then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which was denied, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions presented.
View caseNatasha Nielsen gave a statement during federal questioning after officers relied on a statute that purported to limit the privilege. Defense counsel moved to suppress the statement at trial. The court ruled that the constitutional privilege could not be overridden by statute and excluded the evidence.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement but held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 governed the admissibility of the statement. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that Congress could therefore have the final say on admissibility. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides that a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given and directs the trial judge to consider specified factors in determining voluntariness. Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseYes. Testimony is incriminating if it would tie the witness to a crime or furnish a lead to such evidence. The answer need not itself establish guilt.
Yes. Testimony on another matter does not waive the privilege for questions that relate only to the witness's character for truthfulness.
Yes. The privilege is incorporated against the states and applies fully to state criminal and civil proceedings that carry a risk of criminal liability.
No. The constitutional privilege cannot be displaced by a federal statute that attempts to limit or override it.
…from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any…