Also known as: next-of-kin · NOK · nearest relative
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The persons entitled to succeed to a decedent's personal property under the applicable statute of intestate succession. Modern statutes treat the term as designating a class of takers in a governing instrument without presumptively creating a reversion in the transferor.
Professor Lila created a testamentary trust directing income for her grandchildren's education and the remainder to her next of kin. After the grandchildren completed school, her nephew Marcus was the only surviving relative. Marcus receives the remainder as a member of the designated class.
Earl conveyed his farm in trust to his sons Mark and David for their lives, with the remainder to his next of kin. Mark later sold his life interest to neighbor Nora. Nora holds a valid life estate because the remainder interest belongs to the class of next of kin rather than reverting to Earl's estate.
A grantor conveyed property in trust for a life tenant with remainder to the grantor's heirs and next of kin. The two classes coincided at the life tenant's death. The property passes to those individuals under the instrument rather than returning to the grantor's estate.
In January 1899, James J. Hanigan conveyed a house and lot in New York City to a trustee. The trust instrument directed the trustee to pay the grantor from the rents and profits the yearly sum of $1,500, with discretion to pay more, and to pay some debts and two existing mortgages on the property. The trustee received powers to mortgage the premises to satisfy liens or carry out the deed's provisions and to sell the property. Upon the grantor's death, the trustee was to convey the premises, if unsold, to the grantor's heirs at law or to pay them the unexpended balance of any sale proceeds. The trustee could also reconvey the premises to the grantor at any time to end the trust. At the time of trial in this action, the grantor remained alive, with two daughters as his sole descendants. In June 1902, one daughter, Mrs. Hughes, executed a deed conveying to her husband all her interest in the real estate. The plaintiffs, who are judgment creditors, later recovered a judgment for more than $4,000 against Mr. and Mrs. Hughes. They brought this action to subject what they alleged to be an interest in the real property to the lien of their judgment. The Special Term ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the existence of a reachable interest, but the Appellate Division reached a contrary conclusion, leading to this appeal.
View caseA testatrix left property to a trustee with directions to distribute according to her unstated wishes. The trust failed for indefiniteness. The next of kin of the testatrix take the property by resulting trust.
The will on its face contained a residuary bequest to the defendant that expressly required him to distribute all the property bequeathed to him. It granted him no discretion on whether to distribute it and allowed discretion only as to the manner of distribution pursuant to the testatrix's intentions. No other written instrument was signed by the testatrix and made part of the will by reference. Before, at the time of, and after the execution of the will, the testatrix orally made known to the defendant her wish and intention that the residue should be disposed of and distributed by him as executor for charitable uses and purposes according to his discretion and judgment. She directed him to do so while especially expressing her desires as to the objects to be preferred. The defendant stated these oral communications in his answer, and the plaintiffs admitted the facts to be true. The matter was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on the facts agreed by the parties, with the court entering a decree for the plaintiffs.
View caseAn Idaho statute listed persons entitled to appointment as administrator, placing the next of kin entitled to share in the estate after siblings. A female applicant challenged the preference given to males in the same degree. The next-of-kin category supplied the pool from which the court selected the administrator.
Richard Lynn Reed, a minor, died intestate in Ada County, Idaho, on March 29, 1967. His adoptive parents, who had separated sometime prior to his death, are the parties to this appeal. Approximately seven months after Richard's death, his mother, Sally Reed, filed a petition in the Probate Court of Ada County seeking appointment as administratrix of her son's estate. In her petition, Sally Reed alleged that her son's estate, consisting of a few items of personal property and a small savings account, had an aggregate value of less than $1,000. Prior to the date set for a hearing on the mother's petition, Cecil Reed, the father of the decedent, filed a competing petition seeking to have himself appointed administrator of the son's estate. The probate court held a joint hearing on the two petitions and thereafter ordered that letters of administration be issued to Cecil Reed upon his taking the oath and filing the bond required by law. The court treated §§ 15-312 and 15-314 of the Idaho Code as the controlling statutes and read those sections as compelling a preference for Cecil Reed because he was a male. Sally Reed appealed from the probate court order, and her appeal was treated by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho as a constitutional attack on § 15-314. The matter was ordered returned to the Probate Court for its determination of which of the two parties was better qualified to administer the estate. Cecil Reed took a further appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed the District Court and reinstated the original order naming the father administrator of the estate. Sally Reed thereupon appealed for review by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA slayer acquired title to property by murdering the owner. Equity imposed a constructive trust on the slayer. The next of kin of the decedent receive the property through the constructive trust.
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland. Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow. The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband. In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
View caseNo. Under modern statutes the doctrine of worthier title is abolished both as a rule of law and as a rule of construction. Language such as next of kin therefore creates a remainder in the designated class rather than a reversion in the transferor.
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The class is determined at the time the disposition is to take effect in possession or enjoyment unless the instrument manifests a contrary intent. The persons who would succeed to the designated individual's intestate estate at that moment take the property.
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Yes. Once the worthier-title doctrine is abolished the remainder is a genuine future interest that is alienable. A life tenant may therefore convey a marketable life estate without concern that a hidden reversion clouds title.
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…to have appointed. 2. The children. 3. The father or mother. 4. The brothers. 5. The sisters. 6. The grandchildren. 7. The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the estate. 8. Any of the kindred. 9. The public administrator. 10. The creditors of such person at the time of death. 11. Any person legally…