Also known as: neutral decisionmakers · neutral decision-maker · neutral decision-makers · impartial decisionmaker · neutral arbiter · impartial tribunal
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An impartial adjudicator who resolves factual disputes based solely on the evidence presented at a hearing without bias or predisposition toward either side.
Nolan Nunez received need-based welfare benefits after an initial eligibility determination. State officials later proposed to end the payments based on new monitoring data. At the required evidentiary hearing, an impartial decisionmaker reviewed only the evidence presented and allowed Nolan to confront witnesses before deciding whether termination was justified.
Nia Nkosi, a U.S. citizen, was detained on domestic soil as an alleged enemy combatant. The government offered only classified summaries to support continued confinement. A properly constituted military tribunal acting as neutral decisionmaker permitted Nia to present evidence and contest the factual basis under tailored procedures.
Nathan Nguyen faced civil commitment after a criminal acquittal by reason of insanity. The state sought to keep him confined based on a recent diagnosis. A neutral decisionmaker outside the treating facility evaluated the evidence at an adversarial hearing and determined whether continued detention was warranted.
In 1984, Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. Two medical doctors were appointed to conduct a pretrial examination of Foucha. The doctors initially reported that Foucha lacked mental capacity to proceed, but four months later the trial court found Foucha competent to stand trial. The doctors reported that Foucha was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was insane at the time of the offense. On October 12, 1984, the trial court ruled that Foucha was not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found that Foucha was unable to appreciate the usual, natural and probable consequences of his acts, that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong, that he was a menace to himself and others, and that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crimes and presently insane. Foucha was committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility until such time as doctors recommend that he be released and until further order of the court. In 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana recommended that Foucha be discharged or released. A three-member panel was convened at the institution to determine Foucha's current condition and whether he could be released or placed on probation without being a danger to others or himself. On March 21, 1988, the panel reported that there had been no evidence of mental illness since admission and recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged. The trial judge appointed a two-member sanity commission made up of the same two doctors who had conducted the pretrial examination. Their written report stated that Foucha is presently in remission from mental illness but that they cannot certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. One of the doctors testified at a hearing that upon commitment Foucha probably suffered from a drug induced psychosis but that he had recovered from that temporary condition. The doctor testified that Foucha evidenced no signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in good shape mentally. The doctor also testified that Foucha had an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable. The doctor further testified that Foucha had been involved in several altercations at Feliciana and that he would not feel comfortable in certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or to other people. After it was stipulated that the other doctor would give essentially the same testimony, the court ruled that Foucha was dangerous to himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental institution. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foucha had not carried the burden placed upon him by statute to prove that he was not dangerous. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presents an important issue and was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in a manner arguably at odds with prior decisions of this Court.
View caseNestor Navarro, a public school teacher, was fired after writing a letter critical of school policy. The board claimed the statements disrupted operations. A neutral decisionmaker conducted a hearing limited to the record and decided whether the dismissal violated protected speech rights.
Marvin L. Pickering, a teacher in Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois, was dismissed from his position by the appellee Board of Education for sending a letter to a local newspaper. The letter criticized the way in which the Board and the district superintendent of schools had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools. Appellant's dismissal resulted from a determination by the Board after a full hearing. The Board concluded that the publication of the letter was detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district. Under Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 122, § 10-22.4 (1963), the interests of the school required his dismissal. In February of 1961 the Board of Education asked the voters of the school district to approve a bond issue to raise $4,875,000 to erect two new schools. The proposal was defeated. Then, in December of 1961, the Board submitted another bond proposal to the voters which called for the raising of $5,500,000 to build two new schools. This second proposal passed and the schools were built with the money raised by the bond sales. In May of 1964 a proposed increase in the tax rate to be used for educational purposes was submitted to the voters by the Board and was defeated. Finally, on September 19, 1964, a second proposal to increase the tax rate was submitted by the Board and was likewise defeated. It was in connection with this last proposal of the School Board that appellant wrote the letter to the editor that resulted in his dismissal. Prior to the vote on the second tax increase proposal a variety of articles attributed to the District 205 Teachers' Organization appeared in the local paper urging passage of the tax increase. In response to the foregoing material, together with the failure of the tax increase to pass, appellant submitted the letter in question to the editor of the local paper. The letter constituted basically an attack on the School Board's handling of the 1961 bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial resources between the schools' educational and athletic programs. It also charged the superintendent of schools with attempting to prevent teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond issue. At the hearing the Board charged that numerous statements in the letter were false and that the publication of the statements unjustifiably impugned the motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence of both the Board and the school administration. Testimony was introduced from a variety of witnesses on the truth or falsity of the particular statements in the letter with which the Board took issue. The Board found the statements to be false as charged. No evidence was introduced at any point in the proceedings as to the effect of the publication of the letter on the community as a whole or on the administration of the school system in particular. No specific findings along these lines were made. Pickering sought review of the Board's action in the Circuit Court of Will County, which affirmed his dismissal on the ground that the determination that appellant's letter was detrimental to the interests of the school system was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of appellant's claim that the Illinois statute permitting his dismissal on the facts of this case was unconstitutional as applied under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
View caseNalini Narula challenged a state court judgment in federal proceedings. Virginia argued the original court lacked authority over the matter. A neutral decisionmaker assessed the record to determine whether the state tribunal had properly exercised its jurisdiction.
The present case arises from proceedings in the Quarterly Session Court for the Borough of Norfolk, in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The defendants there set up a defence under an act of Congress authorizing the Corporation of Washington to conduct lotteries. The Norfolk court overruled that defence. A writ of error was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States following an earlier decision denying a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The act in question provides that the Corporation shall have full power to authorize the drawing of lotteries for effecting any important improvement in the City. The ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish the improvement. The sum to be raised in each year shall not exceed ten thousand dollars. The object shall be submitted to and approved by the President of the United States. In the course of the argument, counsel read resolutions adopted by the Virginia legislature in January 1810. Those resolutions, passed unanimously by both the Senate and the House of Delegates, disapproved a proposed amendment to the Constitution for the appointment of an impartial tribunal to decide disputes between the state and federal judiciary. The resolutions instead affirmed the Supreme Court as the proper tribunal for such disputes and requested transmission of the resolutions to Congress and other states.
View caseNorman Nash operated a bakery subject to a state civil rights order. The commission found a violation based on religious objections to certain orders. A neutral decisionmaker on appeal evaluated whether the commission had shown impermissible hostility rather than neutral application of the law.
In the summer of 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a same-sex couple planning to marry legally in Massachusetts and host a reception in Denver, visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, owned and operated by Jack Phillips. Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian who had owned the shop for twenty-four years, informed the couple that he would not create a wedding cake for their same-sex wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. He offered to sell them other baked goods such as birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies, and brownies. Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Division alleging that they had been denied full and equal service because of their sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The Division investigated the complaint. It found probable cause that Phillips had violated the Act. The Division determined that on multiple occasions he had turned away potential customers on the basis of sexual orientation. Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples. The matter was referred to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission sent the case to a state Administrative Law Judge for a formal hearing. The ALJ granted summary judgment in favor of Craig and Mullins after rejecting Phillips' constitutional claims. The Commission affirmed the decision in full. It ordered Phillips to cease and desist from discriminating against same-sex couples. The Commission also required comprehensive staff training on the public accommodations provisions of the Act. Phillips had to submit quarterly compliance reports for two years documenting patrons denied service. Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's legal determinations and remedial order in 2016. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case. During public hearings before the Commission in May and July 2014, some commissioners stated that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain. They described Phillips' invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs as one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use. They compared it to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. In three separate cases decided while Phillips' proceedings were pending, the Civil Rights Division concluded that other bakers had acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations or messages that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages. Phillips petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted in 2017.
View caseA neutral decisionmaker must decide based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing and must lack bias or predisposition toward either side. The requirement prevents the government from insulating its factual assertions from any adversarial testing.
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Yes. A properly constituted military tribunal can function as the neutral decisionmaker when procedures are tailored to military exigencies. The tribunal must still afford the citizen a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for detention.
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No. Periodic internal file reviews by officials within the detaining chain of command do not qualify. Due process requires an adversarial opportunity before a body independent of the officials who made the initial factual allegations.
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An impartial decisionmaker must base the termination decision exclusively on the evidence introduced at an evidentiary hearing. Generalized data alone cannot substitute for individualized review by a neutral body that hears the recipient's evidence and cross-examination.
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…substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency adjudicates individual rights. The only effective constraint on Congress' power is political, but Congress is most accountable…